I can’t stand the noise. Please, make it stop.

In the old days we wanted Liverpool FC to do its business in private and only release it to the world when it was complete. Now, in life in general, no news is bad news. Indeed, no news is terrible news. No news is an excuse for mass hysteria.

I’ve been guilty of it, too; Twitter, in particular, does that to you. You stare at the screen as it updates … and still no news! It’s been five seconds! Refresh, refresh.

It turns you into a lunatic. The modern, internet age – of which I am proud to be part – has so many benefits, but as much as I love what Twitter can offer, it can turn every aspect of football into a circus. It never stops, it never rests, it never sleeps; it’s a monster that needs to be fed, and we love to feed it. We can’t help ourselves.

I can mostly handle the stream of abuse that comes my way on Twitter, but the constant state of unrest is arguably more disconcerting. Add the two together, and do I need it? I’ve reached the conclusion that I don’t. I’ll set up an account to follow the views of the select few writers I respect, and use the pre-existing one to post links to this site, but I don’t have the energy to cope with everything the Twitterverse throws at me (good and bad). It steals my time, and it steals my mind.

We’re addicted to new news – the latest news – and the number of ways we get our news, and how quickly we get it, just continues to grow apace. And once a wave of unrest starts to ripple, it’s hard to resist.

When, just a few days ago, fans started panicking about the number of people being sacked/let go by the club, I was caught up in the unrest. But we need to stop and think, take a step back. Passion is great when you want an atmosphere at a football ground, but it makes us stupid and irrational.

Everyone knows that a wide-ranging review was in place at Liverpool FC – that was hardly a secret – but did we really have to know who was undertaking it? And when it was complete, did we expect the owners to make decisions about letting people go, and not bother to bring anyone in? Was the plan simply to sack people?

A new structure is being put in place; I know this for a fact, although I don’t know any of the details.

(Dion Fanning has written a superb piece on the issue.)

I’d imagine that undertaking such a task – which amounts to an overhaul – is not straightforward. God-knows whether it will prove to be the right structure, or contain the right personnel. But we’ll know in time.

From what I witnessed last week on Twitter, the idea of FSG making a managerial short-list, as well as the varying reported lengths of it, has been ridiculed. Limiting their options was daft, and keeping their options open was daft. The idea of not having a manager in place when sacking the existing one is ridiculed, when the idea of having a manager in place when sacking the existing one (especially one as revered as Kenny Dalglish) would cause outrage.

The notion of Roberto Martinez – no trophies – was ridiculed, and the same people ridiculed the notion that the club (allegedly) dare approached Pep Guardiola (who, incidentally, had no top-level managerial experience before Barcelona).

No ambition and too much ambition, all in the same day. Damned if you do, damned if you don’t. This is the poisoned chalice of making decisions in football. The same applies to managers: their every last call is micro analysed. We can’t help ourselves; it’s what fans do. But the discussions that once took place in private are now everywhere. And yes, of course I’m as guilty as anyone on this. But removing myself from the Twitterverse might help me regain my sanity.

Maybe FSG will evolve the old the Liverpool way, but it’s about getting a balance between core values and modernising, in the way that Barcelona had to get to grips with a decade ago, and how, as outlined in the aforementioned Dion Fanning piece, Newcastle started doing a year ago. Roy Hodgson didn’t get the Liverpool way to such an extent that it was painful; but he’s something of a dinosaur (who is bloody good at setting up low-ambition teams using a rigid system).

The modern football landscape has changed, and the fact is that all players aspire to the Champions League. I’m old enough to remember when the domestic cups were very important, and 4th meant nothing, but it’s a bit like when a player wins the ball with a studs-up tackle and the hoary old ex-pro says “that’s never a foul, he won the ball!”

Things change. We might not like that change, and we might fight against it, but once in place, and until it changes again, you have to play by the current rules.

You move with the times. These days, winning a cup (aside from the Champions League) is like a national side beating Brazil in a friendly; but finishing 4th is like winning qualification for the World Cup.

Of course the club exists to win trophies. But the club cannot easily attract the best players, and pay their wages, without the Champions League. The European Cup is the trophy that everyone wants (which I type with gritted teeth, after last night), so you need to be in the top four (or reigning holders) to have a chance of winning it. And no-one has won the league in the past 20 years without first finishing in the top three.

Personally, I’d have labelled the season a big success had Liverpool won two trophies and finished 5th. One trophy and 8th is a different story. I don’t think it meant that Dalglish had to be replaced – I didn’t expect FSG to be that brave (or stupid, depending on your viewpoint) – but I don’t think that for the longer-term picture, winning the Carling Cup is better than being in the Champions League.

Big name or up-and-coming?

I don’t know who the new manager will be, nor do I know who should definitely get the job. There are those I’d be happy with, and those I’d be less sure about.

What I will say is this: doing well at a small club does not automatically mean that a manager can do well at a bigger one; this is the classic mistake so many people make. But equally, doing well at a small club does not mean that is the limit of a manager’s abilities.

And albeit with a project he inherited mid-season, Roberto Di Matteo has just won the Champions League (and FA Cup) without prior big-club management experience. But when he was at West Brom, I am on record as saying that I thought he had the right approach to succeed at a bigger club. Roy Hodgson may have ended up doing fractionally better than Di Matteo at West Brom, but Chelsea wouldn’t touch Hodgson with a bargepole; he just doesn’t have that big-club approach.

This article by Zonal Marking perfectly illustrates how someone like Roberto Martinez can make brave, clever decisions to solve problems. He’s ahead of the times; switching to a formation that’s on the rise across Europe. It’s not like he’s stuck to the same approach, year after year.

Whether or not that makes him suitable for Liverpool I don’t know; but you can’t write him off based on his Wigan record. He’s not been at a club riding the euphoria of promotion, or one that has large fanbase, an intimidating atmosphere or any money to spend. Presumably he’s being spoken to based on his sharp thinking, not his win percentage at a club aiming to scrape by each year.

Wigan sell their best players to keep stay afloat, receiving fees far in excess of what will be reinvested. Also, you can probably escape relegation more easily when playing football like Stoke (while playing football like Stoke won’t get you a job at a bigger club, where playing football like Stoke would be abhorred.) Martinez wouldn’t be my first choice, but just as some players at small clubs are at the apex of their journey, others can join the elite.

The assistance of an experienced football man in a kind of General Manager role, to help co-ordinate a lot of the stuff that can sap a manager’s time and energy, would mean that a less-experienced manager with bright ideas would presumably stand a better chance of succeeding. In theory it makes sense, but you can never know until it’s tried.

I’d obviously like to see Rafa Benítez at least considered, as the only current inhabitant of Merseyside to have managed a team to the Champions League. It was too soon for him when Hodgson was fired, and I frequently told people on this site that I’d only discuss Rafa returning after Kenny had gone. (The amount of begging emails and tweets I received in relation to trying to help bring Rafa back was incredible; but until last week I fully expected Kenny to remain in position, and then, to me, the issue was moot.)

An altered structure behind the scenes might actually help Benítez, although the relationships with those around him would have to be solid. He’s great if people are on the same wavelength and pulling in the same direction.

Iberians make sense, as the Spanish flavour has worked well at Anfield in the recent past, and the Academy set-up employs two important figures from the Barcelona system, brought to the club by Benítez three years ago. Perhaps Pep Segura and Rodolfo Borrell will rise to the first team picture, and take an overview of the whole club.

Whoever gets the job, the structure should provide an assistance rather than a hindrance.

“Advising” FSG

Finally, on a personal note, I’ve seen it said that FSG should be talking to a wider variety of fans than just me and one or two others.

First of all, as well as presumably downplaying the number of fans they converse with, this seriously overplays my influence. Also, I’ve been told that I speak only for myself, and not as part of any organisation.

As much as I gave my full backing to Spirit of Shankly in the fight against the previous owners, and as much as I believe in the importance of fans having a voice, I’m not sure they’d want to be contacted with a one a.m. request as to how to create a Guardian chalkboard, or where to find certain statistics. Does it really need a committee to do that?

On the sporadic occasions when asked, I gave my opinion on football matters, but I also outlined the what other fans were saying (if different from my view), and gave the contact details of experts when the issue was beyond me. I’m not someone who’ll bullshit when lacking an answer; quite a lot of the time, I just don’t know.

Beyond answering, every now and then, a few football-based questions, I’ve had no direct input whatsoever. As I said in my statement, I am free to email John Henry my views on footballing issues, but that doesn’t mean he’ll pay any attention.

As for a group of fans having a dialogue with the club, I assumed that was what the committee, chaired by Bill Shankly’s granddaughter Karen Gill, was set up to do:

http://www.liverpoolfc.tv/news/latest-news/gill-named-committee-chair

The last time I heard her speak on the issue, a month or two back on the excellent Anfield Wrap podcast, she was very positive about the committee. I presume that, as intended, the club listens to these people, although as I’m not involved, I don’t know how it all works.

I’m a not a political figure by nature, and try to retain my independence, so that I am not tied into any one direction (not to be confused by being tied to any of One Direction, something I’d find equally unappealing.)

While I don’t particularly appreciate being named in the SOS letter, even though they kindly forewarned me and said no malice was intended, I do continue to support their existence; I think it’s important that the union remains together for situations like those we saw a couple of years back.

However, I don’t think we are anywhere remotely near that stage.

They have every right to push for information, but the club also has a right to only release information when they think it’s pertinent. This is not a criticism of SOS or a defence of FSG, simply what is supposed to be “the Liverpool way”. You can’t simultaneously communicate openly and keep everything behind closed doors.

Like anyone, I’d love to know what’s happening with the stadium, but equally, it’s hardly proved a straightforward issue for anyone over the past dozen years at the club. FSG have a track record of getting this side of things right in America, but perhaps things are easier to facilitate in Boston. We don’t want to wait forever, but with at least £50m wasted on failed attempts, the club need to get it right; and for that, I’d rather wait a bit longer. (Even if, by waiting longer, I am not saying that it will definitely be resolved; I have no idea.)

My only true wish now, as a Liverpool fan, is that the fan-base finds some common ground, and gets behind the next manager, whoever he is; and that, hopefully with stability and an improving team, FSG can successfully sort out some of the other issues with at least a modicum of goodwill retained. Failure on the part of any of those involved – fans, manager, players, owners – will just lead to more heartache. And we’ve had our fill of that.

An angry email has been sent to almost every LFC supporter group and website, plus the club itself, asking why I (amongst certain others) appear to be advising FSG. (I don’t know who the sender is.)

“Paul Tomkins is an internet blogger/author who writes detailed summaries and analysis based on statistics. He has no experience what so ever in professional football, in any capacity. He also speaks for nobody but himself. Why is he anywhere near the ownership, or his opinion being given such credence? What is Paul Tomkins’ role? – it needs to be explained.”

Well, here it is.

Before John Henry bought Liverpool FC, he purchased several books on the club, to read up about its history. Two of those books just happened to be ones that I had written. Having enjoyed them, he asked to meet me shortly after the deal was completed. He spent a week trying to contact me via Facebook, but I assumed it was a prank and ignored him. Email proved more successful.

He was aware that I had spent five years writing a column for the club’s official website, and that I’d worked hard to forge a reputation for researching issues; even if people disagree with my opinion – and no-one is always right (particularly in football) – it came from a holistic approach that took in many disciplines.

I was not offered any kind of role – not least because I made it clear that due to my health and this website, I wasn’t interested in one – and I have never worked for FSG, or been paid a penny by them. Also, after what happened at Liverpool with Gillett and Hicks, I was not prepared to work for the club’s owners, even if, to me, they seemed cut from a different cloth.

The only ‘gift’ I have received was a package for my dad late last year, after he entered a hospice with terminal cancer (my dad’s dad played for Aston Villa, and John Henry asked Randy Lerner to send some signed Aston Villa merchandise.)

John Henry will occasionally contact me to help him understand something, or seek my advice on a certain issue, but the last time was back in March. FSG had already consulted several people about who would be best suited to run a review of the football side of things, and in particular, how Damien Comolli’s performance – as their football intermediary – could be judged. I wasn’t asked to perform that review, just to give my thoughts on the names who they’d had recommended – presumably provided by their actual advisors.

I have not been asked to provide any input on the managerial situation, although there is nothing to stop me providing my views, now that there is a vacancy. I am free to email John Henry any time I wish, and he’s free to ignore them!

I did not in any way, shape or form contribute to Kenny Dalglish losing his job, and those people accusing me of so doing are seriously out of line. If anyone thinks I’d dare advise against Kenny then they don’t know me, or indeed, what a total coward I really am; even if I believed that he had to be replaced – and I didn’t – I’d need a billion dollars, plastic surgery, a new identity and relocation to Brazil. He was my idol growing up, and I’d have no right to tell anyone to replace him (although no-one should be kept out of sentimentality, obviously, and it’s the owners’ prerogative to run the club as they see fit; I won’t always agree, but again, that’s football).

I don’t want to legitimise all this by giving it air, but seeing as it’s been sent far and wide, and that I’ve had all kinds of abuse on Twitter and via email, I thought it was best that I set the record straight.

Like any fan, I am not going to turn down my club if my opinion is sought, by owners interested in getting feedback from many sources. But I am not – and here I italicise – an advisor. The FSG style is to canvas the opinion of many and work with the wisdom of the crowd, and on top of that, they will have an inner circle of key people, of which I am not one.

King Kenny: to keep or not to keep? – that is the question (I keep getting asked).

The joys of another summer of chaos. A fanbase on the edge of meltdown, thriving uncertainty and, in the vacuum of communication, rumours coming thicker and faster than Djibril Cissé.

A lot of people I respect, including members of The Anfield Wrap podcast and posters on this site, this week felt that it was time for change. And a lot of people I respect, including members of The Anfield Wrap podcast and posters on this site, this week felt that sticking with Kenny was the only sensible option.

I agree that the managerial position should not be the club’s priority – finding a new Director of Football and appointing a strong CEO (amongst other things) are paramount – but if those appointments involve a root-and-branch assessment of all departments, then a strong case can be made for total restructuring.

Let’s be honest: FSG inherited a seriously failing club, and Kenny Dalglish took over a seriously failing side. But neither has made the progress they’d have hoped for.

On top of this, none of us fans have been helped by the utter insanity that the modern media – social, and establishment – does to us at times like this. The incessant rumours put us on edge, and while I don’t wish to legitimise them, or even add to them, I will try and make sense of the rumours flooding over us.

From the midst of this insanity, as I try to retain all my marbles, here are some reasons why Liverpool might keep Kenny, and why they might replace him.

Reasons to keep Kenny

• Stability. Do we really need more change? Four managers in four seasons would start to seem irresponsible. FSG are certainly not keen on replacing managers, and held off with Roy Hodgson until the situation became untenable. My fear with replacing Kenny, whether the reasons are valid or not, is that the new man will be given zero wiggle room in terms of results before a backlash begins. Roy Hodgson was not hated because he was not Kenny Dalglish, but the next man would have to step into those big shoes.

• The cup form. While the cups are not the priority – being in the Champions League helps attract better players that, in turn, help teams push up the table and compete for even better trophies – Liverpool did incredibly well against top teams in the domestics knockout competitions. That’s not to be sniffed at, even if you do put the top four before the ‘minor’ cups.

• The football. It’s certainly been better than it was under Hodgson, although that’s damning with faint praise. The play has not been perfect, and people will look at certain tactical flaws (as they will with almost any side which doesn’t win 38 games a season; just look at the analysis of Barcelona recently), but overall, it’s been better than the league table suggests.

However, does that make it good enough? The trouble is people judge against the highest standards – of the halcyon days, and of the recent past – and realistic targets are rarely set. Perhaps Kenny didn’t help himself by talking of the title, and raising those old expectations; which might have been as dangerous as Hodgson’s attempts to lower them beyond all acceptable limits.

