By Chris Rowland.

So how many points should we have got this season?  If results had matched performances and we got what we deserved from each game, I mean. Forgetting black swans and outliers, what difference would it have made?

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Pre-match stats

Swansea have failed to score in their last five games in all competitions against Liverpool.

Swansea have won just one of their last eight Premier League games.

Liverpool have failed to score on the final day in the past two seasons.

But the Reds have lost on the final day only once in the past eight seasons.

Against Chelsea on Tuesday night, Liverpool missed their fifth penalty of this league season, becoming the first team since 1998/99 (when collection began) to miss five in one PL campaign.

The Reds have now scored four or more goals in a game in every season since they returned to the top-flight in 1962.

Swansea have mustered just three attempts from fast breaks this term, a league joint-low.

The Welsh side have made an average of 62 passes per shot attempted in the Premier League this season, 17 more than any other team (Fulham – 45).

Stewart Downing has failed to hit the target with each of his last three penalties, and hasn’t converted any of his 72 shots this term.

Liverpool are the only PL team to have lost every away game they have fallen behind in this season (nine in total).

Starting XIs and overall shapes

Rodgers made only one change in his personnel following the loss at Old Trafford, Britton replacing Gower at the base of the midfield trio. Unsurprisingly the team kept its 4-3-3 formation.

Dalglish kept his front six players following the inspiring performance against Chelsea last week, making changes to his back five only. Reina was replaced by Doni, while Skrtel missed the game due to a scheduled nose operation. His place was taken by Kelly, which forced some readjustment to the back four positions – Agger came alongside Carragher, Kelly on the right and Johnson at left back. For a second match in a row Liverpool started with a sort of 4-2-2-2 formation.

The match

As expected, the clash offered some really interesting tactical battles, with the teams using different formations and different types of overall strategy. Throughout the whole match the teams battled with each other to try to impose their own strengths, but in the meantime being cautious in terms of not giving an opportunity for the opposition to take advantage of their weaknesses.

With such different tactical plans the match went through different phases and periods of each team neutralising the opposition and in turn dominating. Hence my main focus will be on these different periods and how the overall tactical battle panned out.

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Pre-match stats

This is the 32nd meeting between Liverpool and Chelsea in the past eight seasons, more than any other fixture in any eight year period in English football history.

Liverpool have won five of the last seven Premier League meetings between the teams, and the last three in a row.

The Reds have scored only 11 goals in their last 10 Premier League home games against Chelsea.

49% of the goals Chelsea have conceded have been shipped in the last 15 minutes of Premier League games this season.

10 of the last 11 goals that Chelsea have conceded have come in the final 20 minutes.

Liverpool have conceded fewer shots on target against them than any other team in the top flight this season (126).

In only two of the last seven clashes between these two teams in all competitions have both sides managed to get on the scoresheet.

In six of the last seven meetings between these two teams (in all competitions), the winning side have scored exactly two goals.

Andy Carroll has scored three goals in his last five Liverpool appearances; the same number as he had managed in his previous 29 appearances for the club.

Liverpool have scored with only 8.8% of their shots at goal in the Premier League this season; the lowest proportion in the top-flight.

Starting XIs and overall shapes

Both teams unsurprisingly made changes to their selections. Dalglish made four changes in terms of personnel – Enrique, Gerrard, Spearing and Bellamy were out of the starting XI (with the first two out of the match squad, the last two on the bench) with Carragher, Shelvey, Maxi and Carroll coming in. The formation was changed too – in the final Liverpool started with a sort of 4-2-3-1 but here the shape was more of a 4-2-2-2.

On the Blue side the biggest surprise came from the high number of changes Di Matteo made – only three players “survived” the Final – Ivanovic, Terry and Ramires. Without Mata on the pitch the formation was changed too, Chelsea opting for a 4-1-2-3.

The supposed tactical battle

As soon as the starting selections were confirmed I roughly explained (here and on Twitter) the most probable tactical scenarios given both team’s starting line-ups.

I expected Chelsea to line-up with 4-1-2-3 but their players’ roles were open to different variants. In the first variant I explained how Ramires could play centrally with the key role of pushing forward in order to link the team and deliver the crucial runs from deep on the break, with Romeu the deepest and Essien in between them, then Malouda on the left to deliver the attacking width and Sturridge to cut in from the right to directly support Torres in attack. In this scenario I expected Chelsea to sit deep, soak up the pressure and hit direct balls down the flanks, through the channels and over the top for their speedy front four players to latch onto and catch Liverpool off guard.

The second variant was for more of a lopsided cross between 4-1-2-3 and 4-2-3-1, with Ramires playing tucked in and relatively deeper on the right, with Sturridge higher on the left and Malouda part of the midfield trio. Here I expected Chelsea to be more possession-oriented, with the aim of keeping the ball and transforming their deeper recycling process into attacking team moves involving Malouda going wider on the left and Sturridge pushing infield in order to attack in more of a lopsided 4-4-2 shape, with the aim of delivering penetrative passing and movement angles.

