Patrick Barclay and James Lawton remind me of two morbidly obese women, deep in denial, trying to squeeze their ‘arguments’ into size 8 dresses. Never mind that the skimpy garments don’t even come close to fitting; they will hold their breath and hope for the best, as masses of blubber flops and flubbers. Two fat ladies, rip rip rip.

In the build-up to the Chelsea game, these two senior football writers produced an unprovoked defence of Roy Hodgson that also just happened to be an unprovoked attack on Kenny Dalglish; observant readers will realise that this was no mere coincidence. For some reason, the pair seem irked that we – as fans – got our man, and they – as part of an old pal’s act – lost theirs. Facts, to their mind, can have nothing to do with it.

Both sneered at Dalglish, just as before him they regularly sneered at Benítez. Above all else, they now sneer at Liverpool fans, for putting their faith in these two managers with their collection of six major league titles (four in England, two in Spain, spread across three different clubs), three FA Cups, a Uefa Cup and European Cup, plus several 80+ points finishes in the English top division; and for not warmly embracing a manager who, outside of Scandinavia, has not a single piece of silverware to his name, and who has never racked up more than 59 points in a season in England or Italy.

Irrespective of their past records, Benítez and Dalglish (second time around) work at a level well above the one Hodgson attained in his brief stint. By including Europa League qualifying rounds (the only area where Hodgson excelled, with a 100% record), Lawton tried to argue that Hodgson’s record was almost the equal of Dalglish’s, if you compared their overall performance since the departure of Benítez.

Let’s face it, did these same people laud Benítez for wins in the Champions League qualifying rounds, even though the Reds sometimes faced some pretty good teams? No. Would these same people praise Dalglish for beating Championship sides (who are probably better than FC Rabonicki) in the Carling Cup? No.

If Lawton and Barclay want to write reams on how well Hodgson is doing at West Brom, or how well he did at Fulham, then I won’t object. But should they try to rubbish Dalglish in order to elevate their man, I’ll call them out for what they are. I’ll defend any Liverpool manager who does a good job, and who doesn’t treat the fans like mugs.

Take a look at the league stats that Lawton quoted, but quickly brushed over. It is beyond me how anyone can argue that there is little difference between 1.25 and 1.80 (points per game) when the minimum is 0.00 and the maximum is 3.00 – and when the acceptable range for a club like Liverpool is between 1.50 and 2.30.

Want to quote stats, Mr Lawton? Why not start with away wins; Liverpool had as many away league wins this weekend as they did in six months under Hodgson. (And that lone win was against the mighty Bolton, not Chelsea.) Dalglish has now overseen two league wins at Stamford Bridge, plus a draw and a victory at The Emirates. It took him just two games to better Hodgson’s 1-0 away victory, with the 3-0 win at Wolves in January. Liverpool later scored five on the road, at Fulham.

Meanwhile, Barclay, on Friday, quipped “During Roy Hodgson’s ill-fated management of Liverpool, a frequent criticism was that his teams seldom won away matches. Kenny Dalglish has brought about a transformation. Now Liverpool can’t win home matches.”

Ho ho.

He added that the club were in a “mini-crisis” going into the game at Chelsea; such a wonderful sense of perspective there. For all the good football writers at the Times, it seems a shame to have one fouling up the sports section with such pungent turds.

Of course, Liverpool remain undefeated at home this season, even if a couple of disappointing draws (Sunderland, Swansea), and one unlucky stalemate (Norwich), have resulted in more dropped points than anticipated. But of course, it’s not like Hodgson’s Liverpool lost at home to, say … Blackpool, is it? Or Wolves? I mean, it’s hardly like Hodgson’s record at Anfield is stellar.

In terms of home points won, Dalglish (2011) and Hodgson are level: 66% each. In terms of points won away from home, Dalglish’s results are more than three times better.

I don’t want to spend my time attacking a ghost like Hodgson; but if his allies are going to attack good Liverpool managers in defence of a failed one, in order to score points, then I must redress the balance. Someone must tell the truth. It’s not fair on Dalglish, or the owners, to suggest that the Scot has made little difference.

It’s like a return to the days of Benítez; hacks with agendas that facts do not favour continuing to show incredible, depressing bias. If Liverpool fans were harsh on Hodgson – and we may have been, to a small degree – he did little to help himself. The facts help him even less. There is nothing in his record to suggest that he was up to the job, or finding the right path. It was a nightmare for all concerned, and no amount of spin will re-write that.

History will show that his results, his team’s performances and his signings (of which there were seven) were not good enough. He broke even on Raul Meireles, but Cole, Konchesky and Poulsen – who, though admittedly relatively inexpensive, were all shoehorned into the side at the expense of better players – flopped. The other three signings barely warrant a mention.

Look at the following five graphs, based on the one comparable competition: the Premier League. Cold, hard facts. Benítez, Hodgson, Dalglish – and a clear trend.

Granted, 2010 was not an easy time to be Liverpool manager, but then again, it rarely is, with high expectations and, between 2007 and when they finally slung their hook a year ago, rotten owners.

But those expectations are why some people are better off at Fulham and West Brom, where winning 33% of your games is an achievement, rather than a failing.

None of this means that Dalglish gets everything right and Hodgson got everything wrong. But the facts are clear, unless you try to fudge them.

Alas, there’s even more in the attempt to discredit Dalglish.

The rest of this post is for Subscribers only.

So, according to Derek Llambias, the Newcastle managing director, Andy Carroll is worth ‘fuck all’. Of course, having bragged of turning down a bid of £30m, at which point Liverpool could easily have walked away, they must have had some sense of his value, but that’s by the by. Either way, at £35m, Andy Carroll remains a news story. Welcome to the goldfish bowl.

The price tag won’t go away, and perhaps that’s the Geordie’s biggest handicap. People expect a lot, and expect it immediately.

Recently I’ve been trying to think back about notable target-men – their goalscoring records and their ability to bully defences – and how long it took them to develop their game. The evidence (which I will come to) suggests that, actually, Carroll – at just 22 – is very well developed in relation to other players of his ilk. That doesn’t mean he’ll go on to prove a smash-hit sensation – potential of all shapes and sizes has sped down the drain – but people often make the mistake of not taking the type of player into account when looking at age.

I’ve always felt that smaller, quicker strikers peak young, and slower, bigger strikers peak later. This is a general rule, and there will of course be exceptions. As a rough guide, I feel that it has a lot of merits.

Pace can get forwards into goalscoring chances, so an average 17-year-old with jet-heels can beat even the best defenders now and then; but without pace, a striker needs to rely on movement, cunning, positioning; and as with the arts of the centre-back, these are skills honed with time and experience. Centre-backs peak after their mid-20s, and I believe the target-man does, too.

When previously considering this, I tended to think of slower strikers as the type who dropped deeper and looked for openings; the clever no.10, who played the passes for the nippy no.9 to run onto. But what about the ‘old-fashioned’ no.9? (Which, in itself, is a term that does players like Carroll no favours; a nod to the old days of English football when, it seems, every forward was a giant.)

As hard as I’ve tried, I’m yet to discover any target-men who were at their best – or at least, already highly prolific – in their teens; I can’t find the target-man ‘major league’ equivalents of Michael Owen, Robbie Fowler, Nicolas Anelka, Fernando Torres, Lionel Messi, Kun Aguero and Wayne Rooney, who were probably capable of 20 goals a season in the strongest divisions by the age of 18. Maybe they exist, and I’ve just overlooked them, but they don’t leap as readily to mind.

