Starting XIs

Wolves formation and personnel were as expected. With O’Hara injured and Henry suspended, Edwards was partnered by Frimpong and the new signing Jonsson in midfield. Up front, Fletcher was chosen ahead of Doyle, with Kightly preferred to Hunt on the right. Jarvis continued on the left.

Before the match, I said that I’d be excited to see Liverpool start with the same team (hence formation) that finished the FA Cup tie against Manchester United, or playing 4-1-2-3 with Adam, Henderson and Shelvey (in that order from defensive to most attacking) in the centre, Bellamy and Kuyt on the wings and Carroll up front. This was roughly what happened, although Spearing was declared fit enough to play in place of Shelvey, taking the position of the most defensive midfielder.

As this match was heavily one-sided with Liverpool dominating from start to finish, I’ll focus this match report mainly on how Dalglish’s players performed in the three main phases – defence, transition and attack.

In defence

Wolves are not a team capable of delivering a constant attacking threat from the central midfield areas. They have neither a quality ball player (especially without O’Hara) nor a quality box-to-box player who can drive from deep positions. Their style is based on attacks down the flanks and employing two defensive-minded midfielders in a central three. They were predictable and therefore easy to counteract.

In this particular match however, the presence of two destroyers meant that the third midfielder – Edwards – had more attacking freedom. The team morphed from a 4-5-1 in defence to a 4-4-1-1 in attack. This gave the striker and wingers more support from behind, which caused Liverpool a few problems during the match. Edwards moved intelligently, trying to run into the channels and use the space in between the full backs and the centre backs to stretch Liverpool’s defence horizontally and open up space for Fletcher to exploit. For example, in the 12^th minute he caused Liverpool’s midfield a problem as they couldn’t decide who should track back and cover him. He burst free down the right and delivered a through-ball-cum-cross to Fletcher in the box. Reina reacted well.

The other threat was Edwards’ runs from deep, surging past Spearing to provide another target for the wingers’ crosses.

As I recently argued, when Liverpool play with both Spearing and Adam in the centre, even in a midfield trio, the team will have problems because both like to close down too often rather than holding their positions. In this match there were a few situations in which first Adam then Spearing showed this problem. This left gaps which, when playing three-against-three in the centre, Edwards was able to exploit.

The other tactical issue was that Wolves attack down the flanks, especially via Jarvis who could get in behind Johnson when the full back made attacking runs. But apart from a few crosses and dribbles, Jarvis created little. On the other wing, Enrique was more conservative and therefore Kightly had far less space. Enrique finished with five tackles out of five attempts. Kightly only threatened Liverpool once, near the end of the first half and from a central position. Here, he and Edwards offered a dual threat against Spearing, and after a quick exchange of passes they got a shot off which just missed the target.

Apart from these problems, Liverpool were comfortable. From the start, the away team pressed from the front. Henderson (the most advance midfielder once again) joined Bellamy and Kuyt as the pressing trio who tried to give Wolves as little time on the ball as possible to hold onto possession. The two deep-lying midfielders were forced to quickly hit the ball to the wings or to the forwards. Only on the few occasions where Adam and Spearing showed indiscipline in closing down too early did Wolves have any space in which to work.

In the first half, Fletcher’s other chance was following a corner, from which his header came off the cross bar. In the second half, Ebanks-Blake hit the woodwork from a long shot.

Even when McCarthy opted to play 4-4-2 for the final half an hour by bringing on Hunt (who had gone to the right flank) for one of the defensive midfielders (Johnson) and Ebanks-Blake (put up front) for Kightly, the home team failed to impose themselves on the game.

Transition and in Attack

More interesting was the way that Liverpool got the ball and turned defence into attack – and, of course, how they actually attacked.

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By Mihail Vladimirov.

Liverpool 2 Man City 2: Heading to Wembley

Starting XIs

Liverpool went with the same formation they have started every big game with this season – the 4-1-2-3. There were no surprises in the starting line up either, with the only question mark before the match about how the front three would be arranged. In the end, it turned out to be Downing and Kuyt on their “natural” flanks, and Bellamy as centre forward. The alternative would have been to have Kuyt in the centre and Downing/Bellamy as inverted wingers.

On the other side of the pitch, Mancini made some interesting changes. He used a passive formation – 4-2-1-3 – rather than the 4-2-4 that he has used to dominate certain games this season. The personnel were also unexpected. The team sheet suggested lots of possible combinations: Zabaleta could play on either flank or through the middle as a defensive midfielder; Kolorov could play as a full back or a winger. And what would Nasri or Silva do? When they got to the field, Lescott was the left back with Kolorov ahead of him on the wing. Zabaleta was the right back, with Richards playing centre back (with Savic), and Nasri played in the hole ahead of the “double pivot” of defensive midfielders. Silva roamed from the right flank.

First half

As I suggested before the match, the key here was not so much the starting elevens or the formations but the mentality of the coaches. Neither decided to flat-out attack, unsurprisingly given that the score was close and the tie delicately balanced.

Both sides looked to recycle the ball through the middle with patient and probing short passes involving all of the outfield players. Neither pressed heavily, although they would engage when necessary. This is something Manchester City often do in their big games, especially when playing away; while for Liverpool this was business as usual. This allowed City to dominate the opening 3-4 minutes, but Liverpool were dangerous whenever they regained possession. In the fourth minute they countered down the left wing with Enrique pushing forward, and he eventually got to the penalty area to take a great chance; but the shot was awkward and easy for Hart to block. The rebound fell to Downing, but his left-footed shot was disappointed. A minute later, Bellamy broke forward but also failed to deliver anything special.

The key tactical issue, at least from Liverpool’s perspective, was how the midfield three worked in defence and attack. This had been central to the previous two meetings with City, and this one was no different.

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Liverpool had a very good record against Bolton Wanderers, winning their previous ten meetings in the league. However, the Trotters broke their duck with a convincing win against the Reds.

Motivational Issues

A lot of people have questioned whether Liverpool were ‘up’ for this game, and it’s a fair criticism. It is here we should start with the game analysis.

Dalglish’s post-match interviews for both ESPN and the BBC pointed to the non-tactical problems in the performance. This was pretty obvious from the first whistle to the last.

The way the players behaved in the opening minutes suggested motivational and concentration issues. In particular, the defensive performance was poor with switched-off players and poor communication. All of the goals came from bad defensive organisation. Each attack by Bolton seemed misjudged, underestimated and underprepared for in every possible way.