In both variants the common threat for Liverpool was that Chelsea were going to have a midfield advantage (3v2) and could easily out-pass Dalglish’s team; then given the pacey and fluid front players the away team in theory would have all the required tactical ingredients to really worry the home team.

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Familiarity breeds contempt, and since 2004, Liverpool seem to have played Chelsea four or five times a season. The epic – if not exactly attractive – Champions League games have given way to equally combative domestic cup encounters.

Before, particularly between 2004 and 2007, it seemed that Chelsea, with all their expensive players, would win the league games, but Liverpool triumphed in the killer cup ties, such as in the Champions League and FA Cup semi-finals.

But then, in more recent times, Liverpool started finally winning league games at Stamford Bridge, and did so again this season; but twice went out of the Champions League in West London (2008 and 2009), and now have lost this year’s FA Cup final.

So much seemed to be riding on this game. Lose, and Liverpool’s season would be labelled a polish-resistant turd, with the Carling Cup a mere consolation, and the FA Cup Final providing nothing to show for a fine run of knockout results. But win, and there would be a lot to celebrate; the focus could legitimately be shifted from the league form, because two proper trophies in one season is still a rarity.

In the league, even if you don’t win the title, everything good you do up until the last game stays on the record; but lose a cup final and what went before vanishes. Too many of Liverpool’s best results have disappeared into the ether.

A season shouldn’t be defined by one game at the end of 50+ matches, but so below-par have the Reds’ Premier League results been, particularly in the second half of the season, it needed a second cup in the trophy cabinet to legitimise that failure; after all, Chelsea themselves could win two cups and still finish well off the pace in 6th. You can’t have two cup runs and maintain excellent league form unless you really are a top-rate side, and even then, plenty can’t juggle it all. (And Chelsea’s season, with their costly squad and monumental wages, needs the Champions League to legitimise it; the FA Cup alone won’t suffice, unless they finish in the top four. Ironically, they now need to win at Anfield tomorrow night to achieve that.)

In the domestic cups, Liverpool beat Manchester United at home, Chelsea away, Manchester City away, Stoke home and away, and Everton in a neutral setting. Results like those would have transformed the league season; instead, beating United and Stoke at home, and Everton at Wembley, resulted in nothing concrete – just a day out.

And even at Wembley on Saturday, to highlight the Jekyll and Hyde season, the bad fought with the good, with the bad winning for two-thirds of the match, only for the good to make a late case for itself; 60 minutes of nothingness turned on its head by a riveting final 30, by which time it proved too little too late (and, having spent the season hitting the post, the Reds were ‘denied’ by another fine-margin issue).

Liverpool were strong for only a third of the game, just as they’ve won roughly a third of league games. Those good 30 minutes were ultimately meaningless; in keeping with how plenty of good 90 minutes in the league – particularly at Anfield – have counted for nothing because getting that white ball over the whole line has been beyond them. Trying to make sense of it all can lead a writer to substance abuse.

Of course, just to further confuse things, Andy Carroll – who was playing poorly when the team was playing well – is now playing like someone worth building a team around. But would you dare do so? It’s been the season that refuses to make sense.

Confusion

The more time that passes, the more confusing things get. Is Carroll part of the problem, or now part of the solution?

The big man in the white boots has been superb of late. But how does he dovetail with Suarez, and does their partnership limit the tactical permutations? Can we play consistently well with him in the side, and not revert to long-ball football at the first sign of trouble? Can he stay consistently fit and prove that he has grown up, and is now a dedicated athlete? Will the incredible hunger he has shown for the past month or two remain in place?

I honestly have no idea. I’d like to think he is coming into his own, rather than just playing out of his skin, but I don’t feel that I know so.

And Carroll’s luck could do with changing, too. He should be the hero of a cup comeback, but instead he is only credited with one goal. With Chelsea killing off Spurs in the semi-final with a goal that didn’t even reach the line, you have to feel for Carroll, whose career at Liverpool could have finally gone from bubbling along to champagne explosion had the linesman given the goal.

It shouldn’t come down to official’s decisions, and I don’t blame the linesman, but for me, the whole of the ball looked over the line, once the iffy camera angle was taken into account. And even though I got a lot of Liverpool fans on Twitter saying “so what?/get over it”, it’s moments like that which change games and destinies. The futures of Dalglish and Carroll would have looked far more secure had it been given, even if it was a matter of mere millimetres either way.

That ‘goal’ would have made the score 2-2, and if momentum doesn’t exist from game to game – when players have had a chance to cool off and for their mood to change (as also happens at half-time) – it surely shifts within one; and in this case, it was with the men in red.