But more on that a little later.

Target Style

Andy Carroll isn’t as slow as people make out, but he doesn’t have that extra change of pace to get away from defenders, and obviously, when up against sprinters for centre-backs, he can look laboured. He has good technical ability, in terms of lay-offs and hold-up play, and has a sweetness in his left-foot that many strikers of any size would envy. However, although it can be coached, his movement off the ball isn’t yet that great.

His status as a ‘traditional’ no.9 is based on his size and aerial ability, although at Liverpool his heading has been fairly wayward; to me, evidence of a lack of confidence, given the way he frequently rose to meet crosses with towering headers at Newcastle. Again, this sense of unease with his own game is down to developing gradually within a familiar environment, with low expectations, then dramatically yanked out of his comfort zone and suddenly expected to play like a ‘£35m player’. It takes time to develop, and it often takes time to adjust to a new club.

I actually think that Carroll is starting to come of age for the Reds away from home; it gives him the chance to hold the ball up for Suarez and the midfield support, and it also means that he’s not facing the kind of packed defences he encounters at Anfield, where it’s more likely he’ll be crowded out. His understanding with Luis Suarez has blossomed in away games in particular, and overall – and somewhat counterintuitively – Carroll has played just behind his strike partner in most of their games together.

With five goals in 21 matches for the Reds (albeit just 14 starts), he’s doing okay. This season, all three of his goals have come on the road, and none has been headed. Part of the problem has been his team-mates too frequently hitting long balls in his direction, to the point where Liverpool have probably played its best football in his absence; however, there have been plenty of games where the ball was kept on the deck with the big no.9 in the side, and also some poor performances when he’s been absent.

Although the Kop support him, I sense that he hasn’t had quite the goodwill afforded to Peter Crouch, even though it took the gangly £7m striker 19 games to finally find the net for the then-reigning European champions.

Had Carroll cost £7m, he’d be viewed more favourably on his performances thus far. Fees clearly affect perceptions (as well as the player’s own game). But if everyone can just get past the price tag, and view him as a component of the team, rather than a costly individual, he might stand a chance.

You can always argue that such a fee could have been better spent, but with Suarez, Enrique and Bellamy all bargains, you can’t win ‘em all; some signings will seem cheap at twice the price, others expensive – it’s the way it goes. The key is now coaxing the best out of the big no.9, rather than obsessing with what he’s not (i.e. Kun Aguero. Or, indeed, Luis Suarez…).

Most importantly, given Carroll’s age, and the type of player he is, if comparisons are to be made, they need to be like with like. Observers need to appreciate the longer learning curve of the target-man.

Perhaps this type of player is rarely viewed as world-class – unless they have pace, they find it hard to be consistently devastating – but many have proven increasingly prolific (even pretty mediocre versions, like Kevin Davies), on top of the focal point/spearhead qualities they bring.

Compare and Contrast

No two players are identical; therefore comparisons can always be criticised. In thinking of a whole host of target-men over the past 20 years or so (mostly in England, but also further afield), I realised that some were quicker than others, and that there was a wide range of heights, even though I set the minimum at 6ft; the maximum topped 6’8”.

I wanted to do my best to avoid comparing apples with oranges; all the while accepting that, given differences within the different striking genres, I may have to compare apples with pears, and oranges with clementines. Once I’d worked out how the traditional no.9s performed I could then look at the differences in trends between target-men and the generally smaller, more mobile variety of forward: only then comparing the apple and the orange.

I looked only at performance in the top divisions main five European leagues (England, Spain, France, Germany and Italy), and only compared goalscoring records in league games; to exclude games against substandard opposition, either in weaker leagues or in cup ties where strikers can fill their boots. (Target-men obviously do much more than score goals, but it’s the most obvious comparison that gets made; and assist and chance creation data goes back only so far.)

Given the nature of this site, I tried to include as many Liverpool players as possible, but the list mostly comprises non-LFC players. Obviously the players I looked at have been in teams of varying quality; some good, some bad, some great, some woeful, and so on. So again, it makes comparisons difficult, but I’ll try all the same.

Exceptionally quick and/or skilful tall strikers like Zlatan Ibrahimovich and Thierry Henry were excluded, as they could just as easily fit into the ‘oranges’ category I wanted to later compare against. I also excluded target-men who’d started as wingers (such as Emile Heskey), as it’s harder to say when they became a target-man.

In total I looked at 23 ‘target-men’, and 11 strikers who relied more on a combination of pace, skill and finishing than aerial challenges and hold-up play. All names (beyond those with an LFC connection) were chosen randomly and without bias – the ones that sprung to mind, and the suggestions other people made to me.

(Some further names – and good ones at that – were mentioned to me after I’d crunched the data, but maybe I can go back and expand it at a later date. I’ll mention some of those names at the end of this piece, but they are not included in the overall averages.)

Overall, the target-men in the mini-study average 97 top-league, top division goals apiece, at 8.8 per season. The mobile goalscorers average 130 goals each, at 10.7 per season.

All About Age

Only three of the 23 target-men I studied made their league debut as early as 17, and Carroll was one of them. Three more made their debut at 18, but the overall average for playing their first game in a major league top division worked out at 21. Clearly, as suspected, target-man is not a young man’s game; by contrast, the average of the 11 smaller/quicker strikers is just 18, with three of that category making their first league appearance at just 16.

(In calculating age, I worked out how old the players were at the start of each season.)

Out of the 23, only two had managed double-figures in a qualifying league before the age of 20; with 13 the highest amount registered. However, eight of the 11 smaller/quicker strikers had reached double-figures at the age of 19, four of whom exceeded 17 league goals in a season.

In total, 15 of the 23 ‘apples’ had their best season (or best season to date) aged 25 or over, whereas six of the 11 ‘oranges’ had their best season aged 23 or younger (only two of the 11 peaked after 25). Above all else in the study, this, to me, is the most revealing stat. Whatever the relative merits of the different kinds of players, that seems highly pertinent.

Of course, Carroll, at just 22, is still some way off his mid-20s, and Edin Dzeko is 25 right now; therefore neither are applicable here when it comes to peaking after 25. So in essence it’s 15 out of 21 who peaked aged 25 or over. In other words, three out of every four target-men will have his best season in his mid-20s or later. (Going back further, I just checked John Toshack’s stats: slow start after joining Liverpool aged 21, and his best season aged 26, in 1976.)

Excluding Carroll and Dzeko, two of the three remaining strikers to have experienced their best season when under 25 – Emmanuel Adebayor and Peter Crouch (both 23 at the time) – are still playing, and quite conceivably yet to have their best season (though this seems less likely with Crouch, now that he’s 30 and not at a big club).

Eight of the 21 had their best season aged 28 or over, and three of those had their best-ever season in their 30s. Only Fernando Morientes peaked young, with his best season aged 22, although he had some highly effective seasons up until the point he joined Liverpool in his late 20s. For Andy Carroll to have managed 13 league goals in a single season at the age of 21, having moved clubs halfway through – and moving clubs has hampered many on the list for a year or two – and missed a large chunk of the campaign, is highly impressive; look below at how few other target-men were posting similar figures in a tough division by that age.