The midfield, possibly with the exception of Henderson and probably Gerrard, didn’t pass the ball well enough. Either the direction was wrong or the receiver did not control the ball well enough. The overall behaviour of the team in defence and attack was simply not up to the level which we all know this team is capable of. They lacked the desire to track back and cover the back four against the runs of Bolton’s midfielders. This was a major factor in how the first two goals were created, with both Mark Davies and Chris Eagles getting a free path into the Liverpool penalty area. In attack, Liverpool lacked the quick and progressive thinking needed. This lack of mental edge affected how they made and received passes, as well as how effectively they could feed the advanced players.

Dalglish’s demeanour on the sideline pretty much summed up the whole game. He reacted angrily to the first two goals in a way he simply has not done so far this term. But he didn’t let up even when Bellamy managed to pull one back. There were a few times in the first half when the camera focused on the away bench and I was stunned at how both Dalglish and Clarke looked so tense. In the past few months Dalglish has looked worried or unhappy, particularly when the team is not playing well, but never has he been so animated and obviously riled. This was significant.

In the post-match interviews he questioned his players’ motivation for the match and quite rightly looked incredibly angry. Even though he kept his cool on camera, we do have to ask – why were they so poorly prepared for this game?

I have questioned Liverpool’s mental preparation a couple of times in the past couple of months, mostly in the match against Wigan and the away Premier League game against Manchester City. In both it seemed likely that the mood (whatever the rights and wrongs) was affected by the Suárez controversy. In between these matches, we saw in the first half against Blackburn and large parts of the Newcastle match that there was something not quite right with their commitment and motivation. This is vital if the tactical approaches of the club are going to propel them to the high level to which they should be aspiring.

So, we could argue that Dalglish was so angry because this was not the first time the players had underperformed for him. I doubt that if this were a one-off poor performance Kenny would have got that angry, especially in front of the television cameras. Having tried other approaches, Dalglish reached the end of his tether. An experienced manager like him will have noticed the problems over the past month or so, but clearly his daily interactions were not taken on board by his players. Perhaps Dalglish believes he is not getting through to them – or worse, he is simply not being listened to.

If this is true, why has it taken so long to see this reaction from Dalglish in public? Surely he must have been having harsh words with the players behind the scenes? Wasn’t the Wigan match enough evidence that there were serious non-tactical issues with the team – a lack of commitment and motivation, possibly caused by off-the-pitch issues? If not, then the Blackburn match should have shown that while the tactical decisions being made were sound, the performance of the players was costing the side points. The Newcastle and City games made this problem perfectly obvious. This was the fifth bad match in this month-long period, albeit punctuated with good results and tactical performances against Stoke in the league and Manchester City in the cup. And that must result in drastic action being taken. As much as we can (and should) blame the players for yet another unprofessional level of performance, the manager surely has to take responsibility for not stopping this slide sooner, either through words or actions. Alternatively, if he has been dealing with the players in the appropriate way, it’s time to start dropping people.

Kenny implied that the players may have underestimated Bolton and have their eyes on two massive cup ties over the coming week. But this is part of the manager’s job – to ensure that the players are ready for the next match, not the one after that. The “match by match” mantra might be a cliché, but that’s because there’s an element of truth to it. Is it the case that the players are prioritising games themselves, slacking off in the ‘lesser’ games, and only switching it on for the ‘big’ ones? This is what Dalglish has accused them (albeit indirectly) of in his post-match interviews, and it appears that they are guilty as charged. But he needs to shoulder his end of the responsibility for failing to ensure that the players do not switch off and that they show the required level of commitment and motivation.

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By Paul Tomkins.

When arguing that Rafa Benítez was doing a good job (and often a very good job), I often observed how wrong it was to expect Liverpool to automatically return to the glory days. Too much had changed between 1991, when Kenny resigned with the Reds reigning champions, and 2004, when Rafa arrived.

Anyone who thought Kenny was going to work miracles has been reminded of his mortality. However, this doesn’t mean that he isn’t doing a good job.

Equally, he’s not doing a flawless job, but being Kenny, there’s a tension where some fans think him beyond criticism and others want to go too far in the other direction (in trying to break this perceived omertà). Stony silence shouldn’t be the case – his record and signings are there to be assessed, like those of any other manager – but equally, he should be judged on the situation he inherited, not the one he left 20 years ago, or the one where we were regular Champions League qualifiers until last season.

This season, in the Premier League at least, he’s doing roughly the same as last season – and considerably better than the man he replaced. He had the natural boost of his reappointment, where everyone was relieved that Hodgson had gone and the King was back; and when that wore off, he had some money to spend in the summer, albeit not without having to prune the wage bill. The injury to Steven Gerrard – who is still not match-fit, as seen against Stoke – and the suspension of Suarez has meant that, with other absentees, he’s yet to even start his strongest side.

Therefore I believe that, overall, he’s doing a good job, if not yet a ‘great’ one.

Dalglish didn’t do too well in the cups last season; an away tie at Manchester United was (not unexpectedly) lost, not least once suffering an iffy penalty and an early red card to Gerrard. The Uefa Cup exit at the hands of eventual finalists Braga was disappointing, mind. Roy Hodgson’s only relative success at Liverpool was in that competition, albeit against mostly substandard opposition in the easier early rounds.

This season, Dalglish has steered Liverpool to League Cup victories over Stoke (away), Chelsea (away) and Manchester City (away), and even though it’s a devalued cup that would not normally be high on our list of priorities, those are never easy games.

While Liverpool’s league home record has been surprisingly poor (albeit whilst still remaining unbeaten), the overall record is still pretty good. It’s heading in the right direction, albeit not at breakneck speed. Playing good football and creating chances hasn’t been a problem, but finishing them off has.

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Before this match there had been just 11 goals scored in seven Premier League matches between Liverpool and Stoke. Added to Liverpool’s recent scoring problems, perhaps the lack of goals should not have been that unexpected.

First half

Tony Pulis did not cause any surprises with his starting eleven, but he did change from his usual 4-4-2 formation. He opted to start with a sort of 4-1-4-1 as he had done in last year’s Anfield fixture. Palacios played the “sweeping” role behind Delap and Whelan, while Walters went to the right flank with the aim of cutting inside and helping Crouch when the team went on the attack.