Chelsea were backing off, and perhaps there for the taking (although often, when a game is returned to draw status from a two or three goal deficit, the team that were behind tend to then stick on what they have, and the team that threw away the lead suddenly have to fight; in Istanbul, for example, as soon as it went 3-3, Milan took charge again – as if Liverpool knew they had got back into the game on spirit alone, but could not continue to tear into the more-talented and experienced Italians. So Carroll’s ‘goal’ wouldn’t have won the cup, but being so close to the end, it could have brought about extra-time.)

(Either the broadcast camera is not in line or the goalposts were not fully upright)

The officials’ failure to signal a goal left me feeling worse than had the team not created another chance at 2-1. While Carroll’s header could have been directed lower, it was such a good contact that he had no right to expect Cech to pull off such a remarkable save, whether the ball was over the line or not. It reminded me of Shevchenko versus Dudek in extra-time in Istanbul – the striker had the whole goal to aim at, but just hitting the target with power in those situations usually suffices.

The incredible thing about Carroll is that even when he tries the right thing, it somehow fails to work. If he aims for the corners – even the top corners – it goes narrowly wide, or hits the post, or somehow the keeper pulls off a remarkable save (Cech at Wembley, Hart at Anfield). If he just closes his eyes and powers it on target, it hits the keeper. He’s not had one go in when he’s got the contact totally wrong, in the way that so many players benefit from the occasional scuffed effort bobbling in.

He’s looking lean, fit, sharp and his feet look ‘light’; as opposed to looking like he was playing in lead boots when he arrived. His foot movements are now so nimble, even if, as a player, he isn’t the quickest off the mark; he’s got light feet, but still has to shift a big unit around. Perhaps he should have had more of a chance in the side during Suarez’s suspension, but Bellamy was sensational at that time. And maybe he’s not making enough of his own luck, but he hasn’t exactly been fortunate since £35m was associated with his name.

Whether or not Carroll and Suarez can form a sufficiently effective partnership – they’ve had some good games together, but it’s not been a roaring success (or produced tons of goals) – they can certainly offer good options as individuals. The problem as a pair is that, with the exception of Suarez in certain situations, they can’t really get in behind teams, and a striker who can do that seems vital, even if only as an alternative (assuming that Bellamy is not going to be reliable enough).

The defence is less problematic. Three of the back four that played at Wembley are first-rate; only Enrique is worrying me, after an excellent first five months. His form has dipped alarmingly, and maybe we’re seeing why Spain didn’t get carried away with his strong displays – he’s possibly too limited on the ball. He’s quick, he’s strong, but at times looks fairly clueless as he twists and turns his way down a blind alley. For five months, no-one beat him for pace, but even that’s now occurring.

And of course, Pepe Reina is having a poor season by his standards, but for me, it’s a case of form is temporary, class is permanent (although the return of a top goalkeeping coach might help).

Mid-table midfield

However, as a unit, it’s the midfield that’s worrying me most. I wouldn’t object to any of Spearing, Adam, Henderson and Downing in the squad, but all of them together leave me underwhelmed. Maxi and Kuyt have perhaps lost confidence by being behind some of these players in the pecking order, but then they are in their 30s and slowing down; and like Bellamy and Gerrard, they do not present long-term solutions.

Spearing has his qualities as a shuttler, but he’s certainly nothing special; even his best games are merely ‘solid’. Henderson is young, and talented, but (as yet) unable to impose himself. Downing is almost 28, and is still unable to impose himself. And Adam is a big bundle of frustration. You can add the exciting but raw Shelvey to the list of those who just don’t seem good enough right now.

Although I expect a couple to develop very nicely – namely Henderson and Shelvey – I wouldn’t be devastated if we sold any or all of them, or loaned out the younger ones. (By contrast, Andy Carroll is showing lately what a lot of them lack: the ability to impose themselves. Henderson seemed to find that authority and aggression against Blackburn, but then lost it again.)

Of course, Bellamy, who has spent a lot of his playing time in midfield, has a lot of what we’re looking for, but has not played well since returning from injury, and is ‘unreliable’ in terms of fitness. He’s a mere squad player, due to his age and inability to play too frequently.

(Thinking about it, getting everyone in form at the same time has been a problem: Enrique was brilliant at the start of the season, Bellamy in the middle and Carroll at the end. How many have been on their game most weeks from August to May? Have more than a couple of players been on top form for even two-thirds of the season?)

And the worry is that the only midfielder who is definitely good enough right now – and under 31 – is Lucas Leiva. And we can only cross our fingers and hope that he recovers fully from his serious cruciate injury, and does so in time for August. All teams have injuries, but some hit you harder than others.