(Click to view full size. Where players have two or more best seasons, the one with the fewest games played is counted.)

The overall average age for best season for target-men is 26.4, with it standing at 25.7 for players still active in the relevant leagues, and 26.5 for those who have either retired or moved to less-competitive environs. Compare this with the average age of 23.4 for the peaking of the 11 non-target-man strikers, and again, it suggests that although they may not burn as bright to start with, they come into their own later in their careers.

None of this means that Carroll will develop into the kind of striker he has the potential to become; the no.9 Rio Ferdinand felt could be ‘unplayable’. But it does go to show that even though he’s not the finished article, he’s arguably ahead of many of the great names we now look back on as masters of the art at the same stage of their careers.

(Target-men not included: Gabriel Batistuta, major league debut at 22, best season aged 25; Les Ferdinand, major league debut at 20, best season 25. Smaller strikers overlooked: Ian Wright, debut 22, best season 29; Kevin Phillips, debut 27, best season 27; Kun Aguero, debut 18, best season 22. Alessandro Del Piero, Serie A debut 19, best season 23.)

Further analysis of the target-men in the study follows, for Subscribers only.

The following piece is an in-depth look at just where, after a few years of drama, the Reds stand right now in terms of progress and direction headed. The first half of the article is free to read, the second half is for Subscribers only.

Feeling disoriented? You may not be alone. It seems that many Liverpool fans are a little lost right now. Lost between expectations, transitions and reality. We are the discombobulation nation. Far better under Dalglish than Hodgson, but behind Newcastle in the table.

(Still, we were behind almost everyone this time last year, in 18th place.)

Fans almost always want more than is realistic. But what is realistic right now?

The 1990s were spent in the shadow of belief: belief that we were the rightful heirs to the title, having spent the previous two decades basking in glory. It took a while to realise that, hey, we’re not simply unlucky; we’re just not that good anymore.

For a while, in the mid-‘90s, the Reds, just like Keegan’s Newcastle, had a great attacking team, but, at best, an average defensive one; only Manchester United (and briefly, Dalglish’s Blackburn, before he moved ‘upstairs’ having wont he 1995 title) seemed to get it right at both ends.

After the last title in 1990, the Reds won just two trophies that decade: an FA Cup in 1992, and the League Cup three years later, both against lower league opposition. There was just one further final, the cream suit debacle of ’96. There were a couple of tilts at the title, but never quite amounting to much.

Then came the Houllier years, a general upward trend from seasons two to four, and a nosedive for the last two. Still, he won four trophies, and the treble of 2001 was the best time we’d had for a decade.

Throughout his time – excluding the poor first season – Liverpool were ‘roughly’ a top four side, if only a Champions League side on two occasions.

Manchester United and Arsenal were the titans, and Chelsea, Leeds and Newcastle the rivals for a place in the top four. This trio were relatively big spenders, and so were Liverpool. (Even so, United were spending £30m on single players almost a decade ago, when £11m was a lot for Liverpool.)

But it was a time when ‘big spending’ had yet to be redefined by Roman Abramovich. That came in 2003.  The big-spending ‘90s had yielded very little for the Reds, and now they were losing out to richer clubs.

Liverpool averaged 65 points a season in Houllier’s time, and, fortunately for us, scraped 4th place, with a fairly low total of 60 (with just 16 wins from 38), in 2003/04. A massive 30 points off the title, but still good enough to scrape by.

I can’t speak for others, but I felt I knew where LFC ‘belonged’ during the next five years; I had my bearings. Maybe it’s because I started analysing the club on a full-time and highly detailed basis, or perhaps it was the five consecutive Champions League qualifications, and four journeys to at least the quarter-finals. A top four side, and top-eight in Europe.

Liverpool were never title favourites, and were always paying lower fees than United and Chelsea, but there was a strong identity to the team, with the two scouse Trojans (as they were, in their pomp) and the Spanish cavalry.

But then it started to go wrong. The club was at war with itself, and the owners were loathed by the fans. The priority became less about winning matches (although that never becomes meaningless), and more about protecting the future of the club. The fans, split 50-50 over Benítez by the end, were unified in their hatred of Gillett and Hicks.

While Roy Hodgson was a universally underwhelming appointment for Kopites, had his team not performed so much below even modest expectations, he may have steered the ship – after all, he was the ‘steady hand’ – to the shore of season’s end. He may have been a decent interim boss, the man who, after all, said his speciality was getting more out of players, and not requiring a big budget to get results.

Alas, managing Liverpool is nothing like managing Fulham or West Brom in terms of expectations. The tactics were all wrong, the approach far too defeatist.

My own view was that, having expected top four under Benítez, 5th or 6th was where his replacement should have had the team; for me, there were no unrealistic expectations last season with which to hammer Hodgson. (I was mocked on the official site forum by someone who said, after the opening day Arsenal draw, that Liverpool would end the season as champions under Hodgson. Really? These same people called me ‘optimistic’ under Rafa.)

Unfortunately, Liverpool became a team floundering below mid-table, and the football was poor from front to back. All sorts of records for the worst performance in 50 years were being set – worst start, worst cup exit (in terms of quality of opposition), worst goal difference. Remember, this was less than a year ago.

Still, at least Gillett and Hicks were sent packing; if they’d blighted the latter years of Benítez and first three months of Hodgson’s tenure, there was now an incredible sense of victory in the air. Winning the court case was like winning a trophy.

The clouds had lifted! The arrival of FSG coincided with a brief upturn in results, but after a handful of games where things looked increasingly close to being acceptable, the team fell apart, and were now playing worse than ever. Fans became united again; in excess of 90% wanted Hodgson removed.

Hodgson hadn’t got to spend the new owners’ money, but he had benefited from the sense of calm that fell over the club; but chaos on the pitch was now the problem. For a decade Liverpool had been winning 51% of league games under the successive reigns of Evans and Houllier (1994-2004), and 56% under Benítez between 2004 and 2010.

Under Hodgson, the Premier League win percentage was just 35%. He did better with what he called the ‘B team’, in Europe’s second-rate competition, but with the ‘A team’, where it counted, he was found wanting.

So the board turned to the man who, in an era when 60% was an incredibly high win rate (after all, Bob Paisley’s was 57% when racking up six titles in nine seasons), posted 61% across six seasons.

Whatever Kenny Dalglish’s long-term prospects at the club, it was hard to think of anyone better to bring a sense of unity to the fans; or at least, unity that did not involve despising the manager.

Short-term, it didn’t really need thinking outside the box; just someone to fill the rapidly emptying Anfield seats, and get the players smiling again. Oh, and passing the ball on the deck. As fans, there was a sense of relief, and a sense of euphoria. But if last season under Dalglish was the great night on the tiles, this would always be in risk of being the morning after.

Until the final two games of last season – both of which were lost (immediately after the manager’s role was made permanent) – Dalglish’s record was far better than any of us had a right to expect.

The football was fluent, and the Reds rose from 13th to 5th in almost no time, but stumbled over the line, in 6th. Some in the media saw this as a ‘collapse’.

Still, with 35 points, Dalglish had racked up 11 more in 18 games than Hodgson managed in 20. Hodgson was on course for a 48-point finish, whereas Dalglish’s results, pro rata, were suggestive of a 74-point season. Boy, were we grateful. And that brings us to this season.