All in all, based on the resources – the average cost of the XI and the wage bill – Liverpool should not have been finishing below Newcastle and Everton, and so far adrift of the top four. That’s a given, and I’m sure Dalglish himself is acutely aware of that fact.

• The players seem happy with him. Of course, players can tend to hate tough taskmasters who push them to their limits, and like those who are nice to them, even if the results aren’t going their way. But equally, you don’t want a squad of pissed off individuals. While you should never base decisions on what players want, the fact that they don’t appear to be actively against Dalglish is a good sign.

• Replacing him with someone worse. If Kenny no longer has any great success on his recent CV, he remains a good manager. You don’t lose certain skills, even if you can lose your cutting edge status, and a bit of your winning ‘aura’ – and that may cost you a telling few percent as the game evolves. I don’t think there can only be one man capable of successfully managing any given football club, but there are plenty who are incapable. Kenny certainly isn’t incapable, but the club continues to punch below its weight in the league.

• And, of course, he’s Kenny Dalglish.

That said, Liverpool clearly can’t keep someone in a job based on sentiment. However, that sentiment is based on a successful managerial career, on top of those legendary playing days. The main doubts relate to just how long ago his greatest successes were, and how much has changed in the meantime. He has good, modern coaches working with him, but maybe a solution would be to find better ones.

Reasons to replace Kenny

• The league form. It’s the club’s worst points total in many decades, and worst finishing position since 1994.

Of course, Roy Hodgson was on course to rack up fewer points before Dalglish rescued things, and Souness had inherited Dalglish’s title-winning side before dismantling it and dragging it down from 2nd at the time of arrival to 6th, 6th and finally 8th. While the points tallies have dropped in the past three seasons, the league position has not been radically different: 7th, 6th, 8th. The only difference is that Dalglish had the first notable net spend in that time (although the wage bill has been lowered, to in some way counteract that). I don’t think that one season of poor league form is a sackable offence (unless the football was Hodgson-bad), but it depends on what else has gone on behind the scenes, and plans for the future.

• Kenny’s media persona. While I share Kenny’s frustrations with some of the questions he gets asked,  his contempt of certain devious journalists and his desire to keep things behind closed doors, being curt with the media just leads them to become more negative, which increases the pressure. Alex Ferguson can get away with it because he’s remained successful, and no-one dare upset ‘the most powerful man in football’ (The Times, 2009). Once Ferguson slips off his perch the knives will be out from those eager for revenge, but while he remains up there contesting titles, he’s largely untouchable.

• (Hypothetical:) Kenny doesn’t fit in with, or objects to, the introduction of the plans that the owners wanted all along.

There’s no doubt that Kenny got the job to stop a rot, which he did. To my mind, if he quit now, or was replaced, he won’t have been a failure; just not an outright success. But if there has been a divergence between the owners and the management staff in recent weeks, it’s not like FSG are going to sack themselves. This is purely speculation on my part, based on what FSG’s original plans were in 2010.

If, again hypothetically, the owners now want to go for a Spanish Director of Football – ex-Barca guru Txiki Begiristain, or perhaps promoting Pep Segura – then perhaps Dalglish wouldn’t feel comfortable with that (although as he worked with Segura at the Academy, I’d guess it would make such an objection fairly unlikely).

With a very clever, Barcelona-inspired Spanish ‘DoF’, a young Catalan manager like Roberto Martinez would then make sense, but it would still be a gamble to replace a club legend with up-and-coming promise.

(Of course, Liverpool essentially did just that in 1985, when appointing Dalglish, although he himself was a legend and both Bob Paisley and Joe Fagan had stepped down; but of course, Kenny, as a total rookie, was less experienced than people like Martinez, Brendan Rogers and Paul Lambert are now. On the continent, clubs tend to recognise young, talented managers before they have a great track record: Benítez at Valencia, Klopp at Dortmund, Villas-Boas at Porto, and so on; all were untried at the very top, yet all delivered league titles and cup successes. My view is that, given his style of play, Martinez could fit into this category, but equally, I wouldn’t stake my savings on it.)

In terms of managers, FSG started with the previous administration’s choice; and then they moved onto the fans’ choice. While they were obviously not opposed to appointing Kenny, particularly after the bright start, it could be argued that they’ve yet to have their choice. Of course, just who at the club is qualified enough to make that decision is open to question; but if they found a Director of Football with strong ideas, they’d presumably have to let him decide.

• There’s a better replacement out there? Many fans want Rafa Benítez back, but those who dislike him would cause a backlash if he was brought back by sacking Dalglish. If Kenny stepped down, that might be another matter, but as it is, with some people involved in the Spaniard’s sacking still at the club, it’s unlikely that they’ll be pushing to re-hire him. Rafa is a top-class manager still living on the Wirral, but perceptions of his divisiveness may count against him, and the owners may fancy a totally fresh start.

Make no mistake: getting an A-list manager at this juncture, with recent league titles and/or European Cups, would be very tough. Pep Guardiola would be the longest shot imaginable. Andre Villas-Boas would have been that man a year ago, but he went to Chelsea, and had a fairly torrid time – although in the league, he actually got better results (5th when fired) than Roberto Di Matteo (who took the Blues down to 6th). Fabio Capello had the best win percentage of any England manager, but was stained, and strained, by poor press relations. Jurgen Klopp would take some serious convincing to leave the German champions, and the chance of Champions League football, for the Europa League. And so on.

But my impression, from speaking with FSG at the time of Roy Hodgson’s tenure, and given that it was the pressing issue the last time I spoke to John Henry (late March) was that the Director of Football is always their priority. Get that right, and the club has a long-term footballing direction; and, with clever scouting wrapped up within the remit, the best possible players brought into the club (if it works). Providing he can work with the DoF, the manager’s job is then a lot easier.

Damien Comolli turned out to be the wrong man, but FSG’s desire was always to get that position right, and everything else follow. If they brought in Txixi Begiristain or promoted Pep Segura (and elevated Rodolfo Borrell to the first-team staff), they’d be relying on some of the men who helped turn Barcelona into the best club side in the world, albeit at the risk of undermining the Academy.

Segura and Borrell already know that you can’t just supplant Catalan ideas onto another club with a different culture and expect it to produce a team full of Messis and Iniestas, but they certainly have a sense of how both worlds collide.

Conclusion

For me, as much as I would never dare suggest that Kenny be replaced, FSG are facing some massive decisions right now, and I’d rather the club was united in one vision rather than splintered by compromises.

Ultimately, time is of the essence; if Kenny is staying, great – I hope he enjoys his holiday and comes back refreshed, bringing back the form and enjoyment of his first six months. After all, little beats the smile of a happy Kenny Dalglish.

But if he’s going, let’s get it sorted straightaway. And if it’s a younger, forward-thinking coach with no great track record who comes in, let’s remember that Newcastle fans were despondent about getting Alan Pardew last season. After all, with all the talk of Moneyball, it was Newcastle who proved to be the smartest people in the room (who’d have thunk it?).

Either way, come August, we need to unite behind the man in charge of first team matters, because otherwise we’ll probably be dooming ourselves to another season of disappointment.

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This is the last day of ME awareness week. Last autumn I was asked by Sir Peter Spencer, Chief Executive of Action for ME, to share my story in the charity’s Interaction Magazine. Given that some of it relates to the creation of this site, I thought I’d also share it here. (Please note, there is no mention of Liverpool’s tactics or whether Andy Carroll was worth £35m).

For some people ME hits them like a speeding train at a level crossing. Bam. Mine, however, approached more stealthily, like a carbon monoxide leak: the slow, insidious creep, imperceptibly enveloping me until, after a number of years, I found myself faded and foggy.

For the longest time I knew that something wasn’t right, but neither I nor a number of physicians could put their finger on it. Still only in my mid-20s, I was more tired than I should have been for someone so previously athletic; had more muscle aches and head pains than anyone I knew; had a sleep pattern that had gone haywire; and, to my horror, experienced the trauma of rapid hair loss (although it transpired that that was merely the onset of male pattern baldness).

It’s been a long journey, from denial and depression to a kind of acceptance that can never be totally complete; part of me will always think I’ll return to normal – that I’ll be running around like a kid again one day. (Perhaps this is also a symptom of being middle-aged, and refusing to accept certain realities.)

As a teenager I’d competed in country cross country races, and played football semi-professionally in my early-to-mid-twenties. At school and college, I’d play football morning break, lunchtime, afternoon break, and then go home and play football; and at the weekend, I’d play for a team.

But by the age of 25 things were changing; I was suffering from post-match exhaustion. It rendered me fairly useless in between games, but abated just in time for the next match, and missing mid-week training actually helped. I was sleeping for several hours immediately after a game, and for the next three or four days felt like an old man. I was forever getting mysterious viruses that laid me low for weeks at a time.

As someone who was fairly driven, I was working hard as a designer at the Guardian newspaper, and somehow managing to get up to Liverpool every other weekend, as a season ticket holder at Anfield. At the same time, having given up playing semi-professionally, I was still playing Sunday League football and five-a-sides at work. But gradually each task started to become too taxing.

I began to struggle to do any of them properly. I knew something was drastically wrong when, during a lunchtime five-a-side game, I was tackled by an obese, middle-aged woman who had all the co-ordination and athleticism of a Henry Moore statue. I tried running past her, but it felt like I was mired in treacle, with legs made of jelly. Her movements were only perceptible via time-lapse camera, but she was still too quick for me.

It was soon after this humiliation that I was diagnosed with ME. I was 28. There followed a series of failed attempts to improve my fitness; also called ‘outright denial’. Sometimes I felt okay during what was only moderate exercise by my old standards – the serotonin and dopamine temporarily masking the problems – only to feel ill for a week afterwards. Eventually I accepted the reality, although not without the accompanying depression. By this stage, in 2001, I was married, with a baby on the way.

Inevitably that didn’t go too well; there was too much pressure, and I was too ill – exacerbated by the depression – to cope. I was forced to find a new job to help pay the bills, and it was a disaster. The first few days were okay, but then every subsequent day took more out of me than I had to give.

While the marriage didn’t last, my son remains my number one priority to this day; even though his arrival adversely affected my health, his presence in my life has given me a lot of joy and strength, and at times has kept me going. When he was born I feared all the things I was not physically able do with him, like run around for hours kicking a ball together. However, for the most part, I’ve learned to focus on what I still can do, rather than that which now eludes me.

And while I’ve had to adapt my thinking, we’ve managed to find things to do together that are not too taxing. And every once in a while, I say ‘to hell with it’, and push myself beyond my limits, such as when going on a short holiday (never more than four days). I accept the fallout from overdoing things, but it can still be hard on those days when I feel too washed out to do much more than watch TV with him. Hopefully he understands.

My nadir was in 2003, when, as a depressed, balding divorcee who only saw his son for a fraction of each week, I was living on Incapacity Benefit in a cheap rented bungalow. I saw myself as only half a man; possibly less – a mere quarter. They were dark days. But the strangest thing about my illness is that it led directly to the most ‘successful’ years of my life. Just as my son came out of a failed marriage, my career came out of my illness.

I’d dreamed of being a writer since about the age of 18, but there was one major obstacle: I wasn’t very good. At school I’d only enjoyed art and sport, and as such, I hadn’t bothered to learn how to write particularly well. From the age of 18 onwards I began to write furiously in my spare time, and that provided my education. Of course, had anyone read my work back then, they’d have said ‘stick to the day job’; they didn’t read it, and obviously I stuck to the day job.

But by 2003 – unfortunately, and yet fortuitously – I had no day job to lose. At the time I was writing about Liverpool FC on the internet, blogging as a hobby (a blobby?), and by late 2004 I thought it’d be a good idea to write a book (after at least two people told me it was worth considering; one hinting that they might even buy it). And so started the journey from societal castaway to reasonably respected writer. It’s not been without its ups and downs, but the past few years have seen me achieve things I never felt possible.

I was lucky in that, unlike most writers, I never suffered rejection letters with manuscripts: I sent my first book, on Liverpool’s 2004/05 season, to just one specialist publisher, and they never even replied. Given my design background, I quickly took the decision to self-publish, and although that meant extra financial pressure and far more work, it gave me control over my destiny, and any deadlines were flexible, as I was the boss. The book topped the Amazon.co.uk football chart soon after its release, and having only had 1,500 copies initially produced, with later reprints it went on to sell over ten times that amount.

Costly print bills due to my naivety meant that I made no profit, but the number of sales, and good reviews, helped my reputation. I was asked to write an unpaid column for the official Liverpool website soon after, a role I fulfilled for five years. Other reasonably well-reviewed books followed, as I became a full-time writer, but the pressure of having to sell a certain number of copies to make a living was immense, especially given the sporadic nature of sales (adversely affected by bad results), and profit margins that, at best, remained slim. Stress, just like physical exertion, lays me low, and it was getting the better of me.

Wondering how I’d continue, Anu Gupta of Digital Query suggested setting up a subscription website, where people pay a small fee each month to read my work. Highly sceptical, I took up Anu’s offer to build, for free, such a site, with payment only due if it was a success; what was there to lose?

Thankfully, the number of subscribers quickly passed the anticipated levels, and now I’m at the point where, for the first time in over a decade, I get a healthy monthly income; two years on from its launch, numbers continue to rise, and the site has won awards.

I wouldn’t say that it’s stress free – maintaining high standards can take its toll, and I’m the type of person that always strives to do better (most of those I know who suffer from ME tend to be similar) – but I can now afford to employ an editor (Chris Rowland), and to pay several of the contributing writers.

The income has allowed me to move in with my girlfriend, Kate, whom I met via an ME forum five years ago. Kate’s ME is more severe than mine, although unlike mine, hers has gradually improved over time, from the point where she was bed-bound a decade ago to now getting out of the house a few times a week.

We have my son a couple of days a week, and while our day to day existence remains a challenge, we’re doing pretty well, all things considered.

Familiarity breeds contempt, and since 2004, Liverpool seem to have played Chelsea four or five times a season. The epic – if not exactly attractive – Champions League games have given way to equally combative domestic cup encounters.

Before, particularly between 2004 and 2007, it seemed that Chelsea, with all their expensive players, would win the league games, but Liverpool triumphed in the killer cup ties, such as in the Champions League and FA Cup semi-finals.

But then, in more recent times, Liverpool started finally winning league games at Stamford Bridge, and did so again this season; but twice went out of the Champions League in West London (2008 and 2009), and now have lost this year’s FA Cup final.

So much seemed to be riding on this game. Lose, and Liverpool’s season would be labelled a polish-resistant turd, with the Carling Cup a mere consolation, and the FA Cup Final providing nothing to show for a fine run of knockout results. But win, and there would be a lot to celebrate; the focus could legitimately be shifted from the league form, because two proper trophies in one season is still a rarity.

In the league, even if you don’t win the title, everything good you do up until the last game stays on the record; but lose a cup final and what went before vanishes. Too many of Liverpool’s best results have disappeared into the ether.

A season shouldn’t be defined by one game at the end of 50+ matches, but so below-par have the Reds’ Premier League results been, particularly in the second half of the season, it needed a second cup in the trophy cabinet to legitimise that failure; after all, Chelsea themselves could win two cups and still finish well off the pace in 6th. You can’t have two cup runs and maintain excellent league form unless you really are a top-rate side, and even then, plenty can’t juggle it all. (And Chelsea’s season, with their costly squad and monumental wages, needs the Champions League to legitimise it; the FA Cup alone won’t suffice, unless they finish in the top four. Ironically, they now need to win at Anfield tomorrow night to achieve that.)