For me, the strange lack of excitement I sometimes feel about this team stems solely from the midfield, and in particular the players purchased last summer. The defence can defend and attack, and the attack can attack and defend. But I’m not convinced about Liverpool across the middle.

As the most expensive – and as a winger – Downing should be doing more. He’s neither a strong wide midfielder (like Kuyt) who works hard and can chip in with goals; nor a winger who goes past men, like the John Barnes of old. Perhaps it wouldn’t be a problem if the other flank was our main focus of attack, and Downing was the steadier alternative to balance things out; but he’s our ‘star’ wide creator, with Henderson often the counterbalance. That’s what worries me. Downing’s a good Premier League player, but continues to look a mediocre ‘big time’ player. Liverpool bought these players from mid-table teams, and now, Liverpool themselves are edging that way.

Goodbyes?

More detailed examinations of what needs improving in the summer will appear on the site in the coming weeks, as the season is sliced open and dissected as part of a systematic autopsy, but for now, a few of the (t)issues can be put under the microscope, in this preliminary examination.

I’d be very sad to lose Kuyt and Maxi, as I like the style of both (particularly Dirk’s work-rate and Maxi’s ability to ghost in at the far post for a tap-in). They can give the team goals. But neither is irreplaceable, and I accept that we can’t be sentimental.

Coming back to Carroll and Suarez, and the issue of goals, it would just need them to get 12-15 apiece if the midfield was weighing in; it doesn’t necessarily need that sought-after poacher with ice in his veins if everyone is chipping in. But as things stand, persevering with this midfield demands it. The team just doesn’t have enough goalscorers, and failing that, it does not possess one man who can get a crazy amount to compensate.

In many ways, when judging Henderson and Shelvey we’re in stasis, awaiting their metamorphoses. Ditto Carroll, although it feels like it might just be happening. (One swallow doesn’t make a summer; half a dozen, however, and we start to wonder.)

And we await the development of other young players; despite still being good for his age, Flanagan has gone backwards this season; Robinson has been injured and only featured in the League Cup; Conor Coady has not yet pushed on to make his debut, and neither has Andre Wisdom. Have they been deemed not yet good enough, or has the type of season made it harder to blood them? (Although going for the title, or for the top four, hardly makes it any easier.)

Raheem Sterling, who is edging into the frame, is precisely the type of player we could use in midfield, but of course, he’s only 17 and lacking in the kind of game intelligence Maxi and Kuyt could bring; but at least in his case it’s because he’s a mere lad who is still learning the game. Hopefully that will come with experience.

He has the pace, verve, skill and directness – plus an eye for goal – that this team is so lacking from wide midfield areas. But we can’t play the 21-year-old version of the winger in 2012. All we can expect to see is a very raw teenager eager to impress, but who will almost certainly experience some peaks and troughs with his form next season as he comes to terms with the step up.

The return of Lucas will help the centre-backs, and if the team concede fewer goals – as it was when he was playing – that puts less pressure on the others to score them. But Lucas himself obviously won’t offer goals; the team will be better balanced, and more able to retain possession, but putting the ball in the back of the net cannot be allowed to remain a problem.

And if Kuyt and Maxi leave, they take away 20 goals a (full) season between them. Then we need successful signings just to replace what we’ve lost, before even thinking of moving us forward. To improve, the Reds probably have to find someone pretty special: a creative tour de force, or someone who could score more than 15 – if not a Ronaldo, then a Robben; or make two or three signings who can share the goals around.

Personally, although he has his uses as a squad player, I’d look to get £10-12m back on Downing, and given his age and that he can do a job for mid-table sides, all of the money back on Adam. That could raise almost £20m; pretty essential if Kuyt and Maxi are allowed to leave for a measly £1m (Maxi free, Kuyt on a contract clause). Those two 30-somethings will however free up large wages, but the new players will surely cost a decent fee plus reasonably high wages.

Carragher is another whose release could free up a third big wage. There is of course a risk to losing his experience, on top of that of Kuyt and Maxi, particularly when it comes to big games; by contrast, Downing and Adam will be no great loss in that sense. Fabio Aurelio, possibly the most technically gifted (but injury-prone) left-back the club has ever seen, is another almost-33-year-old heading for the exit. His wages since Roy Hodgson brought him back to the club have been money down the drain.

Having said that, maybe Liverpool can bring back the almost 31-year-old Joe Cole, as an option, now that he’s rediscovered his Jo(i)e de vivre; but of course, he’s another ageing player on big wages. (Then again, as things transpired, this season Liverpool have been paying him to play well in France.) Ditto Alberto Aquilani: for the sake of a mere £5m, which will now not be triggered by AC Milan, there has to be a case for keeping him. At ‘just’ 27 (28 in July), he’s a young man compared with Maxi, Gerrard, Kuyt, Aurelio and Carragher, and he can spot a killer pass. I prefer Aquilani to Adam, because of his ability to keep the ball, but neither seems a perfect solution, and the Italian’s injuries will always be a worry.