So, where does this undulating journey leave us now? What are realistic ambitions? It’s okay saying “but we are Liverpool!” (which translates as: we should be winning the league), but that doesn’t put food – I mean points – on the table.

The second half of this post is for Subscribers only.

Adios Señor, Bonjour Monsieur: A Look At Liverpool’s Forays Into Different Transfer Markets

I have to admit that I wholeheartedly bought into the Spanish revolution at Liverpool; so much more than the French one that went before it.

The big difference, of course, was that we got the best of Spanish: best manager, best players. By contrast, we had a second-rate French manager (by comparison with Arsene Wenger, at least). Given that Arsenal had not only got the better French manager, but got their first (two years earlier, in 1996), Liverpool was never going to be the primary destination for elite French talent.

A lot of Reds still shudder at Houllier’s forays into the French market. While he made good signings from Holland, Germany and England, he only really had one single clear success (John Arne Riise) when plundering his homeland. All managers sign their fair share of flops, but in Houllier’s case, they almost always came from France.

And now, in 2011, the key transfer strategist is once again French. While it’s unlikely that Damien Comolli will focus solely on his homeland, it’s interesting to note how many Ligue Une players we are being linked with. That said, so far it’s a Uruguayan from the Dutch league and a Geordie that he’s helped procure.

Obviously managers and Directors of Football have markets in which they feel most comfortable, or perhaps simply more knowledgeable; it stands to reason that contacts will be strongest in someone’s homeland.

But no matter where a player is from, it’s the individual’s talent and mentality that is key. While it’s interesting to look at success and failure rates from different countries, every player is unique.

French Farce

Gérard Houllier plundered the French market during six years of spending. The list of names reads like a litany of transfer crimes.

Jean-Michel Ferri, Pegguy Arphexad, Titi Camara, Rigobert Song (although he was briefly at Italian club Salernitana), Bernard Diomede, Bruno Cheyrou, Salif Diao, El Hadji Diouf, Djimi Traore, Gregory Vignal, Djibril Cissé, Anthony Le Tallec and Florent Sinama-Pongolle: 13 French (or French-trained) players, plus one Czech, Vladimir Smicer, and one Norwegian, Riise, plying their trade across the Channel, who cost £57.8m, or £108.1m in 2010 money (Current Transfer Purchase Price, CTPP; see Transfer Price Index site or Pay As You Play for more details).

On average, each player cost £3.5m (£6.7m in today’s money). The list does not include young players like Carl Medjani or Alou Diarra, neither of whom played a single game for the club. (Diarra was also signed from Germany, not France.)

Now, there are of course different types of signings, which fit into three broad groups: those bought in order to immediately strengthen the first XI (or at least challenge for a spot); those bought based on future potential; and those who make up the squad numbers – the understudies. And it’s clear that all three categories are represented by those players.

Of the list, Song, Camara, Diouf, Riise, Diao, Cissé and Cheyrou were bought for the first XI (or thereabouts), with Diomede perhaps also expected to at least remain on the face of the earth.

Traore, Cissé and Smicer were all key parts of the Champions League triumph a year after Houllier departed, although none was a clear success in their own right. Smicer was very gifted but injured too often, and Cissé was quick and powerful, but also somewhat aimless, and like Smicer, had more than his share of bad luck.

For what was paid, Sinama-Pongolle was a success of sorts, although he never reached his full potential at the club. Titi Camara really succeeded in relation to expectations, with one fine season at the club; but it never amounted to any more than ‘pretty good’. And even though he was a success, John Arne Riise wasn’t outstanding.

Now contrast with the Spaniards/La Liga players (who made a Premier League appearance) signed between 2004 and 2010:

Xabi Alonso, Daniel Pacheco, Daniel Ayala, Alvaro Arbeloa, Fabio Aurelio, Mark Gonzalez, Pepe Reina, Josemi, Luis Garcia, Maxi Rodriguez, Fernando Morientes, Antonio Nunez, Mauricio Pellegrino, Albert Riera, Momo Sissoko and Fernando Torres.

Sixteen players, who cost £71.5m. Obviously Benítez was paying for players at a more expensive time, due to inflation, and that’s where CTPP comes in: £107.8m is virtually identical, in current money, to Houllier’s 15 French buys (£108.1m).

But look at the outstanding successes: three, in the form of Reina, Alonso and Torres. Then come the undeniable, if perhaps unremarkable, successes: Arbeloa, Aurelio and Garcia. And next, the qualified successes of Maxi (who is improving all the time) and Sissoko (who had two fine seasons before a serious eye injury, and was sold for a large profit). Eight out of 16 isn’t a bad ratio for successes, particularly as Pacheco and Ayala can still make that ten out of 16.

So, is this because Benítez was a better judge of player, or because Spanish footballers are better suited to England? Or was Rafa buying a few ‘high end’ talents that cost a lot of money?

Looking at the prices paid for certain French and Spanish players, there’s not a huge difference. In today’s money, Cissé and Torres were £25m and £22m respectively, so it was Houllier who made the most expensive single purchase. Meanwhile, Diouf and Alonso were £16 and £19m when inflation is taken into account; and there was only a couple of million pounds (CTPP) between Reina and Diao, Smicer and Garcia, and Arbeloa and Song.

Then there’s the sell-on profits. Taking all fees at 2010 prices, of the twelve La Liga signings to have been sold, £121m has raised; roughly a 20% profit. (If using non-inflated figures, the profit is even higher, at almost 50%.)

This obviously does not include the hopefully-never-sold Pepe Reina, who could fetch £20m+ in the current market; while Maxi, Ayala and Pacheco, for whom less than a million in total was paid, could raise a fair few million between them.

Compare this to Houllier’s French signings. £108m spent in current money, but only £37m recouped on those sold; meaning that 66% of the money effectively vanished.

But none of this proves that the Spanish market is better than the French one. What’s almost certainly true is that, on average, the 16 La Liga buys had a better mentality than the 15 from Ligue Une.

Of the 15 French signings, there were some hotheads (Diouf, Cissé), some wallflowers (Cheyrou), and those who were happy to hang around and pick up their wages for doing nothing (Diao). None had the psychological toughness of Reina, Alonso, Morientes, Pellegrini, Maxi, or even Torres (2007-2009, at least). Cissé did brilliantly to recover from injury, but on the pitch he was something of a loose cannon.

Is this a national failing? – The French implosion at the 2010 World Cup hints that it is, but previous Spanish camps have also fallen apart, and the stereotypically laid-back Dutch are well known for self-destructing at tournaments. (The English, meanwhile, are often best-known for drinking exploits.) And anyway, can we generalise in such a way?

It’s more likely that this was just a bad collection of players, who lacked the mental strength of many of their compatriots at Arsenal at the time. After all, Patrick Vieira, Robert Pires and Thierry Henry were winners.

Value

It’s fair to say that some nationalities are overpriced, as noted in “Soccernomics”. The example given there relates to the Dutch, and Kuper and Szymanski also go on to reference the cachet of Brazilians (quoting an agent who says “It’s easier to sell a crap Brazilian than a brilliant Mexican.”)

But it’s also about the markets in which you shop. Buying from major leagues costs more than buying from backwaters, for players of similar ability.

The best bargains seem to be found in South America, where the talent can be bought direct from the source. But what tends to happen is that British clubs buy Latinos only after they’ve been a success in Europe. But is this such bad practice?