Dalglish tried to be a bit more creative, choosing an unorthodox formation. The 3-4-2-1 shape he chose was the same as the one used last time Liverpool played Stoke at home. Just before the match it became clear that Agger was going to miss it due to the knock received in the previous match, Maxi had an arm injury (hence his omission from the league cup match against Manchester City) and Bellamy is not yet considered fit enough to play two matches in a week. Suarez is still serving his suspension, so Liverpool’s attacking options were limited.

From the start Stoke set up the barricades in their own half. The two tight banks of four dropped very deep, with Palacios patrolling the small zone ahead of the back four. The big question in this game was how Liverpool would be able to break them down.

The tempo of the game was slow, with Liverpool trying to hold onto possession first and then trying to probe the Stoke defence by using fluid movement in their front seven (i.e., everyone except the three centre backs).

Liverpool’s main theme was to build up patiently and then overload the Stoke defence by moving up the pitch as a unit. The passing patterns and angles were created so that each player could participate both in the ball-recycling moves and in the attacking phase by pushing forward. All of this made perfect sense. As I argued before the match, it was imperative that Liverpool tried to confuse Stoke with fluid movement from deep positions, including overlapping midfielders, all over the final third.

The personnel roles and the specific tactical plan became very clear early on, even though the players were overlapping and shifting positions constantly. Adam and Gerrard started deeper and more centrally, aiming to bring the ball out of defence and pull the strings in the attacking phase. This deep central position is becoming Gerrard’s “natural” role, perhaps answering some of his critics who felt he couldn’t adapt from his “false 10” role under Rafa Benitez.

Their presence helped to dictate the tempo of the game, allowing the team to slow things down when necessary and then speed things up to give them more attacking drive. The diagonal passes from both players, especially Adam, helped to give the side more attacking edge. When the build-up phase was complete (or if the ball had been played over them from the defenders), they were encouraged to push on and join the other five attacking players. Here they pressurised Stoke’s defence, and both men had the freedom to make vertical runs into the penalty area. Gerrard was more likely to do this as he has more pace than Adam and has more attacking awareness.

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The opening

As they had done in their previous meeting, both sides continued with similar tactics to the match they had just played. Manchester City started with their 4-4-2 with inverted wingers, while Dalglish stuck with 4-1-2-3 as he has done in almost all of the “big” matches.

In the league meeting it was City who started best while Liverpool tried to get into the match gradually by passing the ball well in midfield. This time the Reds began the game with far more intensity than their opponents, taking control of the game immediately and putting pressure on their hosts.

As might logically be expected, the midfield trio was the key reason for this dominance. Barry and De Jong played their usual deeper roles, which gave Liverpool’s central midfielders plenty of time to collect the ball and recycle possession. When City’s double pivot eventually closed them down they were in position to pass the ball around them and create opportunities for the front three. The team looked really fluid in their movements and were able to create good passing angles. This made it difficult for City’s two banks of four to close down the spaces.

The first danger moment came in the fourth minute when Downing (who, as in the previous match, had the freedom to roam towards the centre) sent a good ball through to Carroll, who turned Savic and was through on goal. Savic recovered enough to force him to shoot with his weaker right foot and Hart saved low down.

Interestingly, it was Downing rather than Bellamy who was given the freedom to cut inside and make vertical runs, and so it was Downing who played the ball more in central positions. After the Carroll chance he made more good runs through the middle of the pitch. That left the left wing free for Glen Johnson to burst forward, and he too had a natural tendency to cut back inside onto his stronger foot. During Liverpool’s bright opening period he offered the outlet for some good one-two passes and some runs which stretched the City defence.

Liverpool continued to hold the upper hand, and in the tenth minute Gerrard broke through the centre and hit a good shot towards the bottom left corner. Another good Hart save denied him a quality goal. In both the previous matches this season Hart has played a pivotal role, and this game made it a hat-trick of excellent performances. From the resulting corner, Gerrard found Downing unmarked on the edge of the box, but his left-footed shot was again saved by the ‘keeper. But from the following corner, as the ball bounced around in the box, Savic kicked Agger on the knee and Gerrard converted the penalty.

After the goal

Understandably, the hosts began to push once they went behind. But Liverpool remained calm and must be given credit for their tactical setup which nullified the threat.

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By football lawyer, Daniel Geey @FootballLaw. (Not that it should matter in terms of the veracity of the points he makes in terms of the glaring inconsistencies in the FA’s report, but it’s only fair to note upfront that Daniel is Liverpool fan).

Further analysis of the media’s treatment of the case (and racism in general) can be found here: http://newsframes.wordpress.com/2012/01/06/media-on-racism-churnalism/ by @NewsFrames 

Background, Introduction and Points to Note

The aim of this article is to put myself in the position of the LFC lawyers and to dissect a number of the Independent Regulatory Commission’s Report (IRCR) conclusions, had LFC decided to appeal to the FA Appeals Board. Although no appeal is to be pursued it may be helpful to disentangle a number of evidential issues that arose throughout the judgment and that have been commented on in the press in the last week or so.

This is not intended to be a comprehensive description of what the IRCR said. In fact, only the most significant evidential, credibility and consistency aspects of the decision are discussed. It means there will certainly be aspects of the decision that are not touched upon, in part because the judgment is 115 pages long and in part because it is important to get across the most salient and relevant points that LFC may have relied upon. The aim is not to go into every detailed issue but predominantly to pick out a number of key points or omissions in the IRCR and highlight their importance.

The structure of this piece is to (1) briefly set out the basic claims of Patrice Evra and Luis Suarez, (2) describe the legal tests that were used, (3) assess the key IRCR reasoning and conclusions, (4) assess a particularly key IRCR omission, (5) highlight corroborating evidential issues, (6) discuss the inconsistencies the IRCR find with Suarez’s account, and (7) briefly discuss the procedural grounds of any appeal.

Points to note:

• All that follows is based on the public IRCR document and not on the entire body of witness evidence before the Commission. All that is stated below is premised on the precise facts as set out and relied upon in the IRCR.
• Due to the length of this piece, I do not discuss the appropriateness of the eight match sanction. A good appraisal of this can be found here ( http://afootballreport.com/post/15301344153/flaws-and-consequences-the-curious-case-of-luis-suarez.)
• The assessment does quote the exact phrases used by the IRCR and as such may not be suitable for anyone who is easily offended by the use of abusive language.
• In the absence of direct corroborating evidence to back up Evra’s claim, unfortunately no one, including the Commission could conclude that Suarez “definitely” said the things Evra claimed. As such, the Commission believed Suarez “probably” said them. This assessment is to do with the process of how the IRCR came to its conclusion.