Deja vu?

While it’s still a fairly young squad overall, age is actually a major problem: what were the best big-game players are now on the wrong side of 30. Such a strong squad three years ago is now strangely reminiscent of where the club was in 2003/04, when starting the season as reigning League Cup holders, and ending it 30 points adrift of the leaders.

The best players then, aside from home-grown lads, were the older ones: Hamann and Hyypia stand out. The recent big young signings – in Houllier’s case, from the French league as opposed to these shores – were overpriced and subsequently under-delivered. Salif Diao, El Hadji Diouf, Antony Le Tallec, Bruno Cheyrou and, as Houllier’s leaving present, Djibril Cissé, were all at a great age. But like Carroll, Henderson and Adam, they failed to make a big enough impact.

Contrast this with Reina, Agger, Lucas, Sissoko, Mascherano and Alonso, all signed when 22 or younger, and Torres and Skrtel, aged 23. So far, only Suarez of the new guard has proved he has the character for handling the expectations, although we don’t have the benefit of hindsight here (and in time, others may be seen as similarly successful).

The football was less enjoyable in 2003/04 than it is now, but of course, Michael Owen – the one type of player we currently lack – was on hand to do little but snaffle a few goals on the counter-attack to scrape the team up to 4th place, 30 points behind the champions.

There was one perfectly-aged mercurial talent, to create the openings: then it was Gerrard, now it’s Suarez. And there was one big English centre-forward with a massive price tag (in today’s money, Heskey cost roughly £30m), who couldn’t score enough goals, but who, on his day, could be unplayable.

There are differences, of course, not least in how Houllier was a manager entering his sixth season, and this is a new project. But the mess that the Frenchman let accrue is not too dissimilar to now, with the shameful scaling down of Gillett and Hicks, the below-par final couple of signings of Benítez (excluding Shelvey and Sterling), the moronic fantasy manager sales of Christian Purslow, the zero-ambition purchases of Roy Hodgson, and the messy Dalglish/Damien Comolli-led Brit-based policy of the past 18 months.

Making a mark

It took Benítez a year to sort out the squad he inherited following Houllier’s final campaign, in a season that saw a disappointing league showing overshadowed by two cup finals. A year later, Liverpool were able to win 25 of the 38 league games, finishing with 82 points (and the FA Cup). As good as Benítez was, the club was in a virtuous circle, with the Champions League income helping the club to remain in the Champions League, and attract Champions League players; although of course, the extra games meant the Reds needed a bigger squad than they could afford, and away league games were harder after a long midweek trip.

While several players were merely in-and-out of the side (such as Peter Crouch), it arguably took just three inspired signings to make such a difference: Xabi Alonso, Luis Garcia and Pepe Reina; all of them easily within the club’s current budget, even with inflation taken into account. Momo Sissoko was also very effective in that time.

Daniel Agger arrived in January 2006, but with just four appearances, didn’t make an impact until the next season. Agger, Reina, Alonso, Sissoko and Garcia were all signed in Rafa’s first 18 months, and all looked the part within those 18 months. In the last 18 months, only Luis Suarez has been of that calibre. Liverpool have spent some Champions League fees, but not handed out Champions League wages.

It’s actually five years since the last clutch of successful signings was made. Five years. Fees aside, there have been some excellent buys – Suarez and Johnson; some good buys – Meireles, Bellamy, and, I had thought, Enrique; and some potentially good buys – Coates, Henderson, Carroll.

But it now needs a 1987 (Aldridge, Houghton, Barnes, Beardsley), or a 1999 (Hyypia, Hamann, Henchoz, Westerveld), or a 2007 (Torres, Lucas, Mascherano, Benayoun), to turn it around. Another 1992, or 2002, or 2011, and unless some hitherto underachievers radically transform, then it will be hard to feel too confident right now; especially if Kuyt, Maxi and Carragher will need replacing, and the dressing room loses even more character.

Before summing up, it’s worth noting that in 2003/04, Liverpool won just 41.8% (18 from 43) of their games against Premier League teams (when also including cup games), and just 42% of league games when finishing 4th. Under Roy Hodgson, it was just 35% (seven wins from 20).

Right now, it’s 43.1% (19 wins from 44), with six of the eight cup games coming against Premier League top seven sides, plus two versus Stoke. It puts some context to the otherwise Hodgsonesque 36.1% win percentage, but it’s still not great – and doesn’t explain why Liverpool can win six and draw one out of eight cup games (75% win rate) against very strong opposition, but then do far worse, on average, against the division as a whole.