Take Luis Suarez. Aged 19, in 2006 he moved to Groningen in Holland for a measly €800,000. But at the time he wasn’t even a full international. After impressing, he was bought a year later by Ajax for £7.5m. In the end, it cost Liverpool £22m to bring him to England.

But the fee relates to not only talent, but how ‘proven’ the player is. Groningen took a gamble on a teenager who’d never left his homeland. By 2007, Ajax knew that he could handle European football and life away from South America, but it was only after he starred for them that his ability to lead the line (and lead the team) at a big club was proven. Ideally, you find the player before he’s established elsewhere, and therefore a lot cheaper, but it’s easier said than done.

Liverpool haven’t had the best luck buying directly from South America, although the total of around £11m paid for Lucas, Leto, Insua and Paletta has proved a worthwhile investment, given that Lucas – my vote for the Reds’ player of the year – is now worth at least that amount on his own. Insua’s value had risen to around £5m in 2010, while Paletta’s fee was recouped (and eventually became a profit, as the Reds were due 45% of his transfer fee when he was sold to Parma last summer). A profit was likewise made on Leto.

Again, the South American successes have tended to have first acclimatised to Europe: Mascherano, Aurelio, Maxi and now Suarez: a 66% record (with only Pellegrino and Gonzalez failing), compared with 25% (or 50% if you rate Insua) when buying direct from the source.

Of course, two the four successes were big-money buys who were more likely to succeed, and therefore it was perhaps less about where they were from and more to do with the increased odds for success when paying higher fees. The other two were well-known players on free transfers, while neither of the flops were expensive.

In the past 15 years, Liverpool have probably had their best success rate with Dutch clubs, if not necessarily Dutch players. Ryan Babel didn’t work out as hoped, but Sami Hyypia, Dirk Kuyt, Sander Westerveld, Jerzy Dudek and Luis Suarez result in an 86% strike rate for the Reds when plundering the Eredivisie.

(I include Westerveld and Dudek as successes, as they were pretty good for the most part, and played their part in very successful seasons. Dutchman Jan Kromkamp was bought from Spain, Bolo Zenden arrived from Middlesbrough, and the lovable but totally hapless Erik Meijer from Bayer Leverkusen.)

Appearances

One way of judging the success of transfers is how many games the individuals start; the better the player, the more chance that they will feature more prominently in the XI. (Those who have injury problems may still be good players, but if they rarely start, it doesn’t necessary make them a good signing.)

For the purposes of this mini study, I’ve excluded kids bought well before they were ever intended to be near the first team, as well as reserve goalkeepers, whose appearances were always going to be limited. It’s not entirely representative of ability, as strikers will be rotated more often than goalkeepers, but it should still provide an interesting guide.

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Assessing the overall tactical master-plan under the new management/coaching team of Kenny Dalglish and Steve Clarke, and guessing where it’s heading, is somewhat difficult, given the number of changes to both the playing staff and the systems seen in the past few months. This season, the task for those who replaced Roy Hodgson and Mike Kelly was always going to be about patching up a ship that was rapidly sinking, and getting back towards the top six.

Roy Hodgson inherited a squad set up to play one way (although Rafa Benítez was both praised and criticised in equal measure for his tactical variations). Hodgson then made a number of purchases, and suddenly the squad was more of a mixed bag. The new players didn’t really suit 4-4-2 – Hodgson’s default system – and to make matters worse, they injected little new quality into the pool of players.

Flat 4-4-2

For a while, earlier in the season, Liverpool FC had gone back in time; back to the dark ages. A horribly predictable and plodding ‘flat’ 4-4-2, under an ill-suited manager, seemed to undo the moves into modern, flexible tactical football taken in the past decade.

Then, Liverpool went further into the past, but this time, took simultaneous strides into the future. While Kenny Dalglish may have been out of the game for more than a decade, his approach (aided and abetted by the indispensable Steve Clarke) has appeared far more modern than that of Roy Hodgson.

Quite why Hodgson reverted to a flat 4-4-2 at Liverpool when he’d apparently evolved out of the habit in his final year at Fulham (particularly in European competition, in which most of his team’s eye-catching performances came), only he will know. At the Cottage, he’d had success with Zoltan Gera playing off a main striker; performing the role that Steven Gerrard had being reinvented in at Liverpool.

Hodgson briefly tried ‘Cole in the hole’, but that lasted 45 minutes against Arsenal on the opening day, before the player – who’d been unable to get into the game on his debut – was sent off.

In the next game, at Manchester City, with Javier Mascherano’s late withdrawal, Hodgson reverted to using two very similar front-line strikers, in Torres and Ngog, rather than moving Gerrard out of central midfield, or seeking other solutions. That midfield was duly outnumbered and overrun, and City deservedly won 3-0. Torres and Ngog together meant no-one could naturally link play, and they floated adrift of the action like Jersey and Guernsey miles from the British mainland.

A side’s tactics have to reflect the level a team is either at, or where it is intending to be. It is not a case of every team, no matter its standing in the game, playing the same way. Barcelona need different tactics to Bolton Wanderers. Even Manchester United alter their approach depending on the quality of the opposition.

Hodgson seems relaxed and authoritative at West Brom, in the manner he had at Fulham. But at a far bigger club – about which he constantly bemoaned the level of scrutiny and exposure – he looked stressed and flummoxed. He never ‘owned’ the situation, and he never set his team out as if he did.

Even if the fans were not totally on his side even at the outset, he never demonstrated that he had the guts to play the right way in order to win them over. He reverted to a safe setting, and the side faltered. The tactics we’re seeing now at Liverpool – which I will examine in detail in a moment – were open to the man who couldn’t even steer the Reds into the top 10 after 20 games. It’s not about 4-4-2 vs 4-5-1, but about the movement between the lines.

If Hodgson lacked the complete ideal set of tools to work with, he still opted to select a hammer when there was a loose screw, and tried to bang in nails with a spirit level. There was never a match-up between tactics and personnel. It took just hours for Dalglish to remedy this; even 1-0 down after a minute and with ten men after 30, his side looked better balanced at Old Trafford in his opening game.

Jonathan Wilson recently wrote about the death of what I call a flat 4-4-2, but which others refer to as rigid, or in his case, ‘orthodox’.

Football is not a predictable game. A team can have 20 chances and still lose to a side that musters only one. All a coach can do is manipulate the percentages as best he can in his favour. With that caveat in mind, though, a prediction – in the next decade, no side will win a major international tournament playing an orthodox 4-4-2.

The rest of this extended post is for Subscribers only, and looks at how the tactics have evolved under Dalglish, and where they might be heading next season.

Something of a defensive injury crisis had Kopites worrying about this fixture. Glen Johnson and Martin Kelly are both out for another month with hamstring issues, while Agger will not play again this term after injuring his knee against West Brom. Liverpool will also be without Steven Gerrard for the rest of the season due to his groin problem, limiting the options in central midfield. Jonjo Shelvey and Fabio Aurelio, however, were both fit enough to make the squad, with the latter making the starting eleven.

Manchester City welcomed back Pablo Zabaleta who had been in Argentina to care for his father who had been seriously injured in a car crash. Gareth Barry, James Milner and Edin Dzeko were all in contention for a place having been rested last week against Sunderland. Micah Richards (hamstring) and Jerome Boateng (knee) remained sidelined.