The length of this article makes it appropriate to set out an executive summary.

Executive Summary

I believe LFC would have focused on:

1. the fact that Evra only made reference to the precise number of times he claimed Suarez called him a negro four days after the event and did not appear to tell anyone that the abuse happened more than once, points to a basic inconsistency in Evra’s account. As such Evra’s story changes when interviewed by Canal+ and in the FA interviews. I think LFC would question why he did not make any reference to the multiple abuses he subsequently claimed up until that point. This points to numerous inconsistencies in Evra’s account of what happened which goes directly towards his credibility as a witness as well as the underlying substantive nature of his claims;
2. a complete lack of any direct evidence corroborating Evra’s claims that he was abused more than the one time that Suarez admits to;
3. the inconsistencies in Suarez’s account of events not being as serious, substantive and detrimental to his credibility specifically in relation to differences in the accounts between Dirk Kuyt and Damien Comolli; and
4. new evidence that could have been submitted to the Appeals Board to strengthen Suarez’s credibility by clarifying inconsistencies relied upon by the Commission.

Standard and Burden of Proof

This is set out in detail in paragraph 31 where the Commission sets out “on the balance of probabilities, is the account of Mr Era true and reliable?” and paragraph 74 onwards [1]. In effect, the Commission were asking “whose account was more probable” (paragraph 345).

[1]  Burden of proof: “It is not for Mr Suarez to satisfy the Commission that he did not breach the Rules. Rather, it is for the FA to satisfy us to the required standard that Mr Suarez did breach the Rules.” Standard of proof: The applicable standard of proof shall be the flexible civil standard of the balance of probability. The more serious the allegation, taking into account the nature of the Misconduct alleged and the context of the case, the greater the burden of evidencerequired to prove the matter.”

The Basics and Contested Statements

Suarez admitted in his witness statement that in response to Evra saying in Spanish “Don’t touch me South American”, he (Suarez) replied using the phrase “Por que, negro?” (translated as “why, black?”). Suarez explained that the term negro was not intended to be offensive or racially offensive but in fact conciliatory. This is the only time Suarez states that he uses the word “negro”. Evra claims that Suarez used the word seven times in total (six additional times to that which Suarez admits to saying). Paragraph 388 sets out what the IRCR believes probably occurred:

“(1) In response to Mr Evra’s question “Concha de tu hermana, porque me diste in golpe” (“Fucking hell, why did you kick me”), Mr Suarez said “Porque tu eres negro” (“Because you are black”).

(2) In response to Mr Evra’s comment “Habla otra vez asi, te voy a dar una porrada” (“say it to me again, I’m going to punch you”), Mr Suarez said “No hablo con los negros” (“I don’t speak to blacks”).

(3) In response to Mr Evra’s comment “Ahora te voy a dar realmente una porrada” (“okay, now I think I’m going to punch you”), Mr Suarez said “Dale, negro, negro, negro” (“okay, blackie, blackie, blackie).

(4) When the referee blew his whistle to stop the corner being taken, Mr Suarez used the word “negro” to Mr Evra.

(5) After the referee had spoken to the players for a second time, and Mr Evra had said that he did not want Mr Suarez to touch him, Mr Suarez said “Por que, negro?”. 

The disparity between both accounts is stark. Suarez only admits to saying point 5 [with negro meaning 'black', not as in 'a negro'] whilst Evra claims to have been racially abused six additional times. The rest of this assessment will establish how the IRCR concluded that based on the balance of probabilities test there was sufficient evidence to back Evra’s account of the events in part because of the inconsistencies in Suarez’s witness statement.

Evra’s post-match account inconsistency

I believe LFC would point to one overarching inconsistency that the IRCR completely failed to consider. Each step in the process needs to be discussed as it relates to the number of times Evra says Suarez called him a negro. As will be discussed below, Evra does not mention the fact that he was called a negro multiple times. At least nine people appear to confirm in witness statements that this is the case before he says to Canal+ that he was called negro more than 10 times. I believe LFC would argue as a general point before looking into the specific factors below that it would appear strange for Evra (who had purportedly been racially abused seven times) not to tell anyone it happened more than once until a press microphone appeared. Even then, he did not mention the specific instances of the claimed abuse and was inconsistent in the number of times the abuse occurred. It means that the first time Evra claimed and set out that he was abused multiple times by Suarez was at the earliest on the 20th of October in his first FA interview. Precisely four days after the match.

The circumstances begin when Evra states in paragraph 103 that “ref, he just called me a fucking black” (singular). The referee could not however corroborate that Evra said this. However, assuming he did, Evra only makes reference to Suarez “calling him a black” once. If this is a ‘one-off’ phrase because all the other accounts in relation to the abuse make reference to multiple abuse references, then Evra’s contention that there were multiple references to the word “negro” ought to be called into question. The point however is that, this account appears completely consistent with what all other Manchester United and referee/fourth official witness statements appear to say in the IRCR.

Next Evra tells Ryan Giggs that he has been called black (with again no reference to the number of times this occurred).  Giggs in paragraph 114 recounts that Evra said Suarez called him black (singular) and is silent about the number of times said. This suggests Evra did not tell him the number of times.

After coming into the dressing room at the end of the game Evra spoke to a number of United players. Antonio Valencia, Javier Hernandez, Nani and Anderson all provided witness statements and their evidence was accepted in full by LFC. All four players make similar claims that Suarez “would not talk to [Evra] because he was black”. There is no mention in any of the witness statements (as set out in the IRCR) of the number of times or the other types of context where Suarez allegedly abused Evra. In paragraph 125 of the IRCR Evra goes on to say that he also told other players that Suarez had said “I won’t talk to you because you are black” (single reference).

The IRCR raises no issues throughout their analysis about why Evra, after being called a negro numerous times, makes no reference of the fact to Giggs, his four teammates and the wider team in the dressing room.

Evra then tells Alex Ferguson in the dressing room that “Suarez called me a nigger” (single reference). Ferguson in his witness statement told the referee that “Evra has been called a nigger by one of the Liverpool players”. In paragraph 277 the IRCR noted that Ferguson “did not recall having said specifically that it was five times and thinks it unlikely he would have done so. Mr Evra did not mention… any specific number that he told Sir Alex at the time.”  Paragraph 130 clarifies that “Evra told the referee that Suarez called him a nigger” and paragraph 131 sets out in the referees witness statement that “Suarez had said to Evra “I don’t talk to you because you niggers”). There remains no reference to Suarez calling Evra a negro more than once.