Inconclusive conclusion

As ever of late, I’m heading off in tangents, trying to take everything in and leave no stone unturned. But some of it just won’t make sense, no matter how much I prod at it, and there are hundreds of aspects still left unexamined. Time will provide most of the answers about players being good enough, but by then, it might be too late; the damage might have been done.

Or, in two years’ time, we might be drinking to the 30-goal Geordie striker and the young Wearside midfielder who overcame slow starts to become national treasures. Stranger things have happened (many of them this season).

Several specific issues will be addressed in subscriber-only pieces in the coming weeks. Subscription costs £3.50 a month. 

Pre-match stats

On all three occasions Liverpool had beatenEverton in an FA Cup semi-final before this season, the Reds went on to lose the final.

Only three teams have previously won the League Cup and FA Cup in the same season:Arsenal in 92/93, Liverpool in 00/01 and Chelsea in 06/07.

Liverpool could become the first team to achieve two FA/League Cup doubles, after they won both cups in 2000/01.

Chelsea have only lost one of their last 33 FA Cup matches (excluding penalty shootout defeats).

That one defeat, 0-1 against Barnsley in March 2008, is also the only time the Blues have failed to score in their last 39 FA Cup games (100 goals in total).

Excluding penalty shoot-out defeats, Chelsea are unbeaten in 22 FA Cup games, only one side has ever gone longer without defeat in the competition: Blackburn Rovers between October 1883 and November 1886 (23 games).

Since the start of the 2006/07 competition, Frank Lampard has scored more goals than any other player in the FA Cup proper (19).

This will be the 10th FA Cup meeting between these two sides and the first FA Cup final contested by them.

There has never been a draw in the nine previous FA Cup meetings between these teams, with Chelsea holding a narrow (5-4) advantage in the head to head record.

This FA Cup fixture has seen an average of 3.8 goals over the nine previous encounters.

The Blues have won five of their last six FA Cup final appearances, keeping a clean sheet in four of these victories.

Conversely, Liverpool have kept just one clean sheet in their last eight FA Cup final appearances (2-0 v Sunderland in 1992).

The Reds have won four of their last five FA Cup final matches, the last victory coming after a penalty shoot-out against West Ham.

Liverpool have won their last four games against Chelsea in all competitions, scoring seven goals and conceding just one in the process.

This will be the 31st meeting between these two sides since 2004/05.

Only once in their last 29 FA Cup games have Chelsea conceded more than once in a game, keeping 12 clean sheets in this period.

Excluding the Community Shield, Didier Drogba has scored in all seven of his matches at Wembley.

Luis Suarez has scored in all three of his FA Cup appearances for the Reds.

Maxi Rodriguez has scored for Liverpool in both of his appearances against Chelsea this season.

In only one of the last six clashes between these two teams have both sides managed to get on the scoresheet.

Starting XIs and overall shapes

Dalglish made eight changes following the previous game against Fulham, but all of them were expected in order to line-up with what many sees as the best Liverpool XI. Once again Liverpool went with what was a cross between 4-2-3-1 and 4-1-2-3, continuing the tradition of the last few months to use 4-4-2 only sporadically.

Di Matteo also didn’t surprise many with his selection, making five changes following the defeat against Newcastle. Bertrand, Meireles, Malouda, , Sturridge and Torres was respectively replaced by Cole, Lampard, Mata, Kalou and Drogba. In terms of formation, Chelsea used their expected 4-2-3-1 too.

Early on

The opening ten minutes (the period before the first goal) was extremely dull with really slow tempo and both teams playing “safety-first” passing all over the place. Both teams preferred to recycle in deeper areas often playing between their defenders and deep-lying midfielders.

In broad terms the teams were closely matched all over the place but especially in midfield. Liverpool’s deepest midfielder (Spearing) was tracking Chelsea’s most advanced (Mata), while Mikel (Chelsea’s deepest) was covering Gerrard (Liverpool’s most advanced). In between, Henderson and Lampard roughly cancelled each other out as potential passing outlets. However, the most freed players were Spearing and Mikel as Mata and Gerrard didn’t track them back properly when out of possession. The outcome was similar (Spearing and Mikel having the time to recycle the ball) but the reasons different; Mata preferred to stay higher and roam between the lines and drift wider in order to take advantage of every free space, effectively becoming the team’s main attacking outlet on the break;, while Gerrard immediately started to roam and generally drop deep trying to level with Henderson (sometimes even with Spearing) when Liverpool were out of possession. The other crucial difference was that in general terms Chelsea tried to quickly drop into a 4-4-1-1 shape, leaving only Mata and Drogba higher up the pitch, while Liverpool generally tried to exert a sort of press, albeit not particularly fiercely or all over the pitch.

The result of all this was that it was Spearing not Mikel who had more space and time on the ball, thus being in a better position to influence his team’s recycling. He did his job reasonably well, using short passes to his nearest players.