Liverpool had drawn three and lost one in their last four Premier League meetings with City (a 3-0 thumping earlier in the season). Only one of the 13 goals scored against City since August 2005 had come in the first half; even that was delayed until the 40th minute. At the other end, Carlos Tevez has a formidable record of four goals in six league matches against Liverpool.

City have won more penalties than any other team (nine); highest percentage of goals in the first 15 minutes of a match (20%); and the lowest percentage of goals in the final 10 minutes (10%). Just over two-fifths of the goals they have conceded came in the final quarter of an hour; which makes them the worst finishers of games in the whole league.

Liverpool had scored in every game for the past 13 in the league, and had lost just one of their last 11 at home. City were without a win in five away matches, taking just two points from a possible 15.

First Half

Liverpool’s back four was the least recognisable, changed as it was by the injury situation at the club. Only Carragher and Skrtel survived from the last game against West Brom, playing here as the centre backs. Aurelio returned at left back, while debutant John Flanagan began his Liverpool career as a right back. The midfield and forward line, however, remained unchanged. Spearing was given the opportunity to continue his impressive form, with Meireles continuing at left midfield.

By contrast, City’s back four continued from the game against Sunderland, but de Jong and Balotelli were benched in favour of Milner and Barry. Dzeko also started.

In terms of formations, both sides continued as they have for the previous few games. Liverpool went 4-4-2, with Manchester City preferring the 4-2-1-3.

In terms of strategy, this left Liverpool with the obvious conundrum of what to do with their numerical disadvantage in the midfield. Additionally, the mobility and pace of City’s wide men (Tevez left and Johnson right) would pose significant problems for their full backs (one a debutant, the other coming off the back of an injury).

Dalglish and Clarke clearly demonstrated the plan early on. As in previous matches, the back four were instructed to keep it tight, refrain from going forward too often and to hold a reasonably deep defensive line. This left no space either behind them or in the channels between them. Only Aurelio made occasional forays into City territory.

The six players ahead of them provided the attacking threat. Lucas and Spearing recycled the ball by sticking close together in the centre. Meireles and Kuyt provided width by getting into wider positions. Suarez was allowed to roam wherever he felt best, playing combinations off the main striker, Carroll.

It was an even contest early on. Both teams worked the flanks, although somewhat surprisingly the central midfielders were bypassed. The away team started to get a foothold as the half progressed. Their extra man and greater closing down allowed them to wrest control of possession.

Mancini’s game-plan was evident – his team would generally come down their left flank where Kolorov could force Kuyt to come deep to deal with his running. Tevez and Milner would then try to overload Liverpool’s right back, Flanagan. This failed to break Liverpool down. Kuyt was able to track Kolorov fairly comfortably, while neither Tevez nor Milner were able to create enough space for themselves nor were they adequately served by the central midfielders. Flanagan coped well in his own right, but he was also aided, when necessary, by the experienced Jamie Carragher alongside him. Skrtel was able to deal with Dzeko on his own, which allowed Carragher to play this covering role.

After the first few minutes, it was clear that Liverpool had City figured out, and could therefore start creating some attacking moves of their own. In the seventh minute they created the first good chance to score. Carroll flicked the ball into Suarez’s path with his feet and as the Uruguayan cut into the empty space his hard, low shot was pushed onto the post by Hart.

Liverpool’s “wingers” were not the ones providing the width here. Kuyt and Meireles tucked in to help Spearing and Lucas recycle possession. The wide options came from the two strikers who were able to pull to the flanks and create space. Dalglish appeared to tell his forward men to favour the left flank when doing this, since City’s right back, Boyata, is far from a natural in that position. Usually a central defender, he obviously lacked the pace and mobility of a top-class full back. By pulling wide and then cutting in, the Liverpool strikers hoped to pull Boyata out of position, free up space down the wing for Meireles and, at the same time, break free of their marker. Villareal are famous for setting up their forwards and wingers in such a way.

It was remarkable  how poor City’s midfield three were in helping out their defence in these situations. They left a huge space in the hole between the defence and the midfield. This should never happen with the numerical advantage they enjoyed in this zone of the field. One of the centre backs was forced to pull wide to deal with the movement of Liverpool’s strikers; this left gaps in the middle for the other striker to exploit, as well as giving the wide striker the option of using Meireles as a passing outlet.

So, with the crowd rocking after Suarez’s chance Liverpool gained momentum. With these huge gaps in the defence, Meireles fought well with Tevez to regain the ball. This was perhaps more memorable because it forced Tevez to come off with an injury. Seconds later, Carroll was able to hit a rebounded shot with a fierce left-foot volley and celebrated his first Liverpool goal.

City’s overall game plan was being undone – 1-0 down and without the man who has scored 40% of their goals this season. Balotelli replaced Tevez on the left wing, but his work rate was obviously (and predictably) well below the Argentine. This gave Liverpool even more breathing room as it destroyed the visitors’ plan of attacking and overloading the left wing.

After the goal, Liverpool were well on top. They won most of the tackles, interceptions and dictated the tempo of the match.

Interestingly, Liverpool did not have to rush around pressing their opponents – their positioning and decision making was good enough to keep their shape and reduce any space into which City could attack. In defence, they formed two solid banks of four, restricting all the space between the lines. This stopped Touré pushing forward and gave no room for Johnson. Dzeko never got into any one-on-one situations, and was completely starved of service. Skrtel and Carragher only had to attempt two tackles in their own penalty area during the whole 90 minutes. Furthermore, Dzeko was forced to play most of his passes from deeper positions, and only completed two passes within Liverpool’s eighteen yard box. This pattern was replicated across the board, with City unable to get any penetration.

After the debacle of the home leg against Braga Liverpool have realised that they cannot be one-dimensional with Carroll up front and get away with it. Against Sunderland and in this game against City, the passing approach was mixed and balanced. Carroll received the ball at his feet as well as his head. He is becoming less the “in the air target man” and more like Didier Drogba at Chelsea. As a further development of his relationship with Suarez, he was also willing and able to drift wide and pull people out of position when required.

All of this was helped by the performance of Lucas and Spearing as a unit in the centre. They recycled the ball very well, with simple “keep hold of the ball” passing that allowed the team to hold onto possession. When the opportunity arose they could then play probing balls between the channels. This all-round display allowed them to defend both with and without the ball – as can be seen from their tackling and interception statistics.

Around the twenty-minute mark, City tried to get themselves back into the game. Their attitude improved and they caused some problems for Liverpool. Mainly these came from corners or from misplaced Liverpool passes, tackles or general lapses in concentration. Johnson broke down the right flank, hoping that when he cut inside he would open up the Liverpool defence. City’s best chance of the first half (possibly the whole match) came when Kolorov came forward unmarked and fizzed in a cross-cum-shot towards the far post. Balotelli had the chance to score but was unable to quite reach the ball.

Liverpool weathered this period with no great difficulty, and were able to counter attack with numbers when they regained possession. Such was the case in the 34th minute when Meireles received the ball in an unmarked position on the left-hand side of the area. He couldn’t quite control it properly, but did enough to cause havoc in the City defence. It ended when Kuyt skillfully guided the ball into the far corner on the right-hand side. Carroll’s determination to keep the ball in play rather than letting the ball escape for a goal kick played a key part in the goal.