The referee’s report sets out in paragraph 153 that when Mr Mariner (the referee) and the fourth official were discussing the issue with Evra and Ferguson, Evra stated Suarez said “I don’t talk to you because you niggers” (single reference).

Next Evra is interviewed on Canal+, which reveals a fundamental inconsistency that adversely affects Evra’s credibility generally. This is because he considers it appropriate to state something that according to the witness statement evidence, as set out in the IRCR, he has not stated to anyone else. He claimed he was abused by Suarez more than once. I believe LFC would be puzzled as to why he uses this opportunity to accuse Suarez of multiple abuses when he has had ample opportunity to voice his concerns to a whole raft of people, with it fresher in his mind, but did not.

I believe LFC would also challenge the “10+ times” inconsistency that was given three sentences worth of assessment (paragraph 281) by the IRCR. Specifically, the IRCR states that Comolli agreed with Evra’s contention that Suarez racially abusing more than ten times was a French ‘figure of speech’ when actually Comolli did not believe that was the case (paragraph 160). I consider LFC would argue strongly against the IRCR’s belief that “there is nothing in the Canal+ interview which materially undermines Evra’s evidence”. Based on the above, I believe LFC would argue that Evra’s account to Canal+ is inconsistent:

1. because it is inconsistent with what he has said (or rather not said) prior to giving the media interview; and
2. if he has been abused numerous times, he certainly needs to be more precise than 10+. LFC would also point out that the Commission came to the wrong conclusion that Comolli supported Evra’s “common figure of speech” explanation.

The only inconsistency in this chronology comes from Ray Haughan, the LFC administration manager who states that he heard Ferguson say “Suarez has called him.. a nigger five times” (paragraph 135). However, the witness statements of Evra, Ferguson, the referee and fourth official do not appear to mention the number of times of any claim. Ferguson explicitly states in paragraph 277 of the IRCR that he does not believe he mentioned the five times point. As such, a panel would on the balance of probabilities probably infer that such a comment was less likely to have occurred because of witness statements of the accusers who do not appear to mention this fact (as set out in the IRCR). This point would then rule out the corroboration conclusion used the IRCR at the end of paragraph 382.

Summary:  Evra claims to speak to the referee on the pitch, to Giggs on the pitch, to Valencia, Hernandez, Nani and Anderson in the changing room, to other United players and Ferguson in the changing room, to the referee and the fourth official in the referee’s room and at no time does he mention the crucial fact that he was abused more than once. He is actually consistent throughout in his single claim that Suarez said he would not talk to him because he was black.

I believe LFC would argue that all of the above is not just one inconsistency. Each time Evra does not make a reference to the number of times the word ‘negro’ was used undermines his later evidence. This makes his subsequent FA witness statements at odds with his statements at the precise time of the events. This is in fact highlighted in the IRCR when it states in paragraph 288 that at least in relation to the referee’s report:

“the referee’s report was made on the day of the match. It should, therefore, be given some weight as a contemporaneous record of what people were told had happened soon after the incident, rather than what they recalled at some later date.”

The Commission ignores its own directions to use the referee’s report as the basis for the number of times Evra said Suarez abused him. I believe LFC would argue that this would cast serious doubts as to the substantive nature of Evra’s claims and the consistency of Evra’s post-match explanations, and as such should lead to the conclusion that material inconsistencies appear in his account which severely damages his credibility.

Corroboration

As a general point which has been made on this site in a recent previous article, I believe LFC would stress, as they have done in their public statements, that Evra’s claims are not backed up with any direct corroborating evidence bar Suarez’s admission of using the word negro once.

The IRCR stresses in paragraphs 214 onwards, for example, that “this is not simply one person’s word against another” and that other evidence such as video footage, the evidence of others on the day and afterwards, documentation from the referee and the transcripts of interviews were all used. The LFC lawyer however stressed that the:

“…case turns very substantially on the evidence of the two main protagonists, that we should think very carefully before reaching a conclusion based solely on the word of the main protagonist for the FA, and that we should look at the other evidence, and see whether there is other evidence that corroborates Mr Evra’s story.”

I think that LFC would argue that the IRCR does not provide any direct corroborating evidence to back up Evra’s claims. Indeed, the IRCR states that in the absence of being able to identify such corroborating evidence they “asked [themselves] which account was more probable”. Based on the above arguments set out, I believe LFC’s aim would have been for the Appeal Board to significantly downgrade Evra’s credibility to demonstrate that his account was less probable.

Suarez Inconsistencies

If LFC had appealed the judgment, among other aspects of the IRCR, the club would have probably focused on at least three main grounds (there are of course others but these appear to be the most significant) that the IRCR used to discredit Suarez’s statements. The Commission believed that Suarez’s account of the incident was “flawed” and “profoundly undermined” the credibility of his evidence. LFC’s aim would be to rebuild Suarez’s credibility by attacking each one of the perceived Commission inconsistencies with the aim of showing that:

1. less weight should be attached to the conclusions reached in the IRCR; and/or
2. the conclusions reached by the Commission did not factor in, or at least discuss, other plausible alternatives.

Suarez and Comolli/Kuyt inconsistent recollections: Kuyt and Comolli provided witness statements based on their interactions with Suarez. Comolli spoke with Suarez in the aftermath of the Evra complaint being made and was the second LFC representative after Kenny Dalglish to speak to the referee about what Suarez had said in Spanish to him. In paragraph 290, he said that Suarez had said “porque tu es negro” and not what Suarez had said in his witness statement i.e. “por que, negro” [2]

In Kuyt’s witness statement, he explained how he spoke to Suarez in Dutch with the translation of their conversation recounting Suarez using the phrase “because you are black” (Paragraph 297). Both Kuyt and Comolli reference in their witness statements that something was ‘lost in translation’ in how the phrase was constructed. The question for the Commission to consider was whether this was a plausible explanation for two individuals who had spoken to Suarez about what was specifically said or whether this contradicted Suarez’s account.

LFC would have highlighted the below points to counter any perceived inconsistency:

• Comolli, who’s mother tongue is French, spoke to Suarez in Spanish, which he then had to retell to the referee in English. He even admits in his witness statement that “he assumed [Suarez] would have used the words”. Comolli may actually have been trying to make sense of Suarez’s statement to the referee rather than quote exactly what was said. This therefore, if anything, should not demonstrate the inconsistency of Suarez’s account but a problem with Comolli’s interpretation of what was said;
• It would be somewhat understandable if something got lost in the translation for Kuyt, having a conversation in Dutch with Suarez, about a specific and highly intricate Spanish phrase, and then trying to retell it in English through a witness statement; and
• That actually the IRCR ultimately backs Suarez account of the incident by setting out in paragraph 388 that “Mr Suarez said “Por que, negro?”. They believed Suarez did use that phrase and not the one that Comolli and Kuyt originally believed was said.