In the domestic cups, Liverpool beat Manchester United at home, Chelsea away, Manchester City away, Stoke home and away, and Everton in a neutral setting. Results like those would have transformed the league season; instead, beating United and Stoke at home, and Everton at Wembley, resulted in nothing concrete – just a day out.

And even at Wembley on Saturday, to highlight the Jekyll and Hyde season, the bad fought with the good, with the bad winning for two-thirds of the match, only for the good to make a late case for itself; 60 minutes of nothingness turned on its head by a riveting final 30, by which time it proved too little too late (and, having spent the season hitting the post, the Reds were ‘denied’ by another fine-margin issue).

Liverpool were strong for only a third of the game, just as they’ve won roughly a third of league games. Those good 30 minutes were ultimately meaningless; in keeping with how plenty of good 90 minutes in the league – particularly at Anfield – have counted for nothing because getting that white ball over the whole line has been beyond them. Trying to make sense of it all can lead a writer to substance abuse.

Of course, just to further confuse things, Andy Carroll – who was playing poorly when the team was playing well – is now playing like someone worth building a team around. But would you dare do so? It’s been the season that refuses to make sense.

Confusion

The more time that passes, the more confusing things get. Is Carroll part of the problem, or now part of the solution?

The big man in the white boots has been superb of late. But how does he dovetail with Suarez, and does their partnership limit the tactical permutations? Can we play consistently well with him in the side, and not revert to long-ball football at the first sign of trouble? Can he stay consistently fit and prove that he has grown up, and is now a dedicated athlete? Will the incredible hunger he has shown for the past month or two remain in place?

I honestly have no idea. I’d like to think he is coming into his own, rather than just playing out of his skin, but I don’t feel that I know so.

And Carroll’s luck could do with changing, too. He should be the hero of a cup comeback, but instead he is only credited with one goal. With Chelsea killing off Spurs in the semi-final with a goal that didn’t even reach the line, you have to feel for Carroll, whose career at Liverpool could have finally gone from bubbling along to champagne explosion had the linesman given the goal.

It shouldn’t come down to official’s decisions, and I don’t blame the linesman, but for me, the whole of the ball looked over the line, once the iffy camera angle was taken into account. And even though I got a lot of Liverpool fans on Twitter saying “so what?/get over it”, it’s moments like that which change games and destinies. The futures of Dalglish and Carroll would have looked far more secure had it been given, even if it was a matter of mere millimetres either way.

That ‘goal’ would have made the score 2-2, and if momentum doesn’t exist from game to game – when players have had a chance to cool off and for their mood to change (as also happens at half-time) – it surely shifts within one; and in this case, it was with the men in red.

Chelsea were backing off, and perhaps there for the taking (although often, when a game is returned to draw status from a two or three goal deficit, the team that were behind tend to then stick on what they have, and the team that threw away the lead suddenly have to fight; in Istanbul, for example, as soon as it went 3-3, Milan took charge again – as if Liverpool knew they had got back into the game on spirit alone, but could not continue to tear into the more-talented and experienced Italians. So Carroll’s ‘goal’ wouldn’t have won the cup, but being so close to the end, it could have brought about extra-time.)

(Either the broadcast camera is not in line or the goalposts were not fully upright)

The officials’ failure to signal a goal left me feeling worse than had the team not created another chance at 2-1. While Carroll’s header could have been directed lower, it was such a good contact that he had no right to expect Cech to pull off such a remarkable save, whether the ball was over the line or not. It reminded me of Shevchenko versus Dudek in extra-time in Istanbul – the striker had the whole goal to aim at, but just hitting the target with power in those situations usually suffices.

The incredible thing about Carroll is that even when he tries the right thing, it somehow fails to work. If he aims for the corners – even the top corners – it goes narrowly wide, or hits the post, or somehow the keeper pulls off a remarkable save (Cech at Wembley, Hart at Anfield). If he just closes his eyes and powers it on target, it hits the keeper. He’s not had one go in when he’s got the contact totally wrong, in the way that so many players benefit from the occasional scuffed effort bobbling in.

He’s looking lean, fit, sharp and his feet look ‘light’; as opposed to looking like he was playing in lead boots when he arrived. His foot movements are now so nimble, even if, as a player, he isn’t the quickest off the mark; he’s got light feet, but still has to shift a big unit around. Perhaps he should have had more of a chance in the side during Suarez’s suspension, but Bellamy was sensational at that time. And maybe he’s not making enough of his own luck, but he hasn’t exactly been fortunate since £35m was associated with his name.

Whether or not Carroll and Suarez can form a sufficiently effective partnership – they’ve had some good games together, but it’s not been a roaring success (or produced tons of goals) – they can certainly offer good options as individuals. The problem as a pair is that, with the exception of Suarez in certain situations, they can’t really get in behind teams, and a striker who can do that seems vital, even if only as an alternative (assuming that Bellamy is not going to be reliable enough).

The defence is less problematic. Three of the back four that played at Wembley are first-rate; only Enrique is worrying me, after an excellent first five months. His form has dipped alarmingly, and maybe we’re seeing why Spain didn’t get carried away with his strong displays – he’s possibly too limited on the ball. He’s quick, he’s strong, but at times looks fairly clueless as he twists and turns his way down a blind alley. For five months, no-one beat him for pace, but even that’s now occurring.

And of course, Pepe Reina is having a poor season by his standards, but for me, it’s a case of form is temporary, class is permanent (although the return of a top goalkeeping coach might help).

Mid-table midfield

However, as a unit, it’s the midfield that’s worrying me most. I wouldn’t object to any of Spearing, Adam, Henderson and Downing in the squad, but all of them together leave me underwhelmed. Maxi and Kuyt have perhaps lost confidence by being behind some of these players in the pecking order, but then they are in their 30s and slowing down; and like Bellamy and Gerrard, they do not present long-term solutions.

Spearing has his qualities as a shuttler, but he’s certainly nothing special; even his best games are merely ‘solid’. Henderson is young, and talented, but (as yet) unable to impose himself. Downing is almost 28, and is still unable to impose himself. And Adam is a big bundle of frustration. You can add the exciting but raw Shelvey to the list of those who just don’t seem good enough right now.

Although I expect a couple to develop very nicely – namely Henderson and Shelvey – I wouldn’t be devastated if we sold any or all of them, or loaned out the younger ones. (By contrast, Andy Carroll is showing lately what a lot of them lack: the ability to impose themselves. Henderson seemed to find that authority and aggression against Blackburn, but then lost it again.)

Of course, Bellamy, who has spent a lot of his playing time in midfield, has a lot of what we’re looking for, but has not played well since returning from injury, and is ‘unreliable’ in terms of fitness. He’s a mere squad player, due to his age and inability to play too frequently.

(Thinking about it, getting everyone in form at the same time has been a problem: Enrique was brilliant at the start of the season, Bellamy in the middle and Carroll at the end. How many have been on their game most weeks from August to May? Have more than a couple of players been on top form for even two-thirds of the season?)

And the worry is that the only midfielder who is definitely good enough right now – and under 31 – is Lucas Leiva. And we can only cross our fingers and hope that he recovers fully from his serious cruciate injury, and does so in time for August. All teams have injuries, but some hit you harder than others.

For me, the strange lack of excitement I sometimes feel about this team stems solely from the midfield, and in particular the players purchased last summer. The defence can defend and attack, and the attack can attack and defend. But I’m not convinced about Liverpool across the middle.

As the most expensive – and as a winger – Downing should be doing more. He’s neither a strong wide midfielder (like Kuyt) who works hard and can chip in with goals; nor a winger who goes past men, like the John Barnes of old. Perhaps it wouldn’t be a problem if the other flank was our main focus of attack, and Downing was the steadier alternative to balance things out; but he’s our ‘star’ wide creator, with Henderson often the counterbalance. That’s what worries me. Downing’s a good Premier League player, but continues to look a mediocre ‘big time’ player. Liverpool bought these players from mid-table teams, and now, Liverpool themselves are edging that way.

Goodbyes?

More detailed examinations of what needs improving in the summer will appear on the site in the coming weeks, as the season is sliced open and dissected as part of a systematic autopsy, but for now, a few of the (t)issues can be put under the microscope, in this preliminary examination.

I’d be very sad to lose Kuyt and Maxi, as I like the style of both (particularly Dirk’s work-rate and Maxi’s ability to ghost in at the far post for a tap-in). They can give the team goals. But neither is irreplaceable, and I accept that we can’t be sentimental.

Coming back to Carroll and Suarez, and the issue of goals, it would just need them to get 12-15 apiece if the midfield was weighing in; it doesn’t necessarily need that sought-after poacher with ice in his veins if everyone is chipping in. But as things stand, persevering with this midfield demands it. The team just doesn’t have enough goalscorers, and failing that, it does not possess one man who can get a crazy amount to compensate.

In many ways, when judging Henderson and Shelvey we’re in stasis, awaiting their metamorphoses. Ditto Carroll, although it feels like it might just be happening. (One swallow doesn’t make a summer; half a dozen, however, and we start to wonder.)

And we await the development of other young players; despite still being good for his age, Flanagan has gone backwards this season; Robinson has been injured and only featured in the League Cup; Conor Coady has not yet pushed on to make his debut, and neither has Andre Wisdom. Have they been deemed not yet good enough, or has the type of season made it harder to blood them? (Although going for the title, or for the top four, hardly makes it any easier.)

Raheem Sterling, who is edging into the frame, is precisely the type of player we could use in midfield, but of course, he’s only 17 and lacking in the kind of game intelligence Maxi and Kuyt could bring; but at least in his case it’s because he’s a mere lad who is still learning the game. Hopefully that will come with experience.

He has the pace, verve, skill and directness – plus an eye for goal – that this team is so lacking from wide midfield areas. But we can’t play the 21-year-old version of the winger in 2012. All we can expect to see is a very raw teenager eager to impress, but who will almost certainly experience some peaks and troughs with his form next season as he comes to terms with the step up.

The return of Lucas will help the centre-backs, and if the team concede fewer goals – as it was when he was playing – that puts less pressure on the others to score them. But Lucas himself obviously won’t offer goals; the team will be better balanced, and more able to retain possession, but putting the ball in the back of the net cannot be allowed to remain a problem.

And if Kuyt and Maxi leave, they take away 20 goals a (full) season between them. Then we need successful signings just to replace what we’ve lost, before even thinking of moving us forward. To improve, the Reds probably have to find someone pretty special: a creative tour de force, or someone who could score more than 15 – if not a Ronaldo, then a Robben; or make two or three signings who can share the goals around.

Personally, although he has his uses as a squad player, I’d look to get £10-12m back on Downing, and given his age and that he can do a job for mid-table sides, all of the money back on Adam. That could raise almost £20m; pretty essential if Kuyt and Maxi are allowed to leave for a measly £1m (Maxi free, Kuyt on a contract clause). Those two 30-somethings will however free up large wages, but the new players will surely cost a decent fee plus reasonably high wages.

Carragher is another whose release could free up a third big wage. There is of course a risk to losing his experience, on top of that of Kuyt and Maxi, particularly when it comes to big games; by contrast, Downing and Adam will be no great loss in that sense. Fabio Aurelio, possibly the most technically gifted (but injury-prone) left-back the club has ever seen, is another almost-33-year-old heading for the exit. His wages since Roy Hodgson brought him back to the club have been money down the drain.

Having said that, maybe Liverpool can bring back the almost 31-year-old Joe Cole, as an option, now that he’s rediscovered his Jo(i)e de vivre; but of course, he’s another ageing player on big wages. (Then again, as things transpired, this season Liverpool have been paying him to play well in France.) Ditto Alberto Aquilani: for the sake of a mere £5m, which will now not be triggered by AC Milan, there has to be a case for keeping him. At ‘just’ 27 (28 in July), he’s a young man compared with Maxi, Gerrard, Kuyt, Aurelio and Carragher, and he can spot a killer pass. I prefer Aquilani to Adam, because of his ability to keep the ball, but neither seems a perfect solution, and the Italian’s injuries will always be a worry.

Deja vu?

While it’s still a fairly young squad overall, age is actually a major problem: what were the best big-game players are now on the wrong side of 30. Such a strong squad three years ago is now strangely reminiscent of where the club was in 2003/04, when starting the season as reigning League Cup holders, and ending it 30 points adrift of the leaders.

The best players then, aside from home-grown lads, were the older ones: Hamann and Hyypia stand out. The recent big young signings – in Houllier’s case, from the French league as opposed to these shores – were overpriced and subsequently under-delivered. Salif Diao, El Hadji Diouf, Antony Le Tallec, Bruno Cheyrou and, as Houllier’s leaving present, Djibril Cissé, were all at a great age. But like Carroll, Henderson and Adam, they failed to make a big enough impact.

Contrast this with Reina, Agger, Lucas, Sissoko, Mascherano and Alonso, all signed when 22 or younger, and Torres and Skrtel, aged 23. So far, only Suarez of the new guard has proved he has the character for handling the expectations, although we don’t have the benefit of hindsight here (and in time, others may be seen as similarly successful).

The football was less enjoyable in 2003/04 than it is now, but of course, Michael Owen – the one type of player we currently lack – was on hand to do little but snaffle a few goals on the counter-attack to scrape the team up to 4th place, 30 points behind the champions.

There was one perfectly-aged mercurial talent, to create the openings: then it was Gerrard, now it’s Suarez. And there was one big English centre-forward with a massive price tag (in today’s money, Heskey cost roughly £30m), who couldn’t score enough goals, but who, on his day, could be unplayable.

There are differences, of course, not least in how Houllier was a manager entering his sixth season, and this is a new project. But the mess that the Frenchman let accrue is not too dissimilar to now, with the shameful scaling down of Gillett and Hicks, the below-par final couple of signings of Benítez (excluding Shelvey and Sterling), the moronic fantasy manager sales of Christian Purslow, the zero-ambition purchases of Roy Hodgson, and the messy Dalglish/Damien Comolli-led Brit-based policy of the past 18 months.

Making a mark

It took Benítez a year to sort out the squad he inherited following Houllier’s final campaign, in a season that saw a disappointing league showing overshadowed by two cup finals. A year later, Liverpool were able to win 25 of the 38 league games, finishing with 82 points (and the FA Cup). As good as Benítez was, the club was in a virtuous circle, with the Champions League income helping the club to remain in the Champions League, and attract Champions League players; although of course, the extra games meant the Reds needed a bigger squad than they could afford, and away league games were harder after a long midweek trip.

While several players were merely in-and-out of the side (such as Peter Crouch), it arguably took just three inspired signings to make such a difference: Xabi Alonso, Luis Garcia and Pepe Reina; all of them easily within the club’s current budget, even with inflation taken into account. Momo Sissoko was also very effective in that time.

Daniel Agger arrived in January 2006, but with just four appearances, didn’t make an impact until the next season. Agger, Reina, Alonso, Sissoko and Garcia were all signed in Rafa’s first 18 months, and all looked the part within those 18 months. In the last 18 months, only Luis Suarez has been of that calibre. Liverpool have spent some Champions League fees, but not handed out Champions League wages.

It’s actually five years since the last clutch of successful signings was made. Five years. Fees aside, there have been some excellent buys – Suarez and Johnson; some good buys – Meireles, Bellamy, and, I had thought, Enrique; and some potentially good buys – Coates, Henderson, Carroll.

But it now needs a 1987 (Aldridge, Houghton, Barnes, Beardsley), or a 1999 (Hyypia, Hamann, Henchoz, Westerveld), or a 2007 (Torres, Lucas, Mascherano, Benayoun), to turn it around. Another 1992, or 2002, or 2011, and unless some hitherto underachievers radically transform, then it will be hard to feel too confident right now; especially if Kuyt, Maxi and Carragher will need replacing, and the dressing room loses even more character.