A minute later and it was 3-0. City were reeling, and Liverpool once again broke through Meireles. A right foot cross from the left wing curled in towards the far post and Carroll’s head was there to beat Kolorov and score his second. City’s problems were blatant. Meireles had completely defeated Boyata and pulled the centre backs out of position. That left Kolorov in a mismatch with Carroll in the air. If there had been even rudimentary cover from the midfield, which nominally included two “holding” midfielders, surely this wouldn’t have happened.

City were a mess, and looked beaten. There was little motivation or inspiration to at least grab one goal and try to get themselves back into the contest. Liverpool finished the first half in complete domination, despite Lescott’s half-chance on 44 minutes after a decent delivery from a free kick.

Second Half

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Although United pulled back a last-minute consolation goal, there was no denying that this was a rout; not a total thrashing, but about as comprehensive as you normally get in these types of game, where often a single goal decides things.

While the star of the show was arguably Luis Suárez – whose jinking run in a tight space was my highlight of the season, and who was involved in all three goals – there were plenty of others who contributed to a resounding victory. No-one played badly, and even Fábio Aurélio was looking like his old self until (also much like his old self) a muscle twanged.

Yet again, Liverpool did not rely on those players who are supposed to drag the team to victory while the others do little more than make up the numbers.

Gerrard, perhaps due to injury, had a quiet game, bar two excellent long-range efforts (although he rarely performs to his highest standards against teams like United, Chelsea and Everton). He was fairly disciplined, and if the tactics determined that he held his position, he did so better than in the past.

Carragher (like Rafael) was lucky to stay on the pitch after a reckless tackle, and shuffled around at right-back like someone who clearly no longer suits the role; but he did a job, and that’s about all that could have been asked. Pepe Reina didn’t have an awful lot to do, bar watch Hernandez’s late effort sail in, while the club’s best defender and libero, Daniel Agger, was out injured. And of course, Liverpool FC lost its star player when he moved to Chelsea.

On top of that, there’s Roy Hodgson’s single really good buy, Raul Meireles, who looked a fine player earlier in the season, but since the change of manager, has started to look a great one. His runs from midfield were tremendous, and the positions he takes up – now that he’s free to roam – showed why he’s been making the headlines with his goals of late, even if he didn’t score today.

Take that lot out of the equation, and most of the club’s critics would say that there’s not a lot left. It’s just deadwood; often an excuse to batter Benítez, despite a handful of bargain buys who are positively buoyant under Dalglish.

Soto Kyrgiakos, who, despite having the mobility of a snail buried in cement, was faultless after coming on as an emergency sub; Maxi’s movement and first-time passing was first-class, as was his work rate; Glen Johnson showed that he can look a top-class full-back on either flank even when asked primarily to defend; and of course, Lucas Leiva epitomised precisely why no-one attempts more tackles in the Premier League, on account of his incredible hard work and clever reading of the game, while his distribution goes from strength to strength.

And of course, then there’s Dirk Kuyt. Constantly questioned, Kuyt yet again proved that he is the ultimate big-game player. This is the third outstanding game he’s had as the spearhead striker since Kenny’s return, following on from the games against Stoke and Chelsea; and of course, two of the three came in massive fixtures.

To go with goals against Chelsea, Arsenal and Everton (who, of course, only belong in that company by virtue of the derby), he now has a hat-trick against United. This means that he now has at least three goals against those opponents. This is before getting onto the vital goals at key times in games, like the one that qualified the Reds for the Champions League against Standard Liège in 2008, or the late goal in Athens that gave us a couple of minutes to contemplate adding that city to a list including Istanbul.

In a strange way, he’s better when the opposition is stronger, because the tempo is often higher. In the last few games – since the victory over Chelsea, in which he was immense – he’d looked terrible (but of course, even at his worst, he gives 100%, and that can have infectious properties.)

Perhaps he needs the Reds’ best technical players to be around him – so that it’s closer to the Dutch national team, for which successive managers continue to find space for him in the XI, despite an excess of far more naturally gifted individuals. While there’s the guarantee of great technique when picking from Van Persie, Sneijder, Van der Vaart and a host of others, those chosen are almost always supplemented by Kuyt.

If the game is slow, Kuyt can look clunky, with his bandy legs you could drive a bus through. But here’s the paradox: usually clunky players look even worse when there’s less time, and they’re hurried; strangely, Kuyt often looks better.

His one-touch passing can be superb, and while lacking pace and silky skills, he somehow swerves past defenders and makes things happen. Perhaps most of all he needs to be surrounded by movement, and under Dalglish – in the total opposite of Hodgson, when it was glaringly absent – Liverpool have that in spades in the majority of games.

Kuyt has a brilliant understanding of space, and is therefore able to find players who move off of him; static team-mates leave him exposed, and he gets in a muddle. While more pace is clearly needed in the team – and with the wings the obvious position for it (if Carroll and Suárez are to be the usual striking combo) – Kuyt’s place has to be under threat to a degree come the summer. But his versatility and attitude – as well as an aptitude for pass-and-move – should keep him as a key component of the squad, even if he doesn’t start as often.

There’s one more unsung hero, lurking behind the scenes, whose influence I’d like to salute.

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While this wasn’t a particularly exciting game, from a tactical perspective there was plenty to intrigue. A fourth consecutive win under Kenny’s managership and a fourth successive clean sheet – just the sort of sequence that, in Hodgson parlance at least, would be described as a “juggernaut”.

Tactical line-ups

Having used a 4-3-3 for most of his Chelsea tenure, Chelsea manager Carlo Ancelotti reverted to the 4-1-2-1-2 he had experimented with against Sunderland last week – a shape he had attempted at the beginning of last season as well – employing Nicolas Anelka at the tip of a diamond midfield. This was evidently a precursor to his accommodation of Fernando Torres in the starting line-up, as the former Liverpool striker replaced Salomon Kalou alongside Didier Drogba in a two-man strike force for the Blues.

King Kenny continued with the three-man central defence he had utilised against Stoke, albeit with Jamie Carragher returning from a protracted injury lay-off following a dislocated shoulder sustained against Tottenham earlier in the season, to replace Kyrgiakos in the starting line-up. Skrtel moved to the centre of the back three, while Agger and Carra played on either side of him, as Martin Kelly and Glen Johnson reprised their wing-back roles further forward.

The Liverpool midfield four was of particular interest: while Kenny had deployed a midfield ‘square’ against Stoke, with two deeper-lying midfielders and two in advance of them, here the shape was a diamond. Lucas Leiva was the most withdrawn of the four, playing as the sole holding midfielder in front of the defence; Gerrard and Maxi operated as determined shuttlers (or ‘carrileros’) on the right and left respectively; Meireles continued in his now-familiar role ‘in the hole’, supporting lone striker Kuyt.