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Starting XIs and overall shapes

In the light of the forthcoming FA Cup Final, not unexpectedly Dalglish made wholesale changes to his starting team. There were nine new faces following the previous league match, with only Shelvey and Henderson keeping their places. But the formation was the same – once again, as so often this year, the team started with 4-2-3-1.

On the other side, Billy McKinlay, currently in charge of Fulham as Jol has been hospitalised due to health problems, only made a few changes within his team’s preferred 4-2-3-1 framework, with Kelly starting at right back, pushing Hughes centrally in place of Senderson, while Murhpy was reinstalled in the starting team in place of Diarra, while former Liverpool winger Kacaniklic starting on the left in place of Frei.

Fulham penetrating early on

Given that both teams started with similar formations, it was logical to expect the difference to come from how the players were tasked to perform tactically. But more or less both teams had similar tactical outlooks, so the actual difference came from the very basic difference between the players – Fulham’s attacking players were faster than Liverpool’s, and right from the start of the match Fulham were the team adapting faster and better to the actual match context.

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Pre-match stats

These two sides mustered 16 shots on target between them in the reverse fixture which ended as a 1-1 draw.

Only Wolves (6) have picked up fewer points than Liverpool (12) in 2012.

Liverpool have only won three of their last 15 Premier League matches, losing nine in that run.

Norwich have won just two of their last 10 Premier League games and have gone 11 without a shutout.

Liverpool have won their last two visits to Carrow Road by a 2-1 scoreline.

The Reds have converted just nine per cent of shots into goals, a lower proportion than any other side in the top flight.

Liverpool have now hit the woodwork on 30 occasions this season, more than any other team, while only Bolton (6) have the struck the uprights fewer times than Norwich (7).

Norwich have scored the joint-most headed goals in the Premier League (15).

The Canaries have conceded just 18% of their goals from set pieces, the lowest proportion in the Premier League.

Liverpool have allowed their opponents just 120 shots on target, fewer than any other team this season.

Starting XI and overall shape

Following the loss against Blackburn in their previous match, Lambert made four personnel changes and changed formation from 4-4-2 to 4-4-1-1. Vaughan and Hoolahan made way for Johnson and Fox to feature in the midfield, pushing Howson in the hole behind the lone striker Morison. On the flanks, Surman was replaced by Pilkington on the left wing, while Naughton replaced Martin at right back.

Dalglish reverted to the 4-2-3-1 formation that the team has predominantly been using in the past couple of months, making even more personnel changes – five. In defence Skrtel was rotated with Carragher, while Spearing made way for Shelvey. Following certain problems I outlined in the match against WBA, it was no so big surprise to see both Maxi and Kuyt benched, with Downing and Bellamy taking their places as inverted wingers. Last game it was Gerrard rested due to precaution, now it was Carroll left out of the squad for very same reason, making way for the captain to feature.

Norwich were poor

In the preview for the match I noted that Norwich are one of the most tactically flexible sides in the league this year. But surprisingly they were really poor, tactically and technically.

As expected their main attacking approach was to hit direct passes down the flanks and the outside channels, then hitting crosses into the box. But they failed to do so with the best possible effect due to two main reasons. First Liverpool’s full backs were sitting relatively deeper, rarely being too adventurous in the opening twenty or so minutes. As a result Norwich’s wingers rarely managed to receive the ball in good attacking positions and even more rarely succeeded in creating decent attacking opportunities (statistically they didn’t create any chances and didn’t have a single shot at Liverpool’s goal in the whole first half). The second reason was that in the box there was only Morison as a potential receiver of these crosses, and logically he was easily marked out by Agger and Carragher.

However the bigger problem was that Norwich were as a whole really static and rigid in terms of overall movement and attacking behaviour. Playing in a 4-4-1-1 formation, it was logical for them to defend with two banks of four, sitting deep and preventing the opposition having space and time in their half, especially with Liverpool actually playing with a 4-2-3-1 formation, which meant the risk of opening too many gaps through the channels and between the lines was great if Norwich dared to fiercely press and push their defensive line higher up the pitch.

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Pre-match stats

Liverpool have won all five previous home games against West Brom in the Premier League without conceding a single goal.

Going back further, the Baggies haven’t won any of their last 21 trips to Anfield (since 1967) in the top-flight (D4, L17).

Overall, the Baggies have lost 10 of their 11 PL clashes with the Reds without troubling the scorers, winning the other 2-1 last season.

Roy Hodgson’s win percentage as manager of West Brom (37%) is now higher than it was during his spell with Liverpool (35%).

Liverpool have drawn a league-high nine home games this term.

Only seven teams have taken fewer points on their own patch than Liverpool have mustered this term (24).