Before summing up, it’s worth noting that in 2003/04, Liverpool won just 41.8% (18 from 43) of their games against Premier League teams (when also including cup games), and just 42% of league games when finishing 4th. Under Roy Hodgson, it was just 35% (seven wins from 20).

Right now, it’s 43.1% (19 wins from 44), with six of the eight cup games coming against Premier League top seven sides, plus two versus Stoke. It puts some context to the otherwise Hodgsonesque 36.1% win percentage, but it’s still not great – and doesn’t explain why Liverpool can win six and draw one out of eight cup games (75% win rate) against very strong opposition, but then do far worse, on average, against the division as a whole.

Inconclusive conclusion

As ever of late, I’m heading off in tangents, trying to take everything in and leave no stone unturned. But some of it just won’t make sense, no matter how much I prod at it, and there are hundreds of aspects still left unexamined. Time will provide most of the answers about players being good enough, but by then, it might be too late; the damage might have been done.

Or, in two years’ time, we might be drinking to the 30-goal Geordie striker and the young Wearside midfielder who overcame slow starts to become national treasures. Stranger things have happened (many of them this season).

Several specific issues will be addressed in subscriber-only pieces in the coming weeks. Subscription costs £3.50 a month. 

There’s no doubt about it. Dalglish has to go. Also, he has to stay. If FSG listen to the fans, they’ll be left in no doubt: only sacking Kenny, whilst simultaneously keeping Kenny, will bring success. The league form is everything, although nothing (bar winning the league) beats a good cup run. Being in the Champions League is the only place to be, but no-one puts a 4th-place finish in the trophy cabinet.

Fenway Sports Group got their first sacking right: Roy Hodgson had to go. No matter what he does at West Brom, his Liverpool side played ugly, anti-football. Daniel Agger, the most cultured defender in England, was told to just “fucking launch the thing”. Ironically, Liverpool might not have lost to the Baggies had Glen Johnson – another thorn in Hodgson’s side, with that pesky passing stuff – just lumped it clear. But good sides play from the back, and accept the occasional lapse. Pep Guardiola doesn’t change Barcelona’s style if Dani Alves gets caught out, and at Swansea, if people want a more down-to-earth comparison, Brendan Rodgers doesn’t berate players who lose the ball in dangerous areas.

No amount of revisionism will change the fact that ‘Royston’ was wrong wrong wrong; just as Lawrie Sanchez was wrong at Fulham before him. Hodgson has had 20-odd seasons outside Scandinavia and won nothing. Nada. Zilch. That doesn’t make him a bad manager, as there are so many different targets each year; but it doesn’t make him a suitable big-club manager, either.

His West Brom side were completely outplayed yesterday, just like his Liverpool side so frequently were. For 75 minutes they were on the wrong end of one-way traffic, and somehow escaped with their goal intact. They grabbed a goal against the run of play, and fair play to them for that; no-one says ‘no’ when that happens, and asks the ref to chalk it off as unfair. But if the game highlighted what’s wrong with Dalglish’s latest vintage – some shortcomings that are costing points – it also showed how the current side at least play with ambition, and unlike Hodgson’s Liverpool, at least look interested.

It’s a results business, but I’d much rather take playing well and losing over playing badly and losing; the main difference between Hodgson and Dalglish in the Liverpool dugout since 2010. Ideally Liverpool would be playing well and winning – that’s the obvious aim – but if people will insist on saying how poorly Hodgson was treated and how prematurely he was sacked, that comparison remains important.

(People keep saying they’d rather be playing poorly and winning. Well, playing poorly and winning is nice, but it’s not like you can build success by looking to offer little and hoping for the best, is it?)

Goals goals goals. Where are they?

If scoring goals is the hardest thing to do in football, then creating chances is the most essential building block. You can of course score a goal without creating anything – benefitting from an own goal, for example – but you’d much rather be a creative side working openings than one riding its luck.

Personally, I prefer this side to, say, the one that finished 4th in 2004 in Gérard Houllier’s final season, where the goals of Michael Owen just about dragged a hugely dull and mediocre side over the line. While this current team is nowhere near as good as it was in 2008/09, it’s got some oomph to it, unlike latter-years Houllier’s set-up. It just hasn’t got a reliably goalscorer.

Newcastle haven’t created hatfuls of chances, but have been clinical. That is to be admired, not least because they’ve bought predators without paying the earth. But is it a platform for long-term success? Is it sustainable?  It may well be, but let’s see. Swansea have played more aesthetically pleasing football than their fellow ‘promotees’, but are 19 points behind the Geordies. Both sides have their merits, and of course, in the cups this season, Liverpool have had theirs. Those teams will win nothing but plaudits, but of course, they also merit their applause.

While Liverpool often haven’t shown enough canniness to take leads in games and then shut them down – although it hasn’t been a problem when the name of the competition has become the FA or Carling Cup – the margins of their failures have been slim.

The move that led to the shot from Jordan Henderson, and the shot itself, were technically far superior to West Brom’s goal, but what could have been a contender for the Reds’ goal of the season (well, runner-up to Coates’ vs QPR) ultimately meant nothing, as the ball bounced back off the bar, rather than in. Even then, it hit the back of Foster but didn’t cross the line or roll to a red shirt; earlier in the season, the same thing happened to Pepe Reina at Sunderland, and the bounce was cruel to the keeper. Maybe Liverpool lack strikers who are quick to the loose ball, but at times it can just roll to the exact point you’re standing, whether or not it’s a good position.

It’s not just about luck, because the finishing from the whole team has been substandard. The worse the finishing has got, the more the players have almost expected to miss. It’s become a joke; a black joke. Here we go again ….

At times, the manager has had a right to expect more composure in front of goal. He can’t run out there and do it himself; not like he could in 1986. Equally, his selections, and his signings, could be said to have contributed to the problem. (And obviously he wasn’t helped by Fernando Torres’ long-standing desire to depart, having scored three times in five games under Dalglish.)

I’d say that there have been a few overlapping problems. Aside from the near misses and woodwork thumping, I’m not sure that there have been enough natural goalscorers in the team. It doesn’t have to just be about the strikers; in the best years under Benítez, we had six players in double figures. Right now, we have one.

While I like the fact that Dalglish trusts footballing defenders, with both Johnson and Agger in his back four and encouraged to play in all areas of the pitch (contrary to the way that Hodgson preferred the likes of Kyrgiakos, Konchesky and Carragher, and the constant ‘out’ ball), the midfield balance hasn’t been so successful.

Losing Lucas remains a massive blow, but that bad luck aside (although some see playing him in the Carling Cup as folly), but there was no-one on the staff who could play that same tactical role.

Dalglish started the season by leaving out Kuyt and Maxi, and they are two who can get goals from midfield, even if neither is 100% reliable (Kuyt misses chances, and Maxi can disappear from games).

You’d expect at least 5-10 from each of them if they started most games on the flanks. By contrast, in the league at least, Liverpool have just one from Henderson on the right, and none from Downing on the left. Given that, in the modern game, at least one central midfielder holds (and therefore hardly ever scores), it’s imperative that others weigh in.

Again, this lack of goals from wide areas needn’t necessarily be a problem in itself; if the strikers were getting 20-30 each, and one of the central midfielders adding 15, there’d be little to worry about, beyond a perceived over-reliance on the prolific players (see Arsenal, and Van Persie). In that situation, Downing and Henderson could simply do what they’ve been doing, knowing full well that someone in the box will gobble up a good percentage of the balls they deliver. It only becomes a serious problem once the other players stop scoring. Despite needing a lot of chances to score, Luis Suarez can get 20 goals in a season; that’s pretty clear. But can he get 20 in the league? What’s his upper limit?

This season, he’s been far more likely to net a goal after just one or two touches; so often he dribbles past three or four only to shoot miles over, as if he gets too excited, or is falling off balance having worked so hard to get into the position.

By contrast, a ball to him in the box when he’s facing the goal often seems to end up in the back of the net; certainly more so than when he’s been running with the ball. Let me take you through this season’s 14 strikes.

Everton last week: one touch into space after receiving Distin’s back-pass, second touch past Howard; vs Aston Villa, one touch – a header; vs Wigan, one touch – side-foot finish from low Gerrard centre; vs Stoke in FA Cup, curled finish from edge of box, shot being his second touch after receiving ball back from Maxi; Brighton, one touch – close-range header; Man United, close-range first-time volley when alert to defender’s mistake; QPR – one touch, a header; vs Stoke in the Carling Cup, winning goal a header from Henderson’s looping cross; vs Exeter, first-time half-volleyed shot after keeper flaps at cross; vs Arsenal at the Emirates, a one-touch tap-in from unmarked central position after good supply from the right; and a deft header from a Charlie Adam free-kick against Sunderland on the opening day.

Stoke away in the Carling Cup is the main exception, as he receives the ball out wide, takes a couple of touches, nutmegs a defender and then curls the ball into the far corner. Brilliant stuff. Wolves at home sees him run in behind the defence, turn Berra one way then the other, then fire in left-footed from a tight angle. Everton (at Goodison) is also an exception of sorts, as he dribbles his way into a dangerous position, but loses the ball. However, it fortuitously bounces back to him, when he’s facing goal on the edge of the six-yard box – as if he’s just received a pass – and he takes a touch to steady and fires in. So that could go in either category.

I make that 11 – maybe 12 – finishes within two touches; nine with just one touch, five of which were headers. It suggests that, while others may benefit from his mazy dribbles and clever touches, he has been more effective finishing off others’ good work. So he can do the poaching, but if you limit him to a central, advanced area of the pitch, you lose his creativity, and his ability to drag defenders out of position.

Having missed a fair chunk of the season, 14 goals – all from open play (although two missed penalties will keep him off spot-kick duty) – isn’t too bad at all. But it’s not especially prolific, either.

Again, that’s not a problem if Suarez is the support striker; it’s a Beardlsey-esque goal tally, for a player who can drift all over the front line. But Suarez isn’t the support striker; at least, not in terms of goals.

The elephant in the changing room

Now, I rate Andy Carroll reasonably highly. I think he’s playing well right now, and is a good target-man. He’s got underrated technique, and looks capable of scoring more goals than he does at present; this analysis by Andrew Beasley points out that he aims for the corners, rather than just blasting at goal. As such, he’s had a lot of near misses by trying to do the right thing, when closing his eyes and belting it, or even scuffing it, might have had better results. There’s a player in there, I have no doubt; the question is, whether it can be brought out sufficiently at Liverpool, and whether it’s worth the time and effort (and money) trying.

Let’s be clear: his record since joining Liverpool is mediocre at best. Again, if he was paired alongside a nimble poacher – or if Suarez could somehow translate his Ajax scoring form – then it becomes less of an issue. Didier Drogba only scored 10 league goals when Chelsea won their first Premier League title in 2004/05, even with the abundance of quality in that side (that was with Damien Duff and Arjen Robben on the flanks, not Henderson and Downing).

A year later, when the title was retained, it was still only 12 league goals from the big Ivorian. But elsewhere, players like Robben and Frank Lampard were banging them in. Drogba could be the menace-maker, while others pounced amid the mayhem. Carroll, though still three years younger than Drogba when he arrived in England, is capable of performing a similar role. (At Carroll’s age, Drogba hadn’t even played in a top division; aged 23, he was with Le Mans in the second tier of the French league, where he’d scored just 12 goals in 64 games. This is not to say that Carroll will be better than Drogba, or even get to be as good, but it does show how big strikers can get better with age.)

While Carroll and Suarez have played fairly well as a partnership, with the Uruguayan scoring more frequently when paired with the big Geordie, there’s a distinct lack of killer pace in the partnership. How many top teams can say that?

Suarez is nippy, but not especially quick. Carroll isn’t as slow as some make out, but is slow off the mark, and even once into his stride, is no Drogba (at his devastating peak) or Emmanuel Adebayor. Perhaps one of the reasons Downing has been chosen over Maxi is his pace; but all the time, no matter how the pack gets shuffled, Dalglish and Clarke have not found a sufficient combination of both pace and goals.

The only way to present a threat in behind defences is to push Suarez up against the last man, with Carroll deeper and, if he wins headers halfway or two-thirds of the way up the pitch (as he did for the equaliser against Everton last week), he has Suarez already in position ahead of him to get onto them. So there’s a logic there, and it was also the way the pair lined up in the 3-0 win over City last April, when Carroll got his only brace so far. Look at heatmaps, and you’ll see Carroll often touches the ball in deeper areas than Suarez.

But if you play Suarez as the spearhead, you lose a lot of his strengths. With five headed goals to Carroll’s one, it’s not exactly illogical to play Suarez as a target-man, and he can be quite brilliant at holding off defenders, but Carroll isn’t going to speed into the box in the manner of a more mobile forward (or, by comparison, in the way Gerrard used to a couple of years back from the second-striker position).

Again, if you switch Carroll to the focal point, you can have Suarez buzzing about, but it reduces the threat in behind teams; Carroll, if isolated up front, can’t do what Torres used to, and turn and run at defenders, either with the ball or without. His only option is to hold it up and wait for support. And Carroll doesn’t have the clever movement, or the pace, to make runs off the back of centre-backs.

So with two strikers who either have yet to mature into goalscoring machines in English football, or who simply may never do so, the onus is on the midfield. And this, to me, is where this Liverpool side have failed. There just hasn’t been enough threat from that quartet.

The Everton hat-trick aside, and the late strike versus Newcastle, Steven Gerrard hasn’t been scoring in the league from open play, although those four goals show that he can still put the ball in the back of the net when he’s in advanced positions. He’s had an injury-blighted campaign, but as he approaches 32, the days of regular barnstorming may be beyond him. Getting the best out of him is another dilemma.

So, with two strikers who, at best, look incapable of scoring more than 25 league goals between them – and right now, share a measly 12 (and have just 19 between them in almost 18 months) – then unless that pair radically improve their chance conversion rates, the midfield has to pose more of a goal threat than it currently does.

I believe that Henderson has the ability to score more goals, but I’m not sure he’ll do so from the right flank. A quick look at some of his career goals, particularly for the England U21s – where four in 16 from central midfield shows his potential – highlights how he seems to prefer instep curlers, and even though his one Liverpool goal to date was left-footed in that manner, he hasn’t had too many memorable shots from right of centre.

He reminds me of a free-kick taker, whose right foot means he only takes shots from either the centre, or left of centre. From the right, with his right foot, he’s provided hardly any goal threat; very few stinging drives across goal. Yesterday, against West Brom, he used his instep to curl a fine effort against the underside of the bar, having received the ball centrally.

He’s clearly a far better player in the centre than out wide, but I understand some of the reasons he’s been used out there: as a ‘solid’ option to counterbalance the winger on the other flank (the Houghton to Downing’s Barnes, although the comparisons end there!), and the fact that he can cross the ball. That said, the goals issue from midfield makes it a problem in terms of him playing there in this side.

(Videos of his 10-or-so career goals to date can be found here:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W2CHIQcG0CA

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z9issYqWK_I

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MvWQ1K5G6Bk

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=83-_upzwi2w)

Who else can score goals? Craig Bellamy was banging them in during the middle of the season, but then injury blighted his career yet again, and since his return hasn’t looked half as confident. Again, he’s never likely to be regularly prolific enough up front these days, and perhaps is not reliable enough, fitness-wise, to plan a best XI with him in.

Bellamy’s chance conversion rate has been excellent, as has Maxi’s. But both are in their 30s, and both have been behind Downing and Henderson in the pecking order. Kuyt’s not having his best season, but he got double-figures under Kenny alone last season, and has five this time, in his first season as a mere squad player. If Liverpool lose both of these players in the summer, then the squad will have even fewer goals in it; their replacements will need to be ultra-reliable to make it worthwhile.