Key tactical points

To be sure, this was a tactical victory in a fundamentally defensive sense. For LFC, the strategy was three-fold:

1) Spare man at the back

From the outset, it appeared as if Kenny’s decision to persist with the back three in order to counter Drogba and Torres was an astute one; as I’d discussed in the post-match analysis of the Stoke game, the use of three centre-backs is – theoretically, at least – designed to be negate the threat offered by a team playing with two strikers. Two ‘markers’ contend with the two frontmen, while there is the security of the ‘spare’ defender who can ‘sweep’ up behind them. For instance, when Carragher was occupied by Torres, and Agger by Drogba, Skrtel’s role was to provide cover as the extra defender, in the eventuality of any attacking danger. Further, if one of the strikers attempted to drop deep to collect the ball – as Drogba notably did in the 35th minute – one of the central defenders (Carragher, in this situation) could pursue him with alacrity, as two central defenders remained to secure the defensive area. (As an aside, Skrtel’s cover was also crucial in the sense that, Carragher, in his advancing years, would be naturally susceptible to Torres’ pace, so have an extra defender as ‘insurance’ was imperative).

In addition, both Drogba and Torres tended to stay high up the pitch and in central areas even when Chelsea were out of possession, whereas they might have attempted to use the channels more in an attempt to drive a wedge of space between the outside centre-back – either Carragher or Agger – and Skrtel in the centre. However, the fact that both Carragher and Agger have both played at fullback before meant that they were comfortable enough to pursue the strikers into wider areas when the need arose. (Agger’s foul on Torres, close to the left touch-line at around 25 and a half minutes, is an example of such an instance).

Although, admittedly, Chelsea did have plenty of chances from open play (not many clear-cut ones, to be fair), there was a distinct lack of cohesion between the front two, as Torres, in particular, cut an increasingly frustrated figure as the match wore on. His eventual substitution in the 2nd half – and the now widely-disseminated statistics showing him to have had the least number of touches of any outfield player during his time on the pitch, 29 in 66 minutes, according to OptaJoe on Twitter – suggest that Liverpool’s back three were effective at nullifying the threat posed by Torres and Drogba.

As the chalkboards below demonstrate, Salomon Kalou (whom Torres replaced in the starting line-up), was far more involved against against Sunderland – a game in which Chelsea also used the diamond formation, while Sunderland used only two centre-backs against Chelsea’s front two of Kalou and Drogba (so there was no spare man in defence) – than Torres was here against his erstwhile team:

In fact, Chelsea’s front two and Anelka looked more effective in a defensive posture: Reina was unable to distribute the ball to the peripheral centre-backs from short goal-kicks as easily as he had done against Stoke, because the Chelsea strikers would frequently mark the outside two central defenders (Torres on Carragher; Drogba pressing Agger), while Anelka would push up to close down Skrtel – forming a de facto 4-3-3 for Chelsea, but a tenuous one, as it only materialised from LFC goal-kick situations.

By the time Chelsea had made a genuine switch to a 4-3-3 in the 2nd half, so that the advanced wide-attackers might drag the 2 outer centre-backs out of position and thus create space, LFC had taken the lead; this prompted Dalglish’s instructions for the wing-backs to drop deeper – along the same ‘band’ as the centre-backs – creating a 5 versus 3 advantage in defence for LFC (3 centre-backs plus two full-backs, in effect, against 3 CFC attackers). It therefore allowed the three centre-backs to remain central and not get drawn out wide to confront the likes of Kalou and Malouda. This necessarily entailed a shortfall further up the pitch for LFC, but it proved inconsequential as the Reds sought to cede both territory and possession in an attempt to remain defensively impermeable.

2. Matching Chelsea’s shape in midfield

Kenny’s rationale for altering the midfield square used against Stoke, to a diamond here, was presumably to replicate Chelsea’s own alignment in midfield. As Michael Cox of ZonalMarking.net correctly points out, each LFC midfielder had what was essentially a direct opponent in midfield: Lucas, as the deepest of the four, picked up Anelka in the trequartista role; Gerrard tracked Lampard; Maxi confronted Essien; and Meireles contended with Mikel further up the pitch.

Lucas, in particular, was brilliant at restricting Anelka’s efforts to find space behind the two Chelsea strikers – as the Frenchman had done to great effect in his ‘trequartista’ role against Sunderland – by closing down astutely and tracking his movements between the lines. By virtue of the diamond midfield’s structure, the major creative burden of the team rests on the player at the apex of the diamond; keeping this player (Anelka) subdued was thus crucial.

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By Dan Kennett. Following on from the previous review after 13 games this article aims to put Liverpool’s performance in the first half of the 2010/11 season into context with the history of the Premier League.  Halfway is a fair point for extensive analysis as apart from postponements, clubs have played each other once.

As well as looking at the league tables across the Premier League area courtesy of www.statto.com this article also utilises the Pay As You Play TPI database.  It also attempts to quantify the oft repeated claims that 2010/11 is an “unusual season” with a “condensed” or “tight” league table.

Part One: LFC current season performance versus historical Premier League performance

There’s been a lot of coverage of this in recent days (e.g. lowest points total going into the New Year since 1953/54 relegation season), not least from the Liverpool Echo and Liverpool Daily Post so I don’t want to spend too much time going over this again. At the halfway stage, Liverpool has set a host of unwanted records:

• Lowest points total =25 (previous was 28 in 92/93 and 98/99)
• Fewest wins = 7 (previous was 8 in 3 seasons)
• Most defeats = 8 (previous was 7 in 4 seasons including last season)
• Fewest goals scored = 23 (previous was 28 in 4 seasons)
• Worst goal difference = -1 (previous was +6 in 92/93)
• Joint worst league position =9th (along with 92/93 and 98/99)

Now let’s compare against the median of Liverpool’s Premier League record at halfway (note – the first 3 Premier League seasons were 42 games, however the median is almost exactly the same for all measures when you include and exclude the 42 game seasons)

If Hodgson had managed to re-create a typical LFC Premier League performance of 10 wins, 34 points and a goal difference of +13 then Liverpool would be 5^th, behind Chelsea on goal difference but ahead of Spurs.

If Hodgson had managed to match last season’s dismal campaign then Liverpool would still have been 6^th, 4 points behind Chelsea

Using last season as a benchmark, if I was Roy Hodgson’s boss and in charge of his appraisal I’d be setting his season goals as:

• Minimum targets = 6^th place, 64 points
• Stretch target = 4^th place, 70 points

Both are fair given Liverpool’s performance in the Premier League era.  At halfway that translates to 32 and 35 points.  Currently Hodgson would be missing the minimum target by 22% and the stretch target by 29%, an almost impossible margin to make up in the 2^nd half of the season.

(Note from TTT statistician, Graeme Riley: The last weekend game with a lower attendance was 34,705 v Sheff Wed in Sept 1997, when Anfield Road was being refurbished, and the lowest on New Year’s Day since 1983; and before that, 1955.)

Part Two: LFC current season performance versus TPI performance

Parts Two and Three of this post is for Subscribers only.

From The Soccerlens Awards:

The Best Club Fansite award celebrates those websites dedicated to a single club. It the ultimate populist vote, and this year saw Arsenal, Manchester United, Liverpool and Tottenham fans (amongst others) thrash it out for the title.

Despite the presence of heavyweights such as KUMB, Republik of Mancunia and Arseblog, we’ve gone for The Tomkins Times for the insightful news coverage and analysis of all things Liverpool. No one puts it better than the Independent when they called it “perhaps the most intelligent guide to Liverpool available on the internet”.

Paul has done a fantastic job, and while he may not win the populist vote, he gets ours for the best club fansite of 2010.

Editors’ Pick: The Tomkins Times

As I noted on Twitter, thanks to everyone who has supported the site in the past year.

Now, some important site news for subscribers.