I believe LFC would highlight the fact that Suarez stayed consistent in what he claimed to have said to Evra, (por que, Negro?), yet because Kuyt and Comolli for differing reasons did not verify his precise Spanish phrase, this is held against Suarez as demonstrating inconsistency.

It would appear unfortunate that Spanish speaking players at LFC (Maxi, Lucas or Coates for example) were not asked to give witness statements to explain in Spanish what Suarez may have said to them. This could have given a more consistent and less likely to be ‘lost in translation’ approach. This is because the Spanish speaking players could have added additional precision to either back Suarez or give Kuyt and Comolli’s account further strength [3]

[2] The difference being as explained in the IRCR that “If Mr Suarez had said “Porque tu es negro”, then he would not be using “negro” as a noun to address Mr Evra, but as an adjective, meaning “Because you are black” paragraph 290.

[3]  This is discussed in the last section about new evidence to provide to an Appeals Board.

Acting in a conciliatory manner (paragraphs 253 onwards): For the one occasion that Suarez admitted to using the term “negro” he argued that it was said in a conciliatory context. The IRCR in paragraph 264 stated that “Suarez’s attitude and actions were the very antithesis of conciliation and friendliness”. The IRCR pointed to the video evidence demonstrating both players’ hostility “before, at the moment of, and after” Suarez’s admitted “negro” use. I believe LFC may have elaborated that:

1. within the bounds of how arguments play out there can be, and are, conciliatory moments used by those arguing to defuse acrimonious exchanges. LFC may have claimed that the IRCR’s perception that once an acrimonious exchange had begun, it remained acrimonious throughout is not so cut and dried. This would be of critical importance to Suarez and LFC because if this conciliatory approach was seen as more plausible, the context of Suarez using the word negro (based on the linguistic experts’ opinion) could have been viewed as non-abusive. The IRCR not only dismissed Suarez’s account of his conciliatory intention but used it to demonstrate that Suarez’s evidence was inconsistent and “simply, not credible”.
2. pictures and body language (without actual audible words) would have been difficult to demonstrate continued, complete and total hostility throughout the exchange. Without audible conversation evidence in the TV evidence, alternative scenarios to simple continuous hostility should have been explored by the IRCR. Indeed no body language experts were brought in to examine how the two players acted throughout the exchange. LFC may have considered using such experts to cast doubt over the IRCR insistence that the actions of the two players was only that of continued acrimony.

Pinching (paragraphs 245 onwards): Suarez stated in his witness statement that during the time of him pinching Evra he was trying to defuse the situation. Specifically:

“Evra did not back off and Dirk Kuyt was approaching us to stand between us. At this point I touched PE’s left arm in a pinching type of movement. This all happened very quickly. I was trying to defuse the situation and was trying to intimate to Evra that he was not untouchable by reference to his question about the foul. Under no circumstances was this action intended to be offensive and most certainly not racially offensive. It was not in any way a reference to the colour of PE’s skin.”

Under cross examination Suarez accepted that pinching was probably not defusing the situation.  The lawyer defending Suarez (Peter McCormick) put it down to “bad drafting” in the witness statement and furthermore admitted to the Commission in paragraph 250 that pinching was not the action of someone diffusing the situation. It appears Mr McCormick did not argue that it was not the actual pinch that Suarez’s witness statement was making explicit reference to when saying he was trying to defuse the situation with Evra. The IRCR inferred that this was a material inconsistency (in saying one thing but doing another) on the part of Suarez. I think LFC may have argued in any subsequent appeal that:

1. although the pinch may or may not be seen to rile or aggravate further, Suarez’s statement that he was trying to defuse the situation was more general in nature and was not in specific relation to the pinch; and/or
2. that the IRCR should not have inferred from his remark that this was anything close to a material inconsistency (albeit poor drafting on the part of the lawyer), when a number of apparent Evra inconsistencies are not addressed in any detail (e.g. Canal+ ten times issue above and Evra’s use of the word “nigger” being changed to “black”).

Inconsistency Summary: The reason these three issues are discussed in detail above is because the Commission uses these and other perceived inconsistencies to discredit Suarez’s account of what happened [4]. Specifically they make robust assessments that:

• “we find it remarkable that [Suarez] sought to advance a case that was so clearly inconsistent with any sensible appreciation of what happened” and
• “Mr Suarez’s evidence on these topics, which was shown to be flawed, profoundly undermined our confidence in the reliability of his evidence” (both in paragraph 357)

The way that the above inconsistencies can be countered by alternative arguments (with admittedly, varying degrees of strength) demonstrates that I believe LFC would have very strongly argued that such inconsistencies and conclusions were vastly overplayed by the IRCR in order to discredit Suarez and as a result favour Evra’s account.

^[4] There is one other relevant inconsistency issue relating to Suarez changing his account as to when he used the phrase negro, based on the video evidence he saw after he first made his FA interview statement. In the light of reports that Evra had up to three opportunities to see the video with the FA prior to making his statement, if true, should not therefore be used against Suarez as the basis for further IRCR conclusions of inconsistency.

Appeal Process

Whilst it has been reported that Suarez can only appeal against the level of the sanction and not the actual verdict [5] my initial reading of the FA Appeals Board Regulations is somewhat different [6]. Although the grounds for appeal may be deemed somewhat restrictive [7], regulation 3.3 states that among other things “The Appeal Board shall have power to: (1) allow or dismiss the appeal”. This would suggest that the Appeal Board could find in favour of an LFC appeal, thus rejecting the IRCR findings. Additionally, the regulations allow in exceptional circumstances for new information to be submitted. Such information could have included:

1. new language expert reports questioning the accuracy of Evra’s Spanish language claims [8] and body language experts to counter the continued hostility conclusion reached by the Commission;
2. evidence about Evra’s past credibility as a witness (which was not used by LFC’s lawyers as set out in paragraph 212);
3. witness statements of Maxi, Lucas or Coates as Spanish speaking players testifying about the exact phrase used by Suarez (if he spoke to them about it) to back up his version of what he admitted to saying and to reduce the Kuyt/Comolli IRCR inconsistency finding.