With Kuyt and Maxi having scored their only three Premier League hat-tricks to date in the second half of last season, as part of almost 20 goals the pair shared within just a few months, it does continually bring us back to why Kenny (and Damien Comolli) felt that new players would do better.

If the manager genuinely felt that they would improve things, then he had to go with that belief; but if it fails, then just as he got heaps of praise for revitalising Kuyt and Maxi after their struggles under Hodgson, he has to take the blame for the new approach falling short. The only way it can be redeemed now is by Downing and Henderson going on to show that this was just a bedding-in period; which is more plausible in the case of the 21-year-old than the man who is seven years older.

Missed opportunities

A key question remains: should Liverpool have signed someone in the January window? I know that, as winter approached, FSG felt Liverpool needed a striker and were happy to supply the funds for one; but that Damien Comolli felt Liverpool needed a centre-back. At the time, I still felt Suarez – who’d just scored four in a tough game for Uruguay against Chile – would suddenly transform into the striker who once netted 50 in a season in Holland; or, at least, the one who gets a goal every two games for his country. But by the time the window opened, it was looking increasingly like Liverpool needed a dead-eye poacher, with ice in his veins (as opposed to the fire in Suarez’s).

There’s no doubt that the January window is not the ideal time to buy. But both Papiss Cissé and Nikica Jelavic were new to the Premier League, and both have been sensations. Yes, they might end up being overnight sensations – we can’t yet say that they are long-term solutions – but the signs are that they are the real deal.

They were inexpensive – the pair combined cost less than Downing – and neither striker commands massive wages. You can argue that the pressure is much tougher at Liverpool, and that’s true. But they’ve done more than could reasonably have been expected at what remain fairly large clubs.

Demba Ba, though no longer scoring as many due to Cissé’s arrival pushing him out wide, only arrived in English football at the start of 2011; in that time, he’s scored 23 league goals. He was another inexpensive January purchase, initially for West Ham.

Kenny to go?

As much as I love Kenny Dalglish, for the incredible amount he has given to Liverpool as a player, manager and dignified grief counsellor, I can see the argument for the league performance signalling the end of his reign. Equally, I can see a valid argument which says it’s crazy to sack a manager who may win two cups in his first full season (in his case, after 20 years away).

I can see why some people think his record in the transfer market is worthy of dismissal (after all, it helped cost Comolli his job). It hasn’t been like when he brought in Steve McMahon, John Barnes, John Aldridge, Peter Beardsley and Ray Houghton within a couple of years of first landing the job in 1985; and as such, it doesn’t provide optimism for the future. Equally, I can fully understand the argument that Liverpool have played some excellent football this season, only to fail to convert total domination into points. While a Barnes would be lovely, it’s perhaps just needed an Aldridge to prod the ball over the line from six inches.

To me, this is not sitting on the fence, but seeing both sides of a complex situation, where a mix of the incredibly good and the incredibly bad leaves individuals deciding if their glass is half full or half empty.

For me, the glass is simply filled to the midway point right now, with an equal mix of sweet and bitter. And I’ve honestly no idea if it’s going to fill up or drain away.

I’ve been saying for many months that I don’t quite know what to make of this Liverpool side. And it only gets more confusing with the passing of time.

I always felt that I knew where I was with Rafa Benítez’s Liverpool, even if the ride could still get bumpy. And I certainly knew where I was with Hodgson’s: desperate to parachute off. (The Croydonian was a successful Cessna pilot who looked terrified and confused at the controls of a Boeing 747. What does this lever do? – ah, drop Daniel Agger in place of Soto Kygriakos.)

This is different.

We have:

• a manager who had been out of the game for a decade, but who had won four league titles spread across two different clubs, and whose instant impact last season was a breath of fresh air;

• a highly-esteemed assistant manager, who helped Chelsea to two league titles in fairly recent times;

• new owners, who ended a Boston Red Sox title drought dating back to World War I, but who are still trying to work out just what the hell they’ve bought;

• a Director of Football who, at the time, was ridiculed at Spurs, but whose purchases are now a key part of their new existence as a top four team;

• an improved Academy set-up, with exciting young players who, though humbled by an incredibly efficient Ajax side, ended the Next Gen series in third-place;

• and a senior squad that has been altered by three different managers (and one DoF) in the past two years but, when everyone is fit, is still pretty strong.

In every area, with regard to the bigger picture, you can see reasons to feel optimistic, and yet nothing is quite working as it should; certainly in 2012.

Liverpool have a fantastic record in the cups this season, particularly against Premier League teams who qualified for Europe: five wins out of six against Chelsea, Man United, Man City and Stoke. And the Carling Cup in the trophy cabinet to boot. But the Reds’ league form is increasingly poor – and undeniably terrible during 2012, during which time only Wolves have won fewer points.

It’s hard to explain, because of the stark contrast between the league and cup form – often against the very same teams – and also between how the Reds were playing earlier in the season compared with now.

One theory I have is that the success in the Carling Cup – with three months of the season still remaining – resulted in some coasting. Equally, it also coincided with the unfortunate defeat to Arsenal, when the top four chances seemed to peter out. The combination of the two may have collided to disastrous effect.

Some of the subsequent performances have had the air of a post-season tour of a country where the beaches are too inviting. I’m sure that the coaching staff will be livid if complacency has set in, but the psyche of an entire football team is hard to control. It just needs a couple of the starting XI to be drifting, and it can all fall apart.

It doesn’t even need to be a conscious decision from the players; just a subconscious easing off, thinking, at the time of the Arsenal defeat, that they were safe around 6th, having walked up the Wembley steps and qualified for Europe. To return to the aeronautical theme, a nosedive of 20,000 feet has caught them by surprise – and now, whether or not the effort is there, they’re locked into a negative spiral. Mid-table beckons.

Liverpool have gone from a team playing well and somehow conspiring to lose, to a side that seems resigned to missing glaring chances and watching the other side score with its first shot on target.

The surprise has gone; now they seem to just expect it to happen. They play like they expect to be unlucky, and when they are unlucky, as they were with the early decisions at St James’ Park (and Newcastle taking the lead against the run of play), there is no sense of defiance; just resignation.

Maybe Liverpool are a much better team than they look right now – my view is that with Agger, Johnson and Lucas back, the side would be at least 20% better. And a second trophy would certainly do much more than paper over cracks. (If there are indeed deep cracks, then two trophies is, at the very least, a decent blob of Polyfilla.)

But to move forward next season, does it need a change of approach?

British Woes

On the whole, I’m not a particularly big fan of the modern British player. I think the best ones are definitely worth having, and as with anything, it depends on the individual in question. But beyond the elite, do you get enough from them?

Last summer’s spending could quite easily be seen as ‘sensible’. I know, because I thought so at the time. But looking back, it was also ‘safe’; low-risk (or so it seemed), but uninspired. It was solid, unspectacular – all of the main signings had played almost 100% of their team’s games last season – but to date, it hasn’t worked out too well.

Everyone who went in the first XI spoke English and understood British football. No-one was a maverick who could go off the rails (Bellamy aside, although he was a ‘free’ and, at 32, maturing as a person). And yet, at the same time, no-one was anything particularly special. No flawed geniuses. Indeed, no geniuses full stop.

No-one was paid high wages, and with the chaotic comings and goings dating back a couple of years (managers, owners and players), perhaps a bit of sensible thinking – ‘within the box’ – was understandable.

But then Roy Hodgson was unveiled with similar ‘steadying the ship’ principles. Sometimes ‘steady’ just isn’t good enough.

The key thing to remember is that things change; players who were ‘crap’ in their first 12 months (or more) at clubs have subsequently come good, even if others will remain unconvincing. But with all but one of the British signings dating back to January 2011 looking more than reasonably assured, it begs a question.

Go back to Roy Hodgson, and neither Joe Cole nor Paul Konchesky – both capped by England – did much beyond make us groan. That makes seven British senior squad signings – all internationals – dating back almost two years, and only Bellamy hasn’t looked overawed.

All five Englishmen have failed to ‘settle’, and if you had that kind of buying record from any other region – South America, say – then you’d start to wonder why they weren’t working out; you might even put it down to cultural differences. (It’s been said of Italians at Anfield, and only two have been bought.)

Glen Johnson – an atypical Brit in that he’s clever and cultured on the ball, and whose game is not about large lungs and feisty tackles – is the last excellent Englishman Liverpool have bought; and even then, perhaps due to injuries, he’s not been sensational. He was, however, fully established as a first-choice England player, and at a good age. That combination was not shared by Cole, Konchesky, Henderson, Carroll and Downing, who were either one or the other (or neither, in Konchesky’s case).

Expand Britain to include Ireland, and Robbie Keane – who moved to these shores when aged just 15 – becomes another overpriced mistake. No-one had to teach him about English football, and yet he failed to sparkle.

Peter Crouch was often pretty good, and, at times very good; but overall, yet again, bar a couple of overhead kicks, nothing sensational. Jermaine Pennant was man of the match in a Champions League final, but not exactly a dedicated professional who could be that bothered most of the time; talented, but a wastrel. Emile Heskey cost almost £30m in today’s money, but with the exception of an excellent debut campaign – in itself unusual – failed to impose himself thereafter.

In the past 20 years, Liverpool have had some world-class – or, at least, international class – English players. However – and this may again be mere coincidence – there seems to be a pattern: they were all home-grown.

Gerrard, Fowler, McManaman, Carragher and Owen were all great players for Liverpool. They weren’t all perfect, but they are up there with the best this club has ever had in their respective positions.

Now, this doesn’t mean that all home-grown players will turn out like Gerrard, just as not all British purchases will end up like Konchesky. Hard as many have tried, the youth system just hasn’t found locals of this calibre in the past dozen years, and in truth, nor have Everton, beyond Rooney (and possibly Rodwell.)

But it does make me wonder if there’s something in the process that allows younger players to get accustomed to the demands of a big club as part of their formative education. It’s far less of a culture shock going into the first team because they are already ‘at home’. (Just as Jordan Henderson and Andy Carroll gradually eased their way into their previous sides.)

At Chelsea, Daniel Sturridge was bought young, and this could be the key: after a brief, unsuccessful spell in the first team, he was dropped, and then, much later on, phased in gently. It’s taken time. He played just 13 games in his first season at Chelsea, and 13 in his second, scoring just one goal (having previously scored five in 21 for Manchester City, albeit with just two and three league appearances in his first two fledgeling seasons). Danny Welbeck at United also briefly played for the first team, went on loan and came back a better player.

And this is what happens with youth team graduates in general: they are dipped in the water, a little bit at a time. Fans may be excited by hot prospects, but they don’t expect instant miracles. They don’t keep saying “£20m for that? Fuck off!”

A loan elsewhere was involved with Sturridge, just as it was with Joe Hart – the one world-class English player at Manchester City. They got Premier League experience, but without it costing their club points if they made mistakes. Micah Richards is another whose introduction over a period of time perhaps made it easier than if a large fee had been paid and been parachuted into the side from day one.

For Mancini’s men, Joleon Lescott is another who looked pretty rocky for a long time. He seems more assured now, but it has taken a few seasons for a man who may not even have needed to move house after his switch from Everton, let alone relocate to a new country and learn a new language. James Milner also took a while to impress, and has been, at best, very good; never remarkable.

At Spurs, Gareth Bale spent a long time as something of a joke figure; it took him a staggering 25 appearances just to end up on the winning team. Even though that wasn’t necessarily his fault, it took a gentle easing-in, from eight league games, to sixteen the following season, to 23 the one after that, before he looked capable of pulling up any trees.

The reason all this springs to mind is that, in the old days, Liverpool often used to buy the best up-and-coming British players. But then never play them. At least, not at first. It was seen as part of Bob Paisley’s genius. It was seen as part of the Liverpool way.

Alan Hansen was signed at 22 – so, no mere kid – and then only played in less than half of the league games in his first season. Ronnie Whelan was 18 when signed, but only really got into the team aged 20. Steve Nicol was signed aged 20, but had to wait 12 months, and even then only played four times that season. Famously, Ian Rush wanted to quit the club after a year on the fringes following his move from Chester, and could have ended up at Crystal Palace.

Yes, Liverpool could afford to keep young talent in reserve back then, due to winning the league most years. There was no rush (just Rush). And there can be little doubt that these particular players were in a raw form back then.

But it’s interesting that this quartet, who ended up amassing a mind-boggling 2,241 appearances between them (average 560 apiece), all started out so slowly, even though they’d been purchased for what in some cases were pretty big fees. (For instance, a teenaged Ian Rush cost £300,000 in 1980; the signing of Dalglish had broken the British record just three years earlier, costing £440,000.

I don’t know why, but unless you buy players who are sensational and ready-formed, then British buys may need even more adjustment time than their foreign counterparts – who, you’d expect, face more challenges off the pitch (language, lifestyle, family relocation, etc.) and also have to come to terms with the pace of our game. Perhaps the majority of Brits are just too technically and tactically deficient by comparison, or maybe it’s a question of mentality.

Why do so many foreign players seem to walk straight into top clubs and, within six months or so, seem to have it nailed? Some may take three or four months to get going, but plenty make relatively seamless transitions.

This does not mean that you give up on anyone who takes a bit longer – quite a few times Arsene Wenger has persevered beyond a year and had success, and we’ve seen it at Liverpool with Lucas – but the failure of so many British players does make something of a mockery of the notion that they settle more quickly.

Just look at Newcastle, and how well almost all of their summer signings have done, even if the pressure isn’t as intense on Tyneside. They’ve brought in a pretty eclectic bunch, from French and German football, but they seem united as a collective.

Again, looking only at clubs who have been in the top four in recent times (and starting with Liverpool), you can see that Hyypia, Alonso, Reina, Mascherano, Torres and Suarez leap out in a way that no British signings have in the past dozen (or even twenty) years. Not even one bears comparison with those seven. Only Mascherano had experience of English football, albeit just five games at West Ham.

Elsewhere, in the past decade-or-so, we’ve seen smooth transitions for imports like Fabregas, Vermaelen, Sagna, van Persie; Silva, Aguero, Kompany and Yaya Toure; Makelele, Drogba, Essien, Carvalho, Gallas, Cech, Robben, Ramirez, Mata and Ivanovic; Van der Vaart and Berbatov; van Nistelrooy, Heinze and Hernandez.

The following started slowly, but were excelling from around six months: Hamann, Henry, Bergkamp, Pires, Vidic and Evra. Outside of top four, Carlos Tevez did so well at West Ham he’s now played for two of the big clubs. He started slowly, but his talent was apparent halfway through his first season.

Nani, Modric, Nasri and Malouda all took even longer, and Shevchenko never did adapt. Cristiano Ronaldo is interesting because despite too many step-overs, he was very good at 17 after arriving from Portugal, but only sensational a few years later.

The very successful English players signed by these same clubs, where the player settled into top form within six months: Rooney, Ferdinand, Smalling, A. Cole (Chelsea), Parker (Spurs) and Johnson (Liverpool). Joe Cole did well at Chelsea, although Scott Parker flopped there. Phil Jones and Ashley Young have done pretty well at United this season, but without consistent form or fitness. Frank Lampard has had a great career at Chelsea, but wasn’t an instant hit.

Only lately has Theo Walcott started looking suitably consistent, and he’s possibly Arsene Wenger’s second-best English signing, after Sol Campbell. The exciting Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain fits into a couple of brackets: English, young, fairly expensive (£12-15m), but also phased in; a substitute appearance here and there, and a full league debut only after seven months.

Or … maybe there’s nothing in this. Maybe it’s all just random, and I’m looking for patterns in fairly small data sets. Or perhaps I’m cherry-picking examples, even though I don’t mean to. No doubt I’ve overlooked a few examples for either side of the argument, too.

There’s no doubt that the bigger clubs have bought a greater percentage of overseas than home-grown players in the past decade, so there should be a higher number (if not proportion) of successes.