West Brom have lost three of their last four away league games (1D) and have failed to keep a clean sheet in 15 games on the road.

Just 4% of the goals the Baggies have conceded this season have come from corners, a league-low proportion.

Anfield has seen fewer goals than any other Premier League ground this season (33).

Liverpool have hit the woodwork 28 times now, seven more than any other side.

Starting XIs and Overall Shapes

Dalglish has flirted with 4-3-3 in his last five matches. Only against Everton (both in the league and in the cup) has he started with a 4-4-2. In this game, however, he chose to play with two forwards. Carragher made way for Enrique while Maxi and Kuyt played on the flanks instead of Downing and Henderson. Gerrard was rested as a precaution which allowed Henderson to start in the centre.

On the other side, Hodgson went with a surprisingly pro-active side, also playing with 4-4-2 as he had done against Queens Park Rangers in the previous game. This time Long partnered Odemwingie up front as Fortuné was recovering from a knock suffered last time out. The other change was that Olsson came back from suspension and replaced Dawson in the heart of defence.

The match was unsurprisingly one sided, so the main focus of this report is on Liverpool. But before going into detail about their approach, I will start by sketching out how West Bromwich Albion tried to threaten Liverpool when they actually got the chance to attack.

WBA’s Attack

Hodgson’s team defended as expected – two tight banks of four squeezing out the space between the lines and in the channels. The surprising element was that they had two attackers playing alongside each other rather than as split forwards (such as in a 4-4-1-1). It is safe to conclude that this was as attacking a team as Hodgson could put out.

What made them pro-active was the way that they behaved when they attacked. Hodgson’s teams are famed for focusing on long-ball transitions from defence to attack. This match was no different, but the long-balls were not negative, nor were they one-dimensional. They were actually quite fluid.

The  two players up front, Long and Odemwingie, constantly worked Liverpool’s channels, while on the wings the wide players were playing on their “wrong” side, naturally encouraging them to come inside. They attacked in two main patterns. The first saw them feed the forwards directly in the channels; the second was more sophisticated (considering the coach). It involved a sort of recycling process in deep areas which allowed the forwards chance to drag their markers out of position so that the in-cutting wingers could come into the channels and exploit the space.

This strategy showed itself rarely due to Liverpool’s dominance – but each time they pulled it off they caused real danger. As a result, Albion had a couple of very good chances to score in each half. Ironically though, their goal didn’t come from one of these well-crafted moves but as a result of a mistake from a Liverpool player.

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Physicist Nils Bohr, talking about a ‘lucky’ horseshoe: 

“Of course I don’t believe in it. But I understand it works whether you believe in it or not.”

Momentum – confidence, or confidence trick?

By TTT Subscriber, Mike Begon. 

Hardly a Match of the Day or a 5Live ‘Kicking Off’ goes by without someone mentioning ‘momentum’ or ‘success breeding success’ or something like it. The same can be said for Tomkins Times discussions – in dark despair after a long run of defeats; in desperate hope following a big win following a disappointing sequence (and there have been many). Everyone believes in momentum.

Everyone knows it must be a fact of sporting life. Most of us have experienced it – or feel we have. But is there actually anything in it? Twenty million people – or whatever it is – can’t be wrong. Except that sometimes they can.

Momentum, psychological momentum and the momentum chain

To put it bluntly, for something to be true requires more than people believing it to be true. It requires evidence. Serious studies have gone in search of that evidence. Before examining them, though, we should define some terms and draw some distinctions that exist in the more technical literature. So: psychological momentum describes ‘changes in performance based on success or failure in recent events that change the beliefs or the psychology of athletes’. Clearly, it can be either positive or negative. Sports psychologists also refer to the ‘momentum chain’, acknowledging that what is being proposed is that the idea of success breeding success can be deconstructed into two separate psychological processes: ‘success breeds confidence’ and ‘confidence breeds success’.

It’s also useful to consider what we mean by momentum itself, irrespective of whether it has a psychological component, especially because, as we shall see, it’s often difficult to tease out that psychological component. If a team, for example, wins 25 of its matches over the course of a 38 game season, then those 25 wins will come in sequences – some long, some short. The same would be true of a team that wins only ten times, except of course that the sequences, on average, will be shorter. But in either case, you can predict the sorts of sequence-lengths you would expect by chance alone if their wins were distributed at random through the season.

Positive momentum, then, would be demonstrated if there were more longer sequences than you would expect by chance alone – and you’d need to apply some statistical technique to test for that. Long, even ‘surprisingly long’ sequences of wins are not evidence of momentum. They need to occur at a significantly greater frequency than would be thrown up by chance.

Hot hands and winning streaks

The studies of momentum themselves tend to fall into one of three categories, surveyed in an article by Roger Vergin in The Journal of Sport Behavior in 2000.

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