^[5] see http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2011/dec/21/luis-suarez-liverpool-appeal-options

^[6] (see the document starting on page 425 “In the case of an appeal from a decision of a Regulatory Commission” http://www.thefa.com/thefa/~/media/Files/PDF/TheFA/FA%20Handbook%202010-11/FAHandbook-update-1011.ashx/FAHandbook-update-1011.pdf .

^[7] See regulation1.1.4-1.5  “The grounds of appeal, available to Participants and The Association, shall be that the body whose decision is appealed against: (1) misinterpreted or failed to comply with the rules or regulations relevant to its decision; and/or (2) came to a decision to which no reasonable such body could have come. 1.5 In addition: (1) Participants only, may appeal on the grounds that the penalty, award, order or sanction imposed is excessive;”

^[8] http://www.thisisanfield.com/2012/01/professor-in-hispanic-studies-dissects-the-fas-suarez-report/

Opinion, Speculation and Conclusion

LFC took under four days to consider a 115 page document and decide not to appeal. This suggests that not appealing was either a ‘policy decision’ taken from the top (in apparent conflict with the club’s previous vehement statements to the contrary) or tactical. It is a long shot to suggest however that LFC may not quite have exhausted their appeal grounds. This all depends on whether an appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) is still a possibility. The rationale being that LFC may take the ban (only four of the games being in the Premier League) but would argue to CAS (perhaps on the grounds of a lack of independence through the FA choosing the panel) that the evidence used in the IRCR needs to be considered afresh in order to partly or completely exonerate Suarez. It would appear however that this is unlikely to happen because:

1. there are explicit prohibitions against going to CAS in relation to regulatory commission procedures (3.2. of the FA Disciplinary Procedures Appeals);
2. the CAS code states that the club should have exhausted all internal remedies (i.e. to go to the FA Appeals Board first) which it appears they have not; and
3. this would embroil the club in an additional regulatory action (something they were presumably keen to avoid when they came to the initial decision not to appeal).

Regardless of whether this may happen or not the above assessment illustrates potential examples of where LFC may have argued against aspects of the IRCR. Although this now appears impossible, the analysis may be useful in demonstrating why Evra’s evidence was perhaps not as watertight as previously thought and that Suarez’s lack of credibility as a witness may have been overplayed.

Thanks to Hal Cohen and my father David for checking the substantive points (though responsibility for all the assessments made above are mine).

Daniel Geey advises clients in the football industry. Such guidance has included advice on the Fit and Proper Person Test, ownership requirements, parachute payments and the football creditors rule, disclosure obligations under the relevant football authority’s rules, conflicts of interest and third party player ownership contracts. Daniel has also provided guidance on UEFA Financial Fair Play Regulations and how the rules may affect the future financial planning of football clubs. He has also given briefings and spoken at workshops and conferences on the interplay between Competition Law, Football and Broadcasting.

Daniel also edits a football law publication called On The Ball which can be accessed here and has a personal website called www.danielgeey.com where you can access for free all his published football law articles. Follow Daniel on twitter at www.twitter.com/footballlaw

Manchester City had only won one of their last 13 league games against Liverpool, and Andy Carroll had scored four in three starts against the league leaders, but those promising omens were not borne out as Liverpool slid to their second heaviest defeat of the season at the Etihad.

Before the first goal

Neither side produced any surprises in their formations or starting line ups. Mancini chose an attacking formation with passive behaviour; while Dalglish used his usual setup for big matches, the defensive formation with a passive style.

The first ten minutes were pretty cagey, with both sides backing off. Neither pressed, preferring to shut down the spaces in their own halves. For City this was more understandable as it was their second game in 72 hours; but Liverpool had a three-on-two advantage in the centre of the field, which might have encouraged them to close down their opponents. However, Dalglish’s initial plan seemed to be to slow the tempo and gradually ratchet up the pressure on the opposition, hoping that by inviting them on they would eventually tire and leave gaps in their defence.

Because of their behaviour, both sides had spells of dominance (in terms of possession) in the opening ten minutes, but neither went for penetrative passes, preferring instead to recycle the ball and wait for their opponents to drag themselves out of position.

Liverpool’s three-man central midfield gave them a slight advantage in this regard, and in the 8th minute Henderson sent a delightful through ball to Downing through the centre. The winger sneaked past Richards and went one-on-one with Hart, but the ‘keeper managed to block his shot with part of his arm and part of his torso.

Interestingly, in the opening minutes Adam tried several times to push forward and drag Yaya Touré and Barry out of their positions, but the forward trio were unable to use this space to their advantage.

After the first goal

The opening goal came from uncharacteristic mistakes from both Kuyt (losing the ball after a throw in near the penalty area) and Reina (who didn’t react well enough and allowed the ball to slip underneath his body).

Liverpool reacted well tactically, trying to put more pressure on City’s midfield two. This resulted in more possession, and after about half an hour they had closer to 70% of the ball. The link between City’s deep central midfielders and their main creative outlet (Silva) was severed, and the team quickly reverted to a policy of dropping deep to avoid being completely overrun through the middle.

In turn this gave even more space for Liverpool’s midfield triangle, allowing them to recycle the ball and dictate the rhythm of the game. As against Newcastle, Spearing played a key role in this, spraying the ball to the flanks and playing the ball off to his midfield partners.

The key man in this period of dominance for Liverpool, at least in terms of attacking edge, was Downing. In the previous match against City he and Enrique had worked exceptionally well against the right back Richards. Downing had preferred not to engage the full back directly, instead letting Enrique (who is a better match for Richards’ physique and pace) run at him, while Dowining tucked inside to act as an additional passing outlet.

But in this game, probably because Liverpool’s passive approach restricted Enrique’s forward movement, it was Downing who took on Richards directly. The situation in the 8th minute suggested that Downing was encouraged to probe the space around and behind Richards, and on a couple of occasions after the first goal he attempted to take him on. This appeared to take Richards off guard as the full back reacted poorly to the first few attempts. He backed off, allowing Downing to have space on the ball and choose where he wanted to run.

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The omens were good. Newcastle had failed to score in their last five league games at Anfield, and Gerrard (although he was on the bench) had scored six in his last eight against the Magpies. Kuyt had also scored in each of his last three league games against Newcastle, bagging a further two assists.

The match

In terms of tactical performance, there was little of interest in this game. It was one of the, if not the, dullest match (tactically) since Dalglish took charge last January. Instead of doing a run through of the game chronologically, therefore, I’ll look to highlight some key aspects from both sides.