If I’m wrong in thinking that English players might actually find it harder to adjust to life at a big club, then I see absolutely no evidence of it being a more reliable approach than importing from overseas.

It’s just that with the whole footballing world out there, maybe it’s mad to look mainly in here, even if the players’ wives can now all converse in the same language.

Buying the very best English players equates to common sense (Manchester United keep doing so). Buying the next rung down, when you could be buying the very best from most – if not all – other countries, is where it starts to fall down a little. As I’ve said before, any one of Carroll, Henderson, Adam and Downing on their own does not bother me as a signing; it’s just that, when combined, they look underwhelming and overpriced.

(By contrast, young Raheem Sterling can now be eased into the side. He was bought two years ago as a 15-year old, and it’s deals like this, and the more recent capture of 16-year-old Jordan Ibe, that can see young English players adapt to the club away from first team pressures.)

The good news is that, having had a Spanish enclave at the time when Spain was the best footballing nation in the world (only to then disband it, starting in 2010), Liverpool now have a Uruguayan flavour, at the time when they are champions of South America.

Work permit issues can make it tougher to procure players outside of the EU, but if, like Coates, they have recent European ancestry, it can make life easier. The link-up with Nacional can strengthen this bond, and while top players gravitate to Champions League clubs, they can also be swayed by the presence of compatriots if the project is exciting. Right now, I’d rather have some of the best Uruguayan players than more mediocre English ones.

Maybe another problem is signing players injured at the time: both Carroll and Aquilani arrived unfit to play, and while both were bought with five years (and not five months) in mind, it meant that when they did finally play, they were off the pace. And by starting life off the pace, people instantly questioned the large outlay; what a waste of money, etc. And the pressure just ramped up. A good start can be vital for any new signing, and neither of these players were able to achieve that.

If the conscious decision to buy British last summer is repeated in 2012, I’ll be struggling for optimism. Most of the best ones are already at the elite clubs, with a good proportion having come through their ranks.

I haven’t given up hope on those purchased in 2011 (particularly the younger players), and the right Brit at the right price is fine, but there are so many great players in leagues around the world that would surely represent better value for money.

A bit more thinking outside the box might help solve problems within it.

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After my last piece (access here), this is a slightly simplified – but not simplistic – breakdown of what’s working, and what’s going wrong. As in-depth as that previous piece was, I got the predictable angry emails saying that I’d purposely missed this and overlooked that.

I’ll start with an old chestnut that some see as an excuse, but others see as circumstance.

• Injuries

The current squad is reasonably strong, but for my money, Agger and Lucas are as good as anyone else in the Premier League their respective positions/roles, and when absent have been badly missed.

All clubs have those players they can’t do without. For Arsenal it’s probably Robin van Persie. Jack Wilshire’s absence can be overcome with other strong midfielders, but they have only one natural goalscorer.

For United it seems to be Paul Scholes, given the dip before he returned (including Champions League failure) and the upturn since. Perhaps in other areas they have able deputies, but not there.

Also, the absence of Bellamy removes almost all top-gear pace from the attack (and no doubt why the precocious Raheem Sterling is now being fast-tracked, no pun intended).

Gerrard has also missed half the season, and while Liverpool actually have a fairly poor record since his return (but which coincides more with the absence of Lucas and Agger), he can still help with the following:

• Goals from midfield

This is particularly lacking in wide areas. Maxi, Kuyt and Bellamy can all score when playing wide, but are all now in their 30s, and neither Maxi nor Kuyt has played consistently well, or, it has to be said, had a consistent run in the side this season (chicken/egg?).

Downing seemed to be on an upward curve at Villa with his scoring but has reverted to type; I still believe he can get more than he has, but he’s never hit double figures in the league, and has only twice got more than five. Henderson has shown at U21 level (four in 16) that he can get forward and score goals, but at Liverpool he seems to prefer to pass rather than take responsibility. As the youngest player in the front six, he may just be deferring to seniority (in contrast with how he plays amongst his international age group).

Ultimately, how much better would Liverpool be with a winger who could cut inside and get 10-15 league goals in a season? (Easier said than found.)

• Failure to convert chances

For me, this is the main reason behind the league position, and it’s become a vicious cycle. Once you know that you miss too many chances, it puts pressure on everyone.

But this is the paradox: in cup games, often against the same opposition, chances have been taken, particularly at crucial moments. In the league games, they haven’t. I have no idea why that would be.

Why does De Gea make three great saves at the end of the League game at Anfield at 1-1, but then, with the same scoreline, get beaten by a late Kuyt strike in the FA Cup – which would have required only a good save?

Why does Suarez score one at home and two away against Stoke in the cups, but not in the league game when he faced them this season? Liverpool created far more chances in the league encounter at the Britannia, but lost; yet won in the Carling Cup.

Why did Liverpool miss so many early chances away at Man City in the league, but score an early goal in the cup?

How can the Reds, at Anfield, put six past a passing side pushing for promotion, but score just one combined against two of the promoted sides?

With the second-worst conversion rate in the Premier League, the longer the problem continues, the greater the apparent need for a reliable finisher. My view is always that it must not be someone who ruins too many moves due bad control or constantly running offside, but good goalscorers who are more than mere poachers are not easy to source.

Liverpool have narrowly missed on countless occasions – woodwork, great saves – and missed too many penalties that cost points.

Once you start struggling for points, it becomes harder to play well. Then you stop creating as many chances. It happens in games – early blitz followed by no breakthrough equals opposition growing in confidence – and it happens over a season.

Perhaps, at Anfield at least, some of it due to the …

• Crowd

Maybe one of the reasons that Liverpool are a cup team is that Anfield is now a cup stadium. If the squad isn’t quite deep or talented enough to produce week-in, week-out consistency and freshness, then the crowd is equally guilty of only getting ‘up’ for the big occasion.

There’s still no better place when it’s bouncing, but often you can hear a pin drop.

Ask yourself this: if Anfield was like it was for the Chelsea semi-final in 2005 every game, how many more points would the Reds win? (Or even if it was half as good.)

But of course, fans, like players, are human beings. And even ‘professional’ fans – who go home and away – aren’t as keyed up when Wigan come to town as when it’s a massive night in a knockout scenario. Neither fans nor players are robots. When things are going well, it becomes a virtuous circle; when not, it’s a vicious cycle.

• Transfer Policy

Whether or not they work out, I don’t have a major problem with the logic behind any of the individuals signed, but as a collective it was arguably too Brit-based, and lacking in big personalities who will not be overawed.

Of the five Brits, only one – Bellamy – has looked at home.

Crucially, and perhaps not coincidentally, even he failed to do so when he was already experienced at 27, and only now seems to have matured and come to terms with the pressure. He’s also a confident lad.

He had a year at the club, followed by four away, to mull it over. It’s not about understanding that Liverpool is a big club; it’s about coming to terms with just how big it (and its history) is. It’s about higher standards than at clubs they’ve been used to, and as a result, fans who aren’t interested in mere ‘decent’ play.

By contrast, Carroll and Henderson are young and entitled to feel overawed. Both have large price tags to justify, and Carroll especially so. They are no longer young lads coming through the system at hometown clubs; they are expensive players at what still remains England’s most successful club.

It takes special players to thrive at a big club, and maybe they are not at that stage yet. Some of the new signings may need to be cashed in on, if there’s not the sense of them ever getting there. The trick is knowing who will grow in stature (as seen with Lucas, or Fletcher and Evans at United), and who will never develop as hoped. And often, even the best managers, in the absence of a crystal ball, end up guessing.

It’s good that Dalglish and Comolli have to agree to all signings, so one is not forcing players on the other. This is the Lyon approach outlined in Soccernomics. The problem can be one of compromise; ending up with players both men like, but not getting players one or the other absolutely love, because the other is unsure. Again, I don’t know if that happened, but the wisdom of crowds doesn’t always work.

Also, I don’t believe buying from the Premier League increases the chances of players succeeding – I can see no correlation in the data (2,000 transfers since 1995) to show that it’s true.

What is true is that you get flops and successes from these shores, and flops and successes from abroad.

If anything, bigger clubs seem to have a slightly better success rate from abroad, but as with everything, it’s the individual’s characteristics that matter, with a good slice of luck thrown in (i.e. don’t break your leg in your first game).

• Failed Targets

Last summer, Liverpool tried to buy Ashley Young, Phil Jones and Gael Clichy. Each chose a club already in the Champions League. Higher wages, more chance of immediate success.

So the Reds dropped down a level, to second choices, and got Downing, Coates and Enrique.

So far, Enrique has done well, even if he’s been a little shaky of late. He’s had enough good games to feel optimistic, and as such, we must judge players’ performance on the larger sample.

Coates, like Jones, is a young centre-back with immense promise. Even so, the goal at QPR was a total shock, in a week when the best two volleys you’re likely to see this season were by men who were 6’6” or taller.

But like any young defender, Coates is also likely to make mistakes. Jones may well be a future England captain, but Coates has already played a part, when aged just 20, in Uruguay winning the Copa America. If Liverpool overpaid in some instances, they got a bargain here.

Meanwhile, Young probably had the talent and self-confidence to thrive at a bigger club, but Downing was actually the more consistent performer for Aston Villa last season. Young, at £17m, was relatively cheap as he was in the last year of his contract.

By contrast, Downing was overpriced, but not a write-off. If Liverpool now sign a better right-winger and a reliable goalscorer, then I see no reason why Downing, as a good footballer and well-liked team player, can’t help take Liverpool back into the top four. The problem is that he’s not got the individual brilliance to be one of the handful of players who could drag them there. Maybe for £20m you’d expect that, but then again, on his unremarkable wages, you wouldn’t.

The aim now has to be to make a couple of summer signings who, unlike the last batch, make an instant impact, although given my estimate of 50% of signings failing for one reason or another, it may need four purchases to achieve that. (If they none start well, then it will require this season’s purchases to up their game.)

You can still find top players who are happy to not play in the Champions League right away (Suarez, for example), but they won’t want to wait too long, and are obviously harder to find than those chasing instant riches and glory.

Liverpool retains a glorious name, but not the riches to do what Man City did, and make unrefusable offers. It needs to take the Spurs route, but that was a building process, not an instant success.

• Inexperience

This is a fairly young squad. It is also a collection of players who, the defence aside, are still relatively new to one another.

Perhaps it’s got a bit worse under Dalglish since he brought in his new players because the old ones, whether or not they needed replacing, understood each other’s movements better.

Or maybe they just aren’t good enough.

Or maybe they just aren’t good enough yet.

Time should make things better; things can quickly click intuitively, but it can also need work on the training ground. However, time brings no guarantees.

• Tactics

Managers will always get tactics wrong at certain times – it reminds me of paper-scissors-stone, in terms of whether or not the planned approach succeeds or fails against an opposition that may be pulling a surprise.

And even if the tactics are ‘right’, it depends on the players a) following instructions correctly, and b) playing well. On any day, you can play a brilliant tactical game and still lose, and get the tactics wrong but still win. Were the tactics right in the cup games, but wrong in the league games, even agains the same opposition?

I think Liverpool have deployed varied tactics, and between Clarke and Dalglish, shown an intelligent, reasonably modern approach, with various formations, and with tactical switches during games. Even the 4-4-2 involves someone between the lines, rather than the  horribly flat Torres/Ngog twin-spearhead Hodgson often opted for.

Problems have come in finding the best solution, and balance, with the players at the club; particularly up front, where Suarez has such versatility – and unpredictability – that the key is often finding someone to remain on his wavelength and play to his strengths.

Also, Downing was supposedly bought to service Carroll, but when the two start, Downing might be on the right (cutting inside to shoot), and a lot of the time, one of them may be on the bench.

Are we going to play to Carroll’s strengths, or Suarez’s? Is there anything wrong with having both ways of playing in order to switch between the two, for variety? But of course, the more ways you wish to play, the more of a challenge it becomes.

Crucially, the absence of intelligent tactical players like Lucas and Agger hasn’t helped of late. Lucas, who reads the game brilliantly and passes with calmness, is still the Reds’ top tackler (in terms of quantity of successful ones made) in the Premier League after four months out, while Liverpool are giving up twice as many clear cut chances per game without Agger than when he was playing.

At times it looks to me like we defend too deep, but look at what happened when Andre Villas-Boas – who I thought would be superb at Chelsea – tried to get them to defend a higher line.

Jose Mourinho swears by Steve Clarke, the coach who played a part in Chelsea’s back-to-back titles, and Kenny Dalglish has always been a student of the game and won the league at two different clubs. Are they now mugs?

• Set-pieces – Attacking

When Liverpool bought Charlie Adam, his set-pieces were seen as key. They were often superb for Blackpool, and in the early weeks of the season brought assists, starting with the opening goal in the first game. Great. But then he got the yips. Suddenly he couldn’t beat the first man, and lost all elevation (though all of us men have suffered that fate from time to time).

Has he lost the ability? No. Has he lost the confidence? Yes. Ditto Henderson and Downing, who also took better set-pieces last season.

Perhaps they knew, as designated set-piece takers, that delivering some bad ones wouldn’t see someone else grab the ball off them, and so they weren’t so anxious; but now, at Liverpool – and this is true even with penalties – it has seemed like it’s left to the players to fight over who takes them. Liverpool don’t have a one set-piece specialist, but several squabbling for the right, and even if a good one is taken, someone else might take the next one.

What’s universally true, however, is that the vast majority of corners come to nothing. So it often feels like the side you watch never scores enough.

• Set-pieces – Defending

For years, Liverpool’s zonal marking was hugely successful, based on hard facts: number of goals conceded, and percentage of set-pieces conceded from. In Benítez’s last season, however, for whatever reason, this slipped.

For ten months or so, Liverpool – now man-marking –were back to defending corners brilliantly under Dalglish. Lately it’s somewhat gone to pot.

Have the opposition sussed out the way Liverpool set-up now? Or is it the case that, once a couple go in, defenders and goalkeeper get nervous, and then more follow?

Zonal marking would have stopped a number of those conceded since Vincent Kompany’s header at Anfield, but then if the team was set up zonally, the opposition would then put the ball somewhere else.

Statistically speaking, zonal marking is said to be slightly better, but there’s no point doing it if you don’t feel comfortable.

A concern, though, is that it might be more suitable for Pepe Reina, who has not looked at his best this season. Perhaps, as with Torres, he responded best to Rafa’s methods, whereas other players might prefer Kenny’s. This, however, is just guesswork on my part. I do know that Reina was certainly not happy with Hodgson’s approach, but then again, few were.

• Substitutions

I have a slight problem with the delay in making changes, and the lack of all three substitutes being used. But equally, I’ve never been keen on managers who make all three at half-time, and who can then throw away a lifeline with an early injury. (Why not make two, but save one for a while?) Ditto the manager who throws on a big centre-back as a striker (or, if you’re Stuart Pearce, a goalkeeper).

Substitutions are something that’s hard to prove either way – you can never play out the alternative decision to see if it worked, or if it was in fact worse – and it’s good to see that, as it was under Benítez, players swap wings, strikers switch roles, etc, to try and pose new problems.

You can change things without changing the players, but a bit more freshness in the final stages of the game can often help.

• Mentality

Liverpool’s best seasons in recent times have been based around players with a superb mentality: Hyypia, Hamann, Babbel (the double-b version), Fowler, McAllister, Owen, Alonso, Mascherano, Gerrard, Carragher, Reina, Lucas, Torres (before he got too moody), Agger, Suarez, et al.

Most of these were schooled abroad, although the British successes have been brought through the Liverpool Academy rather than purchased. How many English players with these qualities have Liverpool purchased in the last 20 years?