Newcastle’s approach

Pardew did little to surprise in terms of his starting XI (only the selection of Vuckic ahead of Ben Arfa could even begin to raise an eyebrow, and even this was understandable given the Frenchman’s fitness issues at the moment) or in terms of formation. He used his usual backup formation the 4-4-1-1, with everyone playing in the positions one would expect.

Their main tactical approach was to sit deep and hope to hit Liverpool on the counter attack with passes towards the flanks or to Ba up front. With the slight move to 4-4-1-1 rather than 4-4-2, Cabaye was sitting much deeper than usual, level with Tiote in defence. This created two banks of four when they didn’t have the ball, with Ba making horizontal runs to create space for a counter-attacking long ball from deep. Vuckic was tasked to help him by sitting in the hole, but he was Newcastle’s poorest player on the night.

Newcastle only created two notable attacking moves in the entire match, and funnily enough both resulted in direct goal-scoring opportunities. In the 25th minute, Jonas Gutierrez managed to fight his way down the left flank before passing to Ryan Taylor, who with his right foot delivered an inverted cross into the box. An unlucky rebound saw Agger divert the ball past Reina after the thinnest of flick-ons off Cabaye’s head.

The second situation came in the second half, in the 70th minute, when Cabaye sent Ba into the penalty area with a quality through ball. The striker beat Reina from an acute angle, but Skrtel rescued the situation with a miraculous clearance off the line.

Liverpool’s approach

In the press conference before the game, Dalglish hinted several times that he was looking not only to stop Ba but the entire Newcastle team playing to their strengths. Liverpool’s approach was good evidence that the Scot knew what he was talking about.

First, Liverpool went with the 4-1-2-3 formation with Spearing as defensive cover behind Adam and Henderson. Up front, Carroll was helped by the inverted wingers Bellamy and Downing. This tactical decision showed exactly how Liverpool were going to defend and attack.

Newcastle were playing with 4-4-1-1, so the 4-1-2-3 meant that Liverpool were matched one-on-one with their opponents all over the pitch – most importantly through the centre where Liverpool’s 1-2 triangle mirrored Newcastle’s 2-1. One would expect the home side in this situation to aggressively press their visitors. Actually, Dalglish took the wiser decision to not use this approach. Newcastle’ aggressive nature, coupled with their ability to counter-attack directly down the flanks and the on-form Ba meant that heavy pressing would leave gaps that Newcastle could have exploited ruthlessly. From the very beginning of the match, Liverpool’s players closely followed their opponents, but did not engage them immediately, waiting for the perfect moment to make the interception or tackle.

This “passive” strategy led to certain periods where Newcastle had the upper hand in terms of possession, but crucially they were unable to do anything with it. They are not comfortable in situations where they have a lot of the ball – their style requires a quick move forward as soon as they regain possession – and so were of little threat to Liverpool. In certain situations, mostly during the period just before Bellamy put Liverpool 2-1 ahead, when Newcastle reached the final third they had to pass the ball backwards as there were too few attacking players. This was evidence of how little attacking intention Newcastle had in this match, or at the very least how uncomfortable they are with long periods with the ball at their feet.

The main idea appeared to be to give Newcastle time on the ball, hand them the initiative and hopefully drag them out of their two banks of four. Then Dalglish’s men would exploit the space on the break. From the beginning, Liverpool’s two wingers were pushed high up the pitch and were often fed with direct balls from deep. From there they either tried to dribble inside and shoot or go down the line and get a cross in. But this approach failed to deliver any more than the occasional wayward shot or cross. Newcastle didn’t commit many players forward when they had the football, and Liverpool were attacking too quickly, meaning they had too few players in advanced positions to really provide an attacking threat.

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Blackburn’s recent record had been abysmal. They had won just one of their last 17 away league games, and had failed to keep a clean sheet in 20 matches. Liverpool, however, are having trouble putting teams away; they are unbeaten in their last eight home matches, but have drawn four of them. And they have the worst shot conversion rate in the league this season, a miserly 8.6%.

First half

Blackburn moved away from their default 4-4-2/4-4-1-1, electing to start with a 4-1-2-3 instead. This was probably due to injuries to key defensive players, as the 4-1-2-3 offers more protection for the back four. N’Zonzi played the holding role, with Dunn and Gamst-Pederson just in front of him. Interestingly, Hoillet started on the left with Formica tucked in on the right.

Liverpool started with their usual 4-4-2, but with an untested combination up front. They played with inverted wingers, which usually means starting with double false nines. However, this time Dalglish opted for the less mobile but more directly attacking Carroll as the main striker. In theory this should have been the most attacking Liverpool team this season, with six attackers (the front four plus the two full backs as quasi-wingers) and a more traditional centre forward-creative forward partnership up top.

As I argued before the match, Liverpool needed to put as much pressure on Blackburn as possible, partly because of their injury problems and partly because of their general lack of defensive ability and tactical cohesion this season.

With Carroll freeing up Suarez to roam everywhere in the final third (wide or deep), and the full backs to provide overlapping runs and presence in the attacking zone, Liverpool certainly had an attacking line up. Yet they started the game rather slowly. They lacked intensity and attacking drive, the team looked static and disjointed in terms of movement and passing.

Blackburn’s midfield trio strangled the centre of the park and limited attacking opportunities for Adam and Henderson. Both Dunn and Gamst-Pederson tried to close them down as soon as possible, forcing them to knock the ball back to the defence or sideways to the flanks. N’Zonzi, playing behind these two, could either cover the gap left by a pressing midfielder or drop into the defensive line and offer additional protection to the defenders once Liverpool went down the wing. As a result, Liverpool lacked attacking penetration through the centre, with all of their attacking patterns pretty much one-dimensional and easy to anticipate for Blackburn’s defensive players.

With the centre flooded, Liverpool were forced to play in wide areas. They favoured the right where both Downing and Johnson could target Blackburn’s inexperienced left back (the 17-year-old Henley). As a result, Liverpool stretched the play on the right with Johnson and Downing taking turns over who would run at the defender and who would tuck inside slightly as the passing outlet. Theoretically, this should have liberated the players on the left flank to roam inside and get closer to the front two. That would overload the defence by allowing the attackers to play quick passes with each other and by getting more bodies into the final third. In practice it never happened due to poor ball distribution and poor timing of runs, off the ball movement and generally poor team cohesion.

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