These best players may have still had faults – petulance, hot-headedness, etc. – but were winners with broad shoulders. Martin Skrtel now seems to be stepping into this category (perhaps due to playing on his natural side when Carragher’s left out, and maybe also due to now being seen as better than the no.23), but of the players purchased in the summer, only Bellamy seems to have that edge.

Suarez clearly has it, although he can take it too far. Then again, so can Rooney, and so did Roy Keane, and so have loads of top players. But the aggression can be controlled, and it’s not about that; it’s more about that constant desire to win. You don’t have to make over the top tackles to be a winner; you just have to loathe losing.

Part of it comes with age, experience and seniority; growing into a tougher personality, wising up. But often it’s ingrained.

Do Liverpool have enough winners? Well, it’s looked that way in the cups, with win after win after win. But it hasn’t looked that way in the league. The same was also true in 2005, but then, the following season, it was suddenly more apparent, with 25 wins from 38 league games (win the final eight this season and that takes the Reds to 19, two more than 2005, although it’s hard to see that happening as things stand).

Things change. Form, fitness, confidence, and so on. Equally, personnel can need changing. Do a good job with that in the summer, and I see no reason to panic. There’s plenty to build on, but it has to be done well.

‘The table never lies’ remains a cliché, because it never tells the full story, either. Only the season as a whole does that, when all acceptable caveats are accounted for.

• Limitations

Ultimately, Liverpool are locked into what is becoming a relatively small stadium (as other clubs expand theirs), and with match-day income well below that seen at other clubs, the exile from the Champions League can become a problem that leads to more problems. Often Premier League sides who are relegated find themselves struggling in the Championship, and Liverpool have effectively been relegated from the top four in England.

Some excellent commercial deals provide hope, to take advantage of Liverpool’s enormous global fan-base, but rather than draw Liverpool level with rich rivals, for now they only partially compensate for what’s being lost.

My view is that smart thinking will help Liverpool when it comes to FFP, but after decades of small thinking, the club still need to invest lots of money in a new stadium. David Moores hung on too long and sold up too late, and then sold to the wrong men; and boat was duly missed by Gillett and Hicks. Now FSG need to make sense of the madness that’s gone before, and make the right decisions. No pressure there, then.

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With Liverpool’s season proving to be an archetypal rollercoaster ride – ups, downs, adrenaline and nausea – I will now try and make sense of some of the key issues.

First off, it goes without saying that Liverpool should be beating Wigan at home – but you will always get a few freak results. It was the first terrible home performance under Dalglish, and after lots of ‘unjust’ draws at Anfield, and the ill-deserved defeat to Arsenal, there was no arguing that Wigan deserved the points.

Despite Wigan’s woes, they knew little was expected of them. By contrast, after the QPR game, there was a lot of pressure on Liverpool, not least to ‘be Liverpool’. While I don’t find Dalglish’s excuse of tiredness particularly plausible in this instance (though both QPR and Wigan had free weeks ahead of facing the Reds, who had a far more packed schedule), a club like Liverpool – with massive expectations but not quite the money to deal with them – needs its best players. When fit this season, Lucas, Agger, Johnson and Bellamy have been in that category, while Kelly’s additional absence left a rookie at right-back.

Since Agger’s rib injury, goals have been leaking left, right and centre. Lucas is the only top-quality midfield shielder the club possesses. Bellamy was scoring goals, and Johnson, who defends better than given credit for, adds another dimension going forward. Some of the understudies are not good enough, but then again, the aforementioned four are amongst Liverpool’s best seven or eight players.

Comparisons

The constant comparisons saying that Dalglish’s record is no better than Hodgson’s are incorrect, and miss the point. Last week, Gabriele Marcotti had noted that Dalglish had the best start of any Liverpool manager since Roy Evans in terms of ‘points’ won (including cups).

While Hodgson’s win percentage was boosted by victories against European minnows in qualifying rounds (and also, like Dalglish, faced one easy domestic cup game: Northampton and Exeter respectively), he never once, in 20 league games, had Liverpool looking like a top side that could go places. Victory at Anfield against Chelsea was pleasing, but a case of hanging on like a relegation-threatened side withstanding a pummelling. Overall, too much long-ball stuff was played, and there was no sense of optimism.

The players were bored by his training methods (which are suited to organising limited sides, to great effect), and he said things like “I hope we don’t get beaten too heavily” on the eve of his first pre-season friendly, against Al Hilal, and by the time of his second league match, his ambition when going to Manchester City was “to not lose 6-0”. A 2-0 defeat at Everton was bizarrely as his team’s best performance. He let Alex Ferguson walk all over him over two separate issues with Fernando Torres, told lies about Rafa Benítez, and seemed more interested in using the job as a stepping stone to becoming England manager.

This, to me, is what lost him the support of fans who were never excited by his appointment, but prepared to give him a go. He soon started insulting the fans, and in so doing, signed his own dismissal papers.

Crucially, with Hodgson, that was all we had to go on. He had nothing in the bank. There was no great start to refer back to, in the way that the Reds’ form under Dalglish last season was worthy of a third-place finish. (Even if it was just the spring of the arrival of a new manager, there wasn’t even a ‘dead cat bounce’ under Hodgson.)

Liverpool’s current dreadful run of five defeats in six league games coincides with the winning of a trophy and reaching another semi-final, and so, irrespective of what Kenny did 25 years ago, he has already put some credit in his bank. That won’t last forever, and of course there are some valid concerns, but it’s getting to the point where any kind of failure is met with calls for a sacking. This is not Chelsea.

And bad runs happen; even to good teams. Just a month-or-so ago I was getting sick of hearing how Spurs were actually the best side in the league this season, and Harry Redknapp was an absolute genius. Since then, they’ve won just two points from 15, and are in danger of letting a supposed title-challenge turn into a return to Europa League football. Still, they’re in the driving seat for 4th place, and also have a semi-final to play. Are they suddenly a rubbish team?

Meanwhile, Arsenal (carrying a few injuries) were quite dreadful earlier in the season, but currently look like the best team around. Arsenal did well to stand by Arsene Wenger, even if some of the fans were getting twitchy. It would have been nice had Purslow and co. done the same with Rafa in 2010, but they didn’t, and now it’s only fair to give Kenny time to give it his best shot.

Holistic

Unless you are an elite side, you can probably only win so many games in a season. There is only so much effort that can be put in, and you will always get flat performances and off days. And this season, Liverpool have had an above-average return in the cups (mostly against Premier League sides) and a below-average return in the league. The squad, and the sides fielded, have not been at the level to do consistently well in both.

Swap the cup and league results in specific fixtures and things would look very different. City at home (drawn) and away (lost), United at home (drawn), Chelsea away (won), and Stoke home (drawn) and away (lost) would suddenly become: City at home (won) and away (drawn), United at home (won), Chelsea away (won), and Stoke home (won) and away (won). That would leave the Reds a fairly incredible 10 points better off in the league; but still not in the top four, and with no chance of a trophy.

It’s easy to say that these teams may have not been trying as hard in the cup games (though all fielded strong teams), and of course, cause and effect from changing one result would mean subsequent results won’t necessarily have remained the same.

But the crux is this: Liverpool played at least as well, if not better, against these teams in the league matches when dropping points than they did when beating them in the cup. In particular, Stoke away, City at home and United at home were games where the Reds played better in the league, but didn’t take their chances. It can start to feel fairly arbitrary why a side takes its chances one day and not another. Why did Liverpool play worse in those cup games but win?

In the bigger picture, my belief is that winning cups can lead to league improvement the following season, even if it’s not guaranteed. At the same time, too many cup games in a single season can harm league form.

In 1997, Middlesbrough had a lot of good players, and reached both domestic cup finals. Do bad teams do that? – one, perhaps, but two? They were, at the very least, a top half of the table side on paper, with Ravanelli, Emerson and Juninho in the XI. But they were relegated. Had they got those wins in the league instead, they’d have been safe.

Sheffield Wednesday lost both 1993 cup finals to Arsenal. The Gunners won a European trophy the year after, and the domestic double in question came just two years after their most recent league title. Their league position that season when winning the two domestic cups? Tenth. (Three places below Wednesday.)

Liverpool won the FA Cup, League Cup and Uefa Cup in 2001. At the time, coming third in the league (with 69 points) seemed a big deal, but the following season the Reds had no such cup fortune, but finished 2nd with 80 points. It’s not inconceivable to think that the side could have reached 80 points a year earlier had its efforts been focused on the league, but when there’s a bigger sense of excitement arising from the cup games, more emotional energy seems to go into it.

But while cup games can harm your side’s health, it’s difficult for a manager to eschew them and focus purely on the league. This is particularly true of managers under pressure, and that usually means a newly appointed boss trying to make a mark, and those who have gone a while without silverware.

There’s also the issue of the Carling Cup being in February. Does a sense of winning something with three months left cause a slackening in intensity in other competitions where the rewards aren’t as easily attainable? Spurs in 2008 and Birmingham last season both crashed badly after the win, while Arsenal self-combusted after losing last year’s final. You can’t really coast after winning the FA Cup, as it’s the end of the season.

Inheritance

It’s only fair to note Kenny’s starting point.

While I believe Rafa Benítez left a fairly strong squad in 2010, it was not  his best; the money-grabbing of Gillett and Hicks had helped see to that, particularly when promising the Spaniard the money from the sale of Robbie Keane to reinvest (on Stevan Jovetić), before withdrawing it to leave the side a striker short.

Roy Hodgson then took that collection of players, and, with a fairly neutral net-spend, succeeded in making it considerably worse.

By the time Kenny Dalglish took over, the following players were in the first team squad: Paul Konchesky, Christian Poulsen, Milan Jovanovic, Danny Wilson, Jonjo Shelvey, Joe Cole, David Ngog, Soto Kyrgiakos, Ryan Babel, Daniel Ayala, Danny Pacheco and Jay Spearing. That’s eleven players you wouldn’t want to rely on, either because they were too young, or just not good enough.

On top of this, Hodgson had brought back the increasingly injury-prone Fabio Aurelio, who had excelled under Benítez when available, but who was released in 2010 because of fitness issues. That makes a dozen players who weren’t of much use, without talking about reserve goalkeepers.

As teenagers, Shelvey, Wilson and Ayala had a lot of potential, but were young and raw. They had a handful of starts between them. I was sad to see Ayala sold, but Sebastian Coates looks an even better prospect.

Pacheco had ability, but wasn’t quite good enough. Spearing had been improving, but slowly. Jovanovic suffered the fate of the man who signed him (Benítez) being sacked before he even arrived, and as with Djibril Cissé six years earlier, it may have contributed to a poor start (which never got better).

For all his talent, Joe Cole looked consistently unfit and peripheral, and did so on £100,000 a week. And at £1.5m each, Kyrgiakos and Ngog were never going to be more than hit-and-miss squad players; but bargains all the same when compared with Poulsen and Konchesky, who cost roughly £5m each – ludicrous fees for thirtysomethings. Ryan Babel was a potential match-winner, but never quite worked out how to use his talent effectively, beyond the occasional inspired cameo.

Raul Meireles was Hodgson’s one successful, albeit unspectacular signing. Before Hodgson got going, Benayoun and Mascherano – two of the stars of the 86-point finish in 2008/09 – had departed, and as such, I’d come to expect roughly 6th place from the Englishman, given that 7th in 2009/10 was seen by many as an unacceptable underachievement. But when Dalglish turned up, the Reds were 12th and losing games.

Emiliano Insua – now doing well at Sporting Lisbon – and Alberto Aquilani – now at the mighty Milan – were already out on loan. With Benítez edged out of the door, the young Insua had been earmarked as not good enough by Christian ‘above his station’ Purslow, as had Lucas Leiva. (Yes, Liverpool’s ‘player of the season-in-waiting’ was being hawked around by Purslow, with Hodgson equally ludicrous in his desire to be rid of Agger.) By the time Dalglish took over, Insua and Aquilani had been ostracised. They might not have been perfect, but they were better than Konchesky and Poulsen.

The only players Dalglish could definitely build a team around were Reina, Johnson, Agger, Skrtel, Lucas, Gerrard, Kuyt (for a couple of years) and Torres; seven Benítez signings, plus the club’s best-ever Academy graduate.

Also in the squad, Carragher was beyond his peak, but could obviously still play a part, and in the wings, Maxi was a quality player, with a year or two left at the top, who had yet to shine. Raul Meireles was not always convincing in the first XI, but due to injuries, ended up deputising for several players (although had yet to score when Dalglish turned up). And Martin Kelly, blooded by Benítez towards the end of his tenure, was a promising prospect, although like Shelvey and Ayala, very raw.

But then Torres, after three goals in five games under Dalglish after just nine in 20 under Hodgson, made it clear he wanted to leave, dating back to broken promises by the club back in 2010. And Gerrard soon suffered serious injury. This season, Lucas followed suit. Hodgson, in getting Liverpool to a lowly 12th, may have not spent much money, but he did have Torres, Lucas and Gerrard: the heart of the team. He also had Carragher, who was 18 months younger than now.

Signings

“Think you’re doing a good job, Kenny? You have spent £113.3m and you’re 28 points behind United” ran the Daily Mail headline last week.

Gross spend in a short space of time is almost irrelevant because it ignores what you lose. What if you spend £100m, but lose £200m-worth of players? Should you be £100m better? Of course not – you should be £100m worse.

Net spend is a good guide, but even that’s affected by what you inherit (you will have a low net spend if you inherit an excess of saleable assets; if you don’t, you won’t). The overall cost of the squad when adjusted for inflation (and the XI that can be selected), along with the size of the wage bill, is what matters most.

Liverpool’s net spend under Dalglish is roughly £40m; so, a third of the Daily Mail’s gross(ly exaggerated) headline. That’s not a huge amount given the work required, and in any rebuilding process, mistakes will be made.

My long-held theory is that most managers will be lucky to get 50% of their signings spot-on. This is partly because, in a squad of 24+, you can’t have everyone you purchase in the side at once; and as such, some will seem like flops. And also, the fact of the matter is that, due to injuries, form, team understanding/wavelength, language and settling-in issues, and sometimes the need to adapt to a new role, new signings can often struggle to replicate the form that led to the move in the first place. Add the pressure of a club like Liverpool, and it can be tough for some to cope.

I’m never comfortable with the idea that five out, five in will mean improvement. If you lose a world-class player, like a Torres, the odds of finding a suitable replacement are not great.

Luis Suarez, for all the profligacy and controversy, is a player whose all-round game has made up for the loss of Torres; it’s just a shame the two were never paired together. Perhaps the Uruguayan doesn’t have the right strike partner, and the need has appeared to be for a dead-eye finisher to accompany him; but there’s no doubt he’s been a gem of a signing.

Now both aged 21, Jordan Henderson and Sebastian Coates cannot be definitively judged; they are both full internationals, but ones who need time. My hunch is that both will prove shrewd acquisitions, based on what they’ve done right; experience will help eradicate what they get wrong.

Henderson is unlikely to be a right-sided midfielder for the rest of his career, and playing there is not helping him win over the fans – but presumably, it’s designed to help the team (and will provide a stern life lesson). Hearing fans cheering his withdrawal yesterday was not nice; reminiscent of the crap that Lucas used to receive. (And even poor old Konchesky didn’t deserve the bird.)

Jose Enrique was superb for several months. Super-quick, and eager to go forward, he looked a bargain at £6m. However, his recent form has been iffy,  with his reluctance to use his right foot, and his interest in barging rather than tackling, causing him problems. His final ball isn’t great, but generally, at the other end of the pitch, he is rarely beaten by his opponent. That said, another problem is that he holds onto the ball too long, twisting and turning without getting his head up. He’s still a very good signing, but needs to prove that the good start was his natural level, and that this is more of a blip.

Craig Bellamy is another very good signing. Despite being 32 with dodgy knees, he recently broke the record for most high-intensity sprints in a game, and has scored some vital goals. A great bit of business, even if not someone for the long-term.

Charlie Adam has also had some good moments, but for all his passing ability, he seems to make too many silly mistakes – be it daft tackles or brainless concessions of possession. Despite all that, he’s not a bad player. He’s a good player who makes too many bad decisions. Perhaps he’s been trying too hard, but if you lack pace in the centre of the park, you need to be able to play like Xabi Alonso to compensate. At times Adam looks capable of matching the longer passes, but he doesn’t have the same footballing brain. (Few do.) It would be nice to see him succeed, but I won’t hold my breath.

Stewart Downing started the season brilliantly, but his shots were hitting the woodwork and his teasing crosses often inexplicably missed or misused by the strikers. He then had a pretty poor few months. But of late, he’s looking sharp and, crucially, full of confidence. He was man of the match against Cardiff, and while it’s “only Championship-level opposition”, the same applied to the rest of the Liverpool side, and many froze with the pressure of their first final and the expectation that the Reds should walk the match.

My main gripe with Downing was his willingness to shoot time and again from 30 yards, but never pull the trigger inside the box. But against Stoke and QPR, he cut inside from the right with shots that led to goals. He may never be spectacular, and he was overpriced in transfer fee (if not wages), but there’s hope yet.

Which brings us onto  …

Andy Carroll

As noted by people on Twitter, Liverpool’s results in the last seven Carroll starts (after Bolton): WWDWDWW; but the last seven without Carroll starting (after Oldham): DDLLLLL. That’s quite some contrast.

TTT’s senior data analyst Dan Kennett posted some great stats on the eve of the Wigan game in the site’s comments section (which is worth the subscription fee on its own!).

(Even yesterday’s game, though not included, saw Liverpool do better with him on the pitch – ‘drawing’ 1-1 – than the 1-0 ‘defeat’ of the first half.)

Liverpool (All Comps): P40 Win%=50, Points Per Game = 1.78

Carroll starts: P22 W13 D5 L4, Win%=59, Points Per Game = 2.00
Carroll doesn’t start: P18 W7 D6 L5, Win%=39, Points Per Game = 1.50

In terms of ‘difficulty’:

Carroll starts vs Teams higher in PL than Liverpool (All Comps v Arsenal, Chelsea, City, United, Newcastle, Spurs)
P8 W5 D1 L2, Win%=63, Points Per Game = 2.00

Carroll starts vs “the rest”
P14 W8 D4 L2, Win%=57, Points Per Game = 2.00

No Carroll start vs Teams higher
P6 W1 D3 L2, Win%=17, Points Per Game = 1.00

No Carroll start vs “the rest”
P12 W6 D3 L3, Win%=50, Points Per Game = 1.75

I think this is fascinating. Not only are the team’s results significantly better when Carroll plays, but the results with Carroll are exactly the same (2 points per game), whether versus “hard” or “easy” teams!

(Dan has subsequently worked out these stats across Carroll’s entire time at Liverpool and posted them in the site’s debate section, and they remain impressive.)

While Liverpool’s game can be less easy on the eye with Carroll in the side,  and the goals have not flowed for the no.9 as hoped, he’s certainly playing better of late; at least he was, until he started being left out.

There are too many other factors to prove conclusively that playing Carroll will lead to better results, but it’s better to have non-scoring strikers who help win games (through other contributions) than to have someone banging in a goal a game in 2-1 defeats. Either way, it’s food for thought.

Conclusions

Even though £40m (net) has been spent on transfers in 14 months, £30m has been wiped off the annual wage bill. Liverpool are no longer a Champions League club, and have had to cut their cloth accordingly.

The excellent commercial deals made this season – particularly the Warrior kit deal – suggest that the wage bill can now be safely increased and it not trouble Liverpool’s Financial Fair Play outlook; as well as making sure that a higher wage bill won’t cripple the club (a la Leeds United) if it remains out of the Champions League.

The more time that passes, the brighter Liverpool’s future looks, providing Uefa stick to their guns, because the Reds are now run by sensible, intelligent owners whose long-term plan was built around such a scenario. Equally, without a massive stadium, and without Champions League income, the new commercial deals will only go so far. The good news is that clubs like Chelsea and Manchester City, who have been built on artificial wealth, will have to do more than make annual net spends of £100m+.

Whether or not Kenny is definitely the man to take the club forward in the long-term is hard to say; but he’s done enough to deserve some time and patience. Equally, those responsible for buying players – and people tend to blame either Comolli or Dalglish when they go wrong, but the opposite person when they do well – need to find a couple of gems in the summer.

None of the current first XI is dropping off a cliff next season. Gerrard and Kuyt are fading forces in their thirties, but far from finished. And Carragher is already a squad player.

Providing Gerrard stays fit, and assuming that Craig Bellamy remains an important asset, the squad can get stronger simply by youngsters improving. Providing he isn’t heckled further into his shell, I’d expect Henderson to get better, and Shelvey could usurp Adam, while Coates could perhaps force Carragher further from the first team.

The prodigious Raheem Sterling made the breakthrough yesterday, and looked right at home, despite still being 16 until just before Christmas. He has immense potential, and his pace can make him a threat, but has a lot to learn in terms of when to go it alone and when to pass, and will need some patience. Other good players wait in the wings from a youth system overhauled by Benítez in 2009, with Dalglish’s help.

But on the surface, a finisher seems vital. Had Liverpool taken their chances earlier in the season, they wouldn’t be in this position; they would have some leeway. More of Dan Kennett’s excellent work shows that Liverpool’s clear cut chance conversion rate is 10% below the Premier League average, but that their opponents are bagging 10% above the average in games against them. As poor as Liverpool’s finishing has been, the opposition, as seen at QPR, are gobbling up an unusually high percentage of a limited number of chances. Can that continue?

Liverpool, and in particular Suarez, hit the woodwork more than anyone else, but the player who used to do so most regularly was Robin Van Persie, whose aim has now improved. So it’s not necessarily a case of being a bad striker, but just adjusting your aim by a fraction (and in two recent games, Suarez has hit the post but someone has put in the rebound). If Suarez can get his head straight after the Evra debacle – and his recent scoring form suggests he’s getting there – he can definitely become a 20-goals-a-season striker, if not replicate his 50 in Holland.

Then there’s the fact that Liverpool won the Carling Cup on penalties (albeit after a very hard run to the final), but in the Premier League have dropped more than five points – the highest in the division – due to missing their spot-kicks. Of course, the cup was won by Cardiff missing more, but despite missing their first two attempts, Liverpool’s success rate in that shootout was far better than it has been in league games. (See this excellent article for details of how costly it’s proven.)

For all the concerns, I retain a sense of something good bubbling just under. A second trophy would make finishing between 6th and 10th largely irrelevant, other than for anything below 8th becoming worst finish by Liverpool in decades (although Dalglish saved Hodgson that probable ignominy).

Getting back to defending set-pieces the way the Reds did for the first 10 months of Dalglish’s return would also help. Whatever system a manager chooses, the defending can get nervy when corners start leading to goals, and that in turn leads to more. (At the other end, Adam’s famed set-piece delivery disappeared once he got the yips: another example of the pressure players are put under causing them to wobble.)

Get more intelligence into the defence – Agger and Johnson instantly do that – and into the midfield – Lucas instantly does that – and suddenly the side looks stronger. [Addition from Dan: In the 20 PL games Agger has played 90mins, Liverpool's opponents have created 18 clear chances (39% conversion). In the other 10 it's 19 at 58%.]

Sort out the issue of right-midfield, with Henderson largely lost there, and with Kuyt not as consistent as before, and that will help. More goals from midfield – like those scored by Gerrard against Everton – and that too will make a huge difference.

Finally, find a striker who only needs to score goals at the average rate, and convert penalties accordingly, and we can easily be talking about 20 more points in the season. Get it wrong, however, and we may be in for another bumpy ride.

By Dan Kennett.

All data in this article is courtesy of Infostrada Statistics, part of the Infostrada Sports Group.  Infostrada specialises in collecting and managing sports data for every sport imaginable. The Infostrada databases contain historical results from any major sporting competition. These results are updated continuously and live, as the sporting events are happening 24/7. In addition to containing historical results, Infostrada also houses biographical information on tens of thousands of athletes. These biographies are also updated continuously.

Find out more here: http://www.infostradasports.com/asp/home/infostradasports.asp

Follow them on Twitter here: https://twitter.com/#!/infostradalive

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Luis Suarez: 9 or 10?

This season, Liverpool have not won enough games because they have not scored enough goals.  What started out as “one of those days” (Stoke away, 24 shots, 3 clear chances, 0 points), became a blip (Norwich home, 29 shots, 2 clear chances, 1 point), became a season-long malaise. By the time we played Blackburn at Anfield (27 shots, 5 clear chances, 1 point), there was little more than a resigned shrug from Liverpool fans.

Since the New Year there is no longer a debate about this Liverpool team. It doesn’t score enough goals and convert enough clear chances to take that step up to the Champions League places.  The debate is now firmly focused on how to solve this. Fundamental to this debate is in which position and which system do you play your best player, Luis Suarez?

Do you play him as the central striker in a variation of 4-5-1 or do you play him with a partner in a variation of 4-4-1-1? Essentially do you play him as a “number 9” or a “number 10”?  Or to put it another way, is he a great goal-scorer or a scorer of great goals?

So far, the debate has focused mainly on tactical opinion and the high-level evidence that he scored lots of goals for Ajax (81 in 110 games).  It should also be noted that his international scoring record for Uruguay is a not-too-shabby 26 in 52 games (for comparison, Alan Shearer was 30 in 63 for England).

So far, so unhelpful. As a result, the debate has focused on why is his Liverpool goalscoring record so much worse than Ajax and Uruguay.  All kinds of weird and wonderful theories have been floated, from him not trusting the players around him, to being a scruffy dribbler, to being worn-down by off-pitch issues.

Suarez at Ajax

Now, thanks to the good people at Infostrada we are finally ready to provide the data that takes the debate to the next level.  They’ve kindly provided Suarez’s goals, assists and shot on/off target data for each of his five seasons in the Netherlands (including Groningen).  The results are emphatic.

Let’s start by looking at his headline goals & assists per minute:

His best season with Ajax (09/10) saw him scoring at more than a goal a game. For the rest of his time at Ajax he was scoring twice as quickly as he is at Liverpool.  That’s normal because as we all know from the English media, “it’s easier to score goals in the Eredivisie than it is in the Premier League”.

Now let’s dig a bit deeper and look at the frequency and volume of shots required to score:

If we think Suarez has a lot of shots playing for Liverpool (between 4 and 5 every game) this is nothing compared to his time at Ajax where it was every 14 minutes over four seasons (over six per match). In his best season this peaked at a shot every 11 minutes (over eight per match).

Where it starts to get really interesting is how efficient Suarez is at converting shots to goals. His best season in the Eredivisie was his first at Ajax in 07/08 where he scored with almost 16% of his shots (6.4 shots per goal).

At Groningen and seasons two and three at Ajax the conversion rate was around 12% and 8 shots per goal. In his final season at Ajax (post World Cup) and then Liverpool the conversion rate has almost halved to 7% and the shots per goal has shot up to about 14. In terms of efficiency, the current season for Liverpool is the worst of Suarez’s career. But again, this is “normal” because “it’s easier to score goals in the Netherlands than it is in England”.

Comparison to Rooney and Van Persie

Liverpool aspire to be a Champions League club and it is widely accepted that Suarez possesses sufficient quality to make that aspiration realistic and become the key attacking player at a Champions League club. In this case, it’s reasonable to compare Suarez’s time in the Eredivisie to the key attacking players of English clubs who’ve already been in the Champions League this season and are likely to be next season: namely Wayne Rooney and Robin Van Persie.

Thanks to EPL Index (Wesbite: http://www.eplindex.com/),  Twitter: https://twitter.com/#!/EPLIndex) we can source the Opta data for the last four seasons.

First, let’s look at total goals and assists:

Here we can see very clearly that while Suarez at Ajax scored at a slightly better rate than Rooney or Van Persie, his rate at Liverpool after 33 full games is more than twice as bad.

With assists, Suarez at Ajax is significantly better than Van Persie but Suarez at Liverpool is again more than twice as bad (but this could be symptomatic of Liverpool’s wider inability to convert chances. Sadly we don’t have the chances created data at Ajax, only those chances that became assists)

Now dig deeper again and look at the frequency and volume of shots required to score:

This is the killer. Van Persie and Rooney both manage five shots per game in the Premier League over four seasons, compared to Suarez’s six at Ajax.

Yet, compared to Suarez at Ajax, Rooney needs one shot less to score a goal and Van Persie two less, all this in the supposedly “harder” Premier League.

If Suarez was a great goalscorer in the “easier” Eredivisie then over four seasons you would expect to see his numbers significantly better.

Once at Liverpool, Suarez has a shot at an almost identical frequency to Rooney yet he needs twice as many shots to score one goal.

In a nutshell, this boils down to Suarez and Rooney playing three Premier League games.  In these three games they will both have 15 shots. However Rooney will score two goals in the three games and Suarez only one.  Over a Premier League season this is roughly the equivalent of Rooney scoring 25 goals and Suarez 13 goals.

[PT: Of course, Suarez is just one year into his time in English football, whereas Rooney has been at Manchester United for eight seasons now, improving gradually over that time; before 2010, he'd only scored more than 14 league goals in a season once, and averaged a hardly-prolific 13 over his first five seasons. Equally, van Persie has recently gone from, at best, a goal every other game, to roughly a goal a game in the past year or so. Both players are older than Suarez.]

Penalties

A quick mention on penalties. During his time at Ajax, Suarez scored 18 penalties. Since 08/09 Rooney has scored 15 and Van Persie seven.

Without the actual details on penalties taken/scored, the approximate conversion rates excluding penalties are:

Now penalties have been excluded, Van Persie’s “shots per goal” is more than three fewer than Suarez at Ajax!

[PT: As roughly 70% of penalties are scored, if Suarez had taken all of Liverpool's penalties since arriving, and scored them at the average rate, he'd have more goals and a higher conversion rate from chances – as a penalty increases the chances of scoring from the 'normal' shot conversion rate of 5-15% to 70%. The problem is, he's taken one in the league, and one in the cup, and missed both.] 

Conclusions

The analysis of Suarez’s Eredivisie data is fairly emphatic. We can draw three firm conclusions:

1. Suarez is not yet an efficient goalscorer or a clinical finisher
2. It is only Suarez’s volume of shots that enable his goalscoring record to look impressive
3. Luis Suarez is a roaming, attacking number 10, not a goalscoring number 9.

At face value, Suarez appears to be a great goalscorer but this is probably not the case. The reality is that he is a forward who is heavily involved in his team’s attacking play but who is fundamentally wasteful.

So what does this mean for Liverpool going forward?  Quite simply, that if the plan is to continue to rely on Suarez to be the primary goalscorer in the team then it will in all likelihood fail. Suarez will not be scoring enough goals for Liverpool to win enough games.  Therefore the plan must be how to best utilise Suarez as a roaming 10 in a system where the primary goalscoring responsibility can be borne by others. 

Looking back to his time in the Netherlands this seems obvious, as he spent most of his time not playing centre forward:

• At Groningen he played mainly with Erik Nevland as one of two central strikers;
• In his first season at Ajax Klaas Jan Huntelaar was CF;
• In 2008/09, Huntelaar started as CF, Suarez played some games himself there and later Dario Cvitanich was CF;
• In his most prolific season Suarez began at CF. Cvitanich or Pantelic played most matches at CF thereafter;
• In his final season, Mounir el Hamdaoui was CF.

Analysis of the future tactical options and the implications for the personnel at Liverpool will be the subject of a follow up post